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Abstract
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE BRITISH RESPONSE
1834 - 1885
by
Gali Oda Tealakh
Supervisor Dr. David W. Sweet
This thesis is a study of Russia's expansion at the expense of the Khanates of
Central Asia in the nineteenth century, beginning with the early exploratory missions
of the 1 830s and 1 840s, continuing with the conquest of Kokand and Bukhara in the
1860s, the subjection of Khiva in 1873, and concluding with the fall of Mery in 1884.
The threat to British interests represented by this expansion is examined, including a
study of Russian projects for the invasion of India, and the failure of the British to react
more decisively than they did is explained: only when the Russian advance threatened
the continuation of Afghanistan as a buffer state did the British exert their influence to
halt the Russian advance. The motives and procedures of Russia's expansion in the
region are examined, specifically through the case history of the construction of the
Central Asian railroad, and more generally in the policy of Russification upon which
the Russians embarked even before their conquest was complete. An examination of the
interaction of economic, political and military motives underlying the Russian expansion
leads to the conclusion that, although its long-term economic, social, and cultural
consequences for Central Asia were enormous, the more immediate logic purpose of
the Russian conquests was military, administrative, and political.
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NOTES
ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION
The consistent spelling of names, whether personal or geographical, in a
Turkic region subject to at least three cultural influences, Arabic, Russian, and
Persian, presents in itself an insurmountable challenge to the historian of the region.
In the nineteenth century, the transliteration of Russian and Arabic characters for
Western as well as Russian travellers and writers of the nineteenth century was
evidently a matter of personal convenience, intelligence, and preference. Thus the
spelling of geographical or personal names, Russian or Turkic, frequently differs
from one author to another. Following the Russian conquest and the introduction of
the Cyrillic alphabet, the renaming of places, rivers, and cities, besides the intensive
efforts towards Russification in the fields of administration, education, and the
economy, further complicated the problem.
In this thesis, for transliterating Arabic, Turkish, and Persian words, The
Encyclopedia of Islam (4 volumes and supplements, Leyden, London 19 13-1938) has
been consulted, and also the Handbook of Oriental History, C. H. Phillips, (ed.),
(London 1963). For transliterating Russian characters I have observed the following
system which is based on the systems of the British Library and the Library of
Congress:
Russian English
	
Russian	 English Russian	 English
Aa....Aa	 56 ......Bb	 BB .....Vv
Fr....Gg	 Zi .....Dd	 Ee ......Ee
Eë )KK .... . Zh	 3	 ......Zz
Ii	 liii	 KK .....Kk
JIjI.....Li	 MM....Mm	 HH .....Nn
Oo....Oo	 liii .....Pp	 Pp ......Rr
Cc.....Ss	 TT .....Tt	 Yy .....Uu
	
FfXx .....Kh	 L[i ......Ts
q	 Ch	 LU iii ......Sh	 LLI iu	 Shch
'L, TB 8 p hi 3 H a K (has no equivalent in English)	 hi hi .... . Y y
b, Mci r X K H cI 3 H a K (has no equivalent in English)	 3	 ...... E e
IOio .....lu	 Ia
Translations from Russian language sources are mine, unless otherwise in-
dicated as being quoted from an already translated source.
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INTRODUCTION
Russia in Asia
The nineteenth century was a decisive era in the political and economic
relations between Russia and the Khanates of Central Asia. These relations, as we
shall see, had their roots deep in history as a direct result of Russia's geographical
location. The history of Russia's association with Asia had been from its beginning
different from that of any other European colonial power. The geographical
difference is evident enough: Russia, itself part of the Eurasian land mass, had
established itself in Siberia in the late sixteenth century after the fall of the city of
Sibir to Yermak in 1582. It has been customary to distinguish between Russia in
Europe and Russia in Asia, although there are no distinct geographical barriers
between the two. The Urals mountains cannot be considered as a barrier, because of
their permeability on the one hand, and because on the other they leave a wide and
fertile prairie between their southern end and the Caspian Sea.
Russia had herself been under the domination of Asian peoples, the Mongols
and the Tatars, for more than 200 years: a period long enough to exert a strong
influence on the Russians culturally as well as ethnically. Even linguistically the
Tatars and the Mongols left their traces in the Russian vocabulary. Some historians
have explained the oriental habits in Russian life, and words in the Russian
language, as a heritage of the Tataro-Mongol domination.' After liberating herself
from Tataro-Mongol domination, Russia naturally would expand, and as a reverse
tendency the expansion was more notably in the direction of her now declining
Asian neighbours. This process developed in correlation to the westernization of
Russia: it is true to say that Russia became an Asiatic power by westernizing herself.
Russia's expansion in Asia was marked by a dual phenomenon: by expanding
through Siberia and further east to the Pacific ocean, Russia was following a natural
law of expansion; on the other hand her expansion in Central Asia may be charact-
erized as an imperialist endeavour.2
I
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Russia's expansion into Asia began in the sixteenth century. It was in no
sense a coordinated expansion, but rather an organic process partly touched off by
the removal of the Tataro-Mongol rule and constraints, the predatory spirit of the
Cossacks, the merchant-adventurer tradition of the Novgorod traders, and the sense
of mission implanted in the Russians. Believing themselves to be the heirs of the
Byzantine imperial tradition, with their inheritance of the Holy Scriptures in a
language intelligible to those who could read, 3 fascinated with the image of Spain as
the protector of Christendom in the west, and in a desperate attempt to emphasize
their European identity, the Russians aspired to play the role of the eastern wing of
Christianity defending European civilization from barbarism and the Islamic
offensive. All of these factors exerted a stimulating and tangible influence upon
Russia's political behaviour in Asia as well as in Europe. Russia made her first
movements eastward in Siberia, and the Pacific ocean was reached by the end of the
seventeenth century. During this phase the Russians encountered on1y primitive
tribes inhabiting vast territories, who were soon outnumbered by the more dynamic
Russian settlers.
The southward movement from Siberia, which began in the eighteenth
century, first into the steppe region of Kazakhstan and later, in the nineteenth
century, into the Khanates of Central Asia, was what might be characterised as
manifest destiny. In Lord Curzon's words, "Russia was as much compelled to go
forward as the earth is to go round the sun". 4 Russia, by expanding eastward and
southward in Asia, was following laws of natural growth, encouraged by two
underlying considerations; the first of which was the need to secure access to an
open sea free of ice, and the second was the urgent need for markets far and secure
from her European competitors.
Russian expansionist activities south of the Urals in the nineteenth century
have been regarded as a response to the needs of the development of mercantile
2
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capitalism in Russia. In this phase the Russian textile industry, as indeed the whole
Russian economy, needed new markets and cheap sources of raw materials secure
from European rivals. Hence some Russian and Soviet historians have emphasized
the economic factor behind Russia's advance in Central Asia; whereas many western
writers and historians have regarded her conquest of the steppe and Central Asia as
part of her strategy against India, which is indeed supported by the numerous plans
designed and developed by several of her most prominent Imperial Generals for that
purpose.
In retrospect, a number of reasons for Russian expansion - economic, pout-
ical, and military - have been advanced, but it is still not clear how far, and in what
proportion, each of those reasons weighed with the Russian Government itself,
confronted as it often was with situations created by decisions taken on the spot by
local military commanders or governors, but, of course, attentively inspired by "Rus-
sia's interest" as a guideline. D. A. Miiutin, 5 the Russian War Minister (1861-1881)
commented regarding this matter:
I have summoned local commanders to follow as closely as possible the
instructions and directives given to them, but in addition I recognised that it
would be damaging to deprive them through such instructions of their
personal initiatives.6
The minister here admitted that the officers should have the right of self-judgement,
and deal with any situation in light of the prevailing circumstances according to their
"personal initiatives". In addition, the War Minister frequently found himself in
conflict with the views and policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding
procedures in Central Asia. Summing up the whole process, M. G. Cherniaev7
manifesting his admiration towards such a principle, i.e seif-judgement, wrote to
Prince Bariatynskii8
 in 1867 saying:
It is a splendid fact in the history of extending our dominions..., that all our
actions from the Ural to the Irtysh, to the feet of the Himalayas and Tian-
Shan have been achieved by the initiatives of regional officers, in the face of
successive opposition on the part of the central government.9
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The countries lying between the western frontiers of China and the Caspian
Sea presented Russia with problems and situations entirely unlike those which the
Russians had experienced in their earlier advance into Siberia and the Steppe region.
Here they confronted societies with old civilizations and established traditions, and
fierce warlike tribes. In addition, Russia found herself obliged to take into consider-
ation the fact that behind the belt of mountains to the south lay the power of the
British Empire, a centre that radiated a counter influence, political and economic, all
over this part of Asia, and had equal interests in it. Russia suddenly found herself
faced with a great European Empire, and was obliged to shift her policy from one
adapted to the Asian context to one more suited to European political psychology.
From a cultural and, particularly, a historical point of view, the Central Asian
peoples may have seemed barbaric to the Russians, nor did they have for them the
same feeling of ethnic affinity which existed elsewhere towards Ukrainians,
Bulgarians, and Baltic peoples, or in other words all those areas where the "lesser
brother" lived. 10 The Central Asians, despite the state of decline that had overcome
them even before the Russian advance, still themselves felt their glorious past, and
remembered that in the recent past they had played a role of rivalry with Russia, and
that for a substantial period of the more remote past they had dominated over her.
During the nineteenth century Russia developed close but mostly hostile and
antagonistic contacts with the people of Central Asia. These relations, reflected in
the memoirs of politicians, historians, and pamphieteers, were such that Russian
officials in Central Asia saw in Britain, their avowed rival, less animosity than in the
indigenous peoples. The first Governor-General of Central Asia, Kaufmann, wrote in
1876 to the Russian Minister for War that the Russians "have reciprocal interests
with England in Asia: together with her we have common enemies, Islam and
barbarism"."
Painstakingly Russia portrayed her Asian neighbours to European courts as
4
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barbarians, an image which to some extent granted her the role of a nation with a
civilizing mission on the one hand and legitimised her military action on the other.
By mistreatment of European travellers, by engaging in the slave trade, and through
their tyrannical rule over their own people, the Governments of the Khanates
contributed to the success of Russia's allegations and facilitated the achievement of
her designs. Despite repeated advice by Britain and the Government of India to
avoid furnishing Russia with pretexts for advance, they continued in their habits, and
intensified their rivalries and ravaging internecine wars.
Historiography
Both Russian and western historians have advanced a variety of explanations
for the expansion of Russia in Central Asia. Among the main reasons offered have
been the increasing need to establish new markets for her trade; the need to combat
British designs against her influence in Central Asia; and the design against British
India.' 2
 In varying degrees, and in different circumstances, all of these factors can
be seen to have played some part in stimulating as well as in justifying the expan-
sion. The treatment of the subject by Soviet historians of Central Asia has varied
considerably. While fairly consistent in condemning the imperialism of the Tsarist
Government and the oppressive nature of its administration of Central Asia, those
historians have at times contrived to give an impression of a natural inevitability
about the process. While considering that the Tsarist Government was not actuated
by the purest motives, some have stifi depicted the Russian conquest as not in fact a
conquest at all, but a process of "voluntary adherence" (dobrovolnoe prisoedinenie)
to the Russian empire of peoples oppressed by their native rulers, or threatened with
absorption by other imperialist powers, notably Britain. Thus they have misapplied
the Soviet interpretive philosophy of the twentieth century to historical events that
took place in the nineteenth century. From most, if not all, Soviet history writings
5
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during the last three decades, which followed the 1950s, the word conquest
(zavoevanie) has been dropped and the expression "voluntary adherence" or "joining"
(prisoedinenie) substituted.'3
It is thus most noteworthy that some Soviet historians, since the second
World War, have changed the evaluation of Tsarist Russia's expansionist policy in
Kazakhstan and Central Asia.' 4 They justify their new attitude by explaining that a
change of interpretation was necessitated by the misunderstanding which had taken
place in the thirties of this century under the impact of the "anti-Marxist" school of
Pokrovskii, which had led to this question being interpreted incorrectly.' 5 Their
new interpretation involves considerable modification of the previous orthodoxy and
in particular tends to promote a misleading impression that there were no antago-
nisms between the native Central Asians and the Tsarist authorities during the
Russian subjugation of Central Asia. In justification of their attitude, which con-
tradicts incontrovertible evidence of the ruthlessness of the Russian policy of
subjugation, and the fierce resistance of the indigenous population to the Russian
military administration, they attributed the reason for that resistance to the endless
feudal wars and raids, in which rival factions besides Uzbek and Turkoman tribal
elites took part, which ruined the country, and interrupted the economic life of the
people. According to their debatable interpretation, this situation brought the
Turkoman people to regard Russia as the power that would be able to put an end to
these wars.' 6 In addition, they seek to attribute the resistance of the Turkomans
merely to the influence of their Muslim spiritual leadership and the encouragement
of British imperialism. The members of this new school attempt to paint a rosy
picture of the relations between Russia and Central Asia by arguing that trade, dip-
lomatic relations, and economic intercourse were growing substantially despite the
raids of the nomadic tribes; that their raids in turn necessitated the escort of com-
mercial caravans by military detachments; and that every five or six years an
6
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embassy from Bukhara and Khiva would arrive in Moscow and St. Petersburg for
the purpose of expanding these relations. 17 In fact, it was not only a practice of
tribesmen to plunder and loot caravans, it was also a customary practice and settled
policy of Russian troops to despoil and pillage. We fmd much documented evidence
of such practices in Russian sources of the nineteenth century:
In 1871, while Colonel Markozov was conducting a reconnaissance operation
accompanied by a regiment of his force in Uzba, near Tubiatana to the north
of Chekishlar, he surrounded a trade caravan consisted of 300 camels coming
from Khiva to the Attrek and despoiled it.18
The revisionist arguments cannot provide an adequate basis for justifying the
subjugation and later the assimilation of the nations of Central Asia by Tsarist
Russia, and cannot stand as a ground for such a gross reinterpretation of history. The
historical records suggests a completely different interpretation. From the early
nineteenth century, and at first by way of trade relations, the Russian government
began to conduct delicate reconnaissance activities. De Maizon's expedition to
Bukhara in 1833-1834, which will be alluded to later, 19 leaves neither ambiguity
nor room for the pretence of friendly intentions or equal relations with the Khanates
of Central Asia. The way this mission was designed, and the duties and assignments
given to De Maizon, from the outset reveal the real intentions and ambitions of
Russia in the region.
The earlier Soviet perspective on the history of Central Asia - which is now
the subject of recent condemnation and criticism by Soviet historians - such as that
approach contained in lstoriia Narodov Uzbekistana (History of the Uzbek Peo-
ples),20 does not in most respects diverge from any other Russian works related to
the history of that region. One of the important differences, (now once again
categorically denied), is the recognition in that work that the Khanates had already
reached the level of centralized governments, and had achieved an advanced level of
development in their political as well as social and economic life, even before the
Russian occupation. This recognition of course leaves no space for claiming a prog-
7
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ressive role for the Russian conquest, or for that civilizing role of Russia which has
been so vehemently propagated during the last three decades.
Interestingly, the advocates of the new school obviously try to avoid recogni-
tion of that characteristic brutality which had marked the Russian advance from its
beginning. Lord Curzon, who visited in 1888 a Tekke Turkomans' site in the compa-
ny of an eye-witness of the campaign of 1881, who was acquainted with the details
of the storming of the fortress, wrote:
at 4 in the afternoon Skobelev led his cavalry through the breach and ordered
both horse and foot to pursue the retreating enemy and to give no quarter.
This command was obeyed with savage precision by both till darkness fell...
Eight thousand persons of both sexes and all ages were mercilessly cut down
and slain. On the morning after the battle they lay in rows like freshly mown
hay, as they had been swept down by the mitrailleuses and cannon. In the
fort were found the corpses of 6,500 men, ... all who had not succeeded in
escaping were killed to a man by the Russian soldiers,... The troops were
allowed to loot without interruption for four days. Within the same time
Skobelev admitted that he must have destroyed 20,000 of the enemy.2'
Evidently, for the sake of contemporary political goals, the revisionists have
not hesitated to moderate the historical record as established by the sources in many
languages. For instance the genocide of the Geok-Tepe Turkomans, who in January
1881 made their last valiant effort against Skobelev - who was given carte blanche
in his selection of both the manner and means of operation - which in Lord Curzon's
words "was not a rout but a massacre, not a defeat, but an extirpation". 22 Krausse,
another contemporary, gave this account:
As soon as the flight of the Tekkes had begun, Skobelev led his cavalry
through the breach and ordered a pursuit to be made by both horse and foot
soldiers, who were instructed to give no quarter... All who had not succeeded
in escaping previously - men, women, and children - were killed by the
pursuers... The soldiers cut down the fugitives where they found them,
leaving the dead upon the plain mown down as if with a scythe, men and
women, children and infants, all dead, many frightfully mutilated in the cause
of the civilizing spread of Russian influence. After the pursuit the troops
were allowed to loot for four days...23
The "civilizing" mission of Imperial Russia in her actual treatment of the
8
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indigenous peoples is also vividly recorded by MacGahan, who escorted the Russian
troops in the campaign against the Yomuds in 1873, and who gives a startling
eyewitness account of that march. After describing the peaceful fields and fruit trees,
and the pleasant Turkoman boys and girls offering Golovachev's infantry and
Cossacks bread, fruits, and milk, MacGahan says:
I was still musing on the quietness and desolation of the scene, when all at
once I was startled by a sharp crackling sound behind me. Looking round, I
beheld a long tongue of flame darting upward from the roof of the house into
which I had just been peering, and an another from the stack of nicely-
gathered unthreshed wheat near it. The dry straw-thatched roof flashed up
like powder, and the ripe wheat-straw burned almost as readily. Huge vol-
umes of dense black smoke rose out of the trees in every direction, and
rolled overhead in dark ominous looking clouds, coloured by the fiery glare
from the flames below. I spurred my horse to the top of a little eminence,
and gazed about me. It was a strange, wild spectacle. In an incredibly short
space of time flames and smoke had spread on either side to the horizon,
and, advancing steadily forward in the direction of our course, slowly enve-
loped everything. Through this scene moved the Cossacks like spectres.
Torch in hand, they dashed swiftly across the country, leaping ditches and
flying over walls like demons, and leaving behind them a trail of flame and
smoke. They rarely dismounted, but simply rode up to the houses, applied
their blazing torches to the projecting eaves of thatch, and the stacks of
unthreshed grain, and then galloped on. Five minutes afterwards, sheets of
seething flame and darkling smoke showed how well they had done their
work. The entire country was on fire.
In half an hour the sun was hidden, the sky grew dark; for, as though
the sudden lighting of so many fires had produced some change in the
atmosphere, a rain set in - a thing almost unknown in Khiva, and which
added one dismal feature more to the already dismal scene. It was a slow,
drizzling rain, not sufficient to put out the fires, but only to beat off the ashes
and make them burn brighter, to drive down the smoke, and make it hang
over the trees in heavy, sullen masses, darkening the air, and forming a
lowering background to the blood-coloured flames. This was war such as I
had never before seen, and such as is rarely seen in modern days.
It was a sad, sad sight... •25
Sometimes these same historians, who defend the Russian "civilizing role" in
Central Asia, contradict themselves by admitting contrary views to those they
propagate, when for instance they admit the existence of discontent among the
Turkoman people, caused by the expansionist policy of Tsarism and the actions of
9
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its armies. They emphasise that discontent was invented and utilized by what they
call the reactionary Turkoman elite and Muslim spiritual leadership, which they
accuse of having been connected with the British intelligence service. This attitude,
towards the Turkomans' leadership indiscriminately, must inevitably lead to the
conclusion that cooperation or sympathy between the Turkomans and the Russians
was excluded, although asserted by Soviet historians. Indeed, they spontaneously
admit that the Russians were unwelcome, when they affirm that in Turkestan the
Tsarist armies were met with severe and unusual resistance by the Turkoman tribes,
especially in Akhal. The heaviest casualties inflicted on the Russian army in all its
campaigns in Central Asia were in the Turkoman country, where these modern inter-
preters of history claim amity and harmony. 27 In the face of the undeniable facts of
history, they attribute the atrocities to Tsarism rather than to Russia generally, or to
individual abuses of authority which accompanied Russia's expansion:
A brutal military-colonial rule had been installed after annexing Turkmenistan
to Russia. Tsarism strove to withhold economic and cultural development
from the Turkoman people... •28
Elsewhere, these authors refer to "insulting Tsarist policy.., dictated by the
eruption of the Russian colonial advance and by the military strategic situation".29
They have also offered the rationalisation that Russia's and Tsarism's 3° aggression
had been escalated by the active expansionist policy of England in Central Asia,
which jeopardized Russia's security, an explanation hardly consonant with the policy
of "masterly inactivity" generally pursued by the British in Central Asia.31
It is in order to subject both Stalinist and post-Stalinist interpretations to a
more empirical scrutiny that I have returned to the contemporary sources available to
the historian of the present day. The reader will find a description of the most
valuable of these, in both Russian and English, in the bibliographical essay which
precedes the bibliography at the end of this work.
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Geography and ethnology
It is important to notice here that Soviet historians usually use two different
geographical expressions when referring to Central Asia. They use the term Tsent-
ralnaia Aziia, which means "Central Asia", when they refer to Kazakhstan or the
prairie region Stepnoi krai with the region extending to the south-west of Mongo-
lia;32 and for what is known in the west as Central Asia they use Sredniaia Azia,
which means "Middle Asia". 33 Apparently, the motive is not a pure scientific but a
political one. They aspire to separate the Kazakh steppes, which Russia conquered
and incorporated earlier, without substantial international attention or impediments,
from what Russia annexed in the second half of the nineteenth century. It appears
that Soviet historians have been anxious to establish divisions and distinctions
between the peoples of the region. Russian Turkestan now consists of four Soviet
Republics: Kirghiziia (Kirghizistan), Tadzhikistan, Turkmeniia (Turkmenistan), and
Uzbekistan. The fifth is the Republic of Kazakhstan, which occupies the steppe
region. The indigenous populations of all five Republics are Muslim and non-
Russian, and are all ethnically closer to each other than any of them is to the
Russians or the Slays.
The peoples inhabiting the region, anthropologically speaking can be grouped
as follows: the Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks belong to the Caucasoid race of the type
known as Central Asian riverain; the Kazakhs and Kirghiz belong to the south
Siberian type formed as a result of the mingling of the Central Asian Mongoloids
with the ancient Caucasoid population of Kazakhstan. Although the Mongoloid
features of the Kazakhs, and even more of the Kirghiz, are more evident than those
of the other peoples of Central Asia, they are not typical representatives of the
Mongoloid race. The Turkomans are from a different ethnic group: they are of the
Khorasan type, which is related to the Mediterranean group, and they are consider-
ably taller.34
11
introduction
The area between the Oxus (Aniu-Daria) and the Jaxartes (Syr-Daria) is
dominated, ethnically speaking, by the Iranians, who gradually absorbed the succes-
sive waves of foreign races which swept through the region from the Altai,35
namely the Tats, Tazhiks, Sarts, Gaisha, and Persians, who can be found over that
vast region from the Indus to the Jaxartes, with Afghan domination to the south and
Uzbek to the north. In earlier periods, from 700 B.0 to 300 A.D., this region had
been swept by Uralian tribes, Finns, and Laps who expanded to reach India in one
direction and Syria and Asia Minor in another. As a western historian commented in
1875, this vast migration and long-continued occupancy must at the time have left
its impress, more or less strongly marked, on all the countries intermediate between
the Jaxartes and the Euphrates. 36 This impress then conflicted with the influx of
another family of tribes: the Turkic wave of immigration followed, and from the
fourth century to the tenth there seems to have been a continuous stream of Turkic
tribes pouring in from the Altai and pushing towards Europe. The mixture was
completed by the expeditions of Chenkiz Khan and Timur, which coloured the
Turkish complexion in Central and Western Asia.37
It was this rich combination of ethnic diversity which the Russians, under
both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, sought to subdue and Russify. Its incorporation into
the Russian empire has, as we have seen, presented severe problems of ideological
justification to successive schools of Russian and Soviet historiography. The history
of Russia's relations with the peoples of Central Asia still therefore offers many
topics awaiting investigation. Fascinating episodes of conquering colonialism and
heroic resistance happened precisely here, in Central Asia. I hope that this modest
study of an era before the Sovietization of Central Asia will be a useful contribution
to the scholarship of the subject, and may further the investigation of the earlier as
well as the later periods of Russia's presence in this sensitive and neglected region.
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Chapter One
RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA:
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Russia's early contacts with Central Asia
It is hard, if not impossible, to ascertain the precise date at which contacts
were established between Russia and Central Asia. Some Arabic records place that
date in the tenth century, 1
 while some Russian historians indicate that commercial
routes between Russia and Central Asia, mainly in the region of the Amu-Daria
river, were established in the eighth century.2
 Contacts with Central Asia were
however greatly enhanced during the reign of Peter the Great, who pushed Russia's
peripheries outwards in every direction in Europe and in Asia as well. As a
nineteenth-century British commentator noted, Peter
devised a scheme of territorial annexation, which during his own splendid
career he practised with the greatest success upon neighbouring countries,
which he bequeathed to his successors, and which a very slight knowledge of
Russian history will enable us to recognize as the formula since adhered to
by the successive occupants of the Muscovite throne.3
The early historiography of Central Asia was derived from tradition and from
casual notices, and in certain brief sketches given by the historians of Alexander the
Great's period, until the Arab conquest of the region in the tenth century, when "the
Arab invaders were followed by annalists, whose minute narratives have left no
period obscure from that date".4
 This period in the history of Central Asia
represents a new era which witnessed the first civilizing effect of Islam on Central
Asia. Some Soviet historians dispute this proposition and argue that it was not the
Arabs and Islam that influenced Central Asian culture, but that Arab and Islamic
culture was derived from Central Asia? Presumably they have adopted this flimsy
interpretation because of political as well as ideological considerations, for on the
one hand Islam is the second largest religion in Russia, and on the other they seem
13
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unwilling to admit a positive role for any religion even in the past. By contrast hist-
orians in the West, including some who are pro-Soviet, concede that "the people of
Turkestan never entered history as a nation in their own right". 6 Yet others have
argued that
it was Islam which, as it were, put Central Asia on the map as a region in-
habited by peoples who had to some extent succeeded in organizing their
society and were thus qualified to enter history.7
The properly documented history of Russia's relations with the region can be
traced back to Ivan 111(1462-1505), who was the first Russian monarch to take ad-
vantage of the situation that prevailed as a result of the rivalry between the Tatars of
Kazan and the Crimea on the one hand, and the Golden Horde on the other. He
sided with the Tatars who successfully paralysed the power of the Golden Horde.8
The Russian colonial movement eastward began in the middle of the sixteenth cen-
tury during the reign of Ivan Groznyi (the Terrible) (1547-1584). This was a venture
of an altogether different and more expansionist kind: the fall of the Khanate of
Kazan in October 1552 was followed in 1556 by the fall of the Khanate of Astra-
khan, to bring the Russian borders to the mouth of the Volga river and the northern
shores of the Caspian Sea for the first time in Russia's history, and to make her a
Eurasian power in close proximity to Central Asia. At this stage the Russia state
began to face the problem of securing its borders against nomad incursions. To treat
this problem, Russia built chains of fortified posts to block those nomads from
reaching the central provinces of the Empire, and the government "soon discovered
what use could be made of the Cossack communities which were springing up in the
frontier regions". 9 The ebb and flow of the tide between Asia and Europe ended in
favour of Russia. She invaded and expanded to the East by land in the period of the
great discoveries, when Spain and Portugal were discovering the new world by sea.
Apparently Russia was for a period unaware of the decay of her eastern
neighbours, despite the fact that the balance of power between her and Asia had
14
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turned in her favour. Thus in 1581 Yermak Timofeivich Povolzheskii, the Ataman of
the Volga Cossacks,a was not only blamed, but was actually condemned to death for
getting involved in war with Kuchum, the Khan of western Siberia. The Muscovite
Grand Duke (Kniaz) Stroganov'° was the first to blame Yermak, and sent him a
warning message remonsirating with him for becoming "involved in dispute with
such a great and strong neighbour".' 1 Ivan the Terrible regarded this adventure of
Yermak as a disgrace, and wrote thus to the Stroganovs who sheltered Yermak and
had him in their service in Perm:
If you do not dismiss from your service the band of the Volga Cossacks,
namely Yermak, the robber chief and his followers, or if you show negli-
gence in protecting Perm and indulge in repetition of this treacherous
conduct, a severe chastisement will be visited upon you, and the robber
Chiefs and Cos sacks who have obeyed and served you, while they have left
my territory unprotected, shall be put to death.'2
Obviously, Ivan's reaction was based on the assumption that Yermak could
not conquer Kuchum, the Khan of Sibiria, presuming that any confrontation with
that Khan would result in a disaster to Russia. But after Yermak's victory and the
fall of the town of Sibir' 3 in 1581, the Cossack leader sent one of his followers
a The word Cossack apparently was derived from the Turkic word "Kazak", which
means free frontiersman. On the top of each Cossack community there was an Ataman.
Later, after total submission to Moscow in the 18th century the Ataman was substituted by a
"Voevoda" or military commander. The Cossack hosts sprang up wherever Russia expanded.
The names of these hosts indicate their location and their territories: the Kuban Cossacks,
the Astrakhan, the Ural, the Don, the Siberian, later the Turkestan Cossacks, the Trans-
Baikal, the Semirechinsk, etc. The Cossacks (the Russian word "Kazaky" or "Kazachestvo"
means rangers or wanderers) sprang up and flourished as a military power by taking part in
the wars between Russia, Poland, and the Tatars. What associated them with Russia was no
national or Slavic sympathy, for they did not belong to the Great Russian race (Velilco-Rus),
but rather a vague communion in the Orthodox faith, which led them to hate the Poles as
Catholics as much as the Turks as Muslims. It was therefore possible as well as less
dangerous for the Tsars of Muscovy to recruit them as allies and employ them in frontier
defence. They formed military settlements on the fringes of the Empire depending on agri-
culture and ready, in a very short time, to provide a menacing cavalry force using their own
arms and horses. Liashchenko, P. I., Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR (History of the Na-
tional Economy of the USSR), vol. I, (Leningrad 1947) p.358-361. Also vide Abdykalykov,
M., and Pankratova, A., Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR (History of Kazakhistan SSR) (Alma-Ata
1943); Pushkarev, S. G., Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms, (Yale University 1970), p.
35; and Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia in Asia, pp. 35-7.
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named Koitso to Moscow to tender the submission of the Siberian kingdom to the
Tsar; he was received in State by Ivan,' 4 and subsequently Yermak enjoyed the
forgiveness of his monarch and entered Russian history as a hero, not as a convicted
felon.
The Russian advance in Siberia was remarkably rapid and the shores of the
Pacific were reached by the end of the seventeenth century. Historically speaking,
Siberia was a safe haven for Russian outlaws like Yermak as well as those farmer-
settlers' 5 and fugitives who fled the inhumane treatment to which they were
subjected in their home-land. Most of those who migrated to distant Siberia were
actually rebellious against the Russian authority or fleeing from exaction and serf-
dom. 16 But they behaved differently when Tsarist authority, their former oppressor,
followed their progress into Siberia, where they became an effective instrument for
attesting and spreading that authority, 17 as indeed was the case with Yermak
himself and his Cossack band. The process of expansion was spontaneously hastened
by oppression and the severe rule of absolutism in Russia's heartlands, that resulted
in a massive exodus eastward. As Mackenzie Wallace, Britain's leading observer of
Russian affairs in the later nineteenth century, dramatically expressed it:
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this oppression reached its
climax. The increase in the numbers of officials, the augmentation of the
taxes, the merciless exactions of the Voyevods" and their subordinates, the
transformation of the free peasants into serfs, the ecclesiastical reforms and
consequent persecutions of the Old Ritualists, the frequent conscription and
violent reforms of Peter the Great, these and similar burdens made thousands
flee and seek a refuge in the free territory where there were no proprietors,
no Voyevods, and no tax-gatherers. But the State, with its army of officials
and tax-gatherers, followed close on the heels of the fugitives, and those who
wished to preserve their liberty had to advance still further. Notwithstanding
the efforts of the authorities to retain the population in the localities actually
occupied, the wave of colonization moved steadily onwards.'8
The history of Russia's advance eastward was marked by political ambiguity
I)• Voevod literally means commander of army, but in old Russia this title was officially
given to functionaries who fulfilled both jobs: a local army commander and civil governor.
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and military consistency, which includes no record of any instance of withdrawal
from any region once occupied at the expense of Muslim Central Asia. Equally, her
expansion into Central Asia though comparatively slow especially in its earlier
stages, was subject to no retrogression, and clearly guided by an unfaltering purpose:
an uninterrupted chronicle of aggression, of acquisition, and of assimilation that
began with the conquest of Perm and Siberia down to the subjugation of Kokand,
Bukhara, Khiva, and Merv, culminating in Russia's establishment as an Asiatic great
power bordering China, Afghanistan, and Persia. During her drive she developed a
peculiar system of "colonies constituting colonies of their own with their own regu-
lations"9. This was the situation of Perm as regards Siberia, of Orenburg towards
the steppe, and later in the 1 860s the case of the Russian province of Turkestan
towards the Uzbek Khanates. After the conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia in
the sixteenth century, and the establishment of Orenburg as the centre of her
proceedings on the steppe and in Central Asia, Russia adopted a unique policy of al-
legiance leading to assimilation, and protection leading to subjugation, in dealing
with the nomads of the steppe; who, one after another, to the close of the nineteenth
century, acknowledged the might of Russia, by confessing allegiance which it has
been the consistent endeavour of Russian administrators to develop into assimilation
with the rest of the Empire.2°
The conquest of Siberia has been said to have brought under Russia's control
fifty-nine different nationalities of different languages and creeds and it added nearly
five million square miles to her territory.2' Russia advanced in obedience, as it
were, to a social-Darwinist law that, as amongst animals the stronger species
eliminated the weaker, so amongst men the stronger state subdued the weaker and
seized its resources. In this regard Russia, endowed by nature with the necessary
social psychology, half European and half Asian, ruthlessly implemented these
principles in her dealings, not only with Asian societies, but with neighbouring
17
Historical background
nations in Europe as well.
Official advice tendered to the India Office shows that some Russophiles in
Britain were disposed to give the Russians their support in this process, at least in so
far as the conquest of Asia was concerned, and to emphasize Russia's "civilizing"
mission as the:
most eastern of the fraternity of nations comprised in the continent of
Europe. The civilization of the East and West, or as some would probably
put it, the barbarism of the East and the civilization of the West, meet on her
confmes.22
Be that as it may, it remains true that in terms of power-politics, until the middle of
the nineteenth century, Russia met no power able to halt her advance either in
Siberia or in the steppe, and the resistance of her victims was insufficient to
maintain and safeguard their independence.
The Russian arrival at the Central Asian stage of her expansion was preceded
by centuries of foreign invasion and internal wars between the Khanates that
prevented the "natural process of nation-forming" among the peoples of Central
Asia.23 The Russians came in to the region with different methods, goals, and
policies. Under the camouflage of civilizing, stabilizing, and pacifying, they conquer-
ed, assimilated, annexed and sealed, proclaiming that this expansion was a natural
movement aimed at securing the trade routes, pacifying "barbarous" tribes and
achieving natural frontiers. By appeal to these three issues, Russia justified the
advance which led to the absorption of the Central Asian Khanates with which she
claimed to have profitable trade-relations. The last decade of the eighteenth century
was a turning point in the history of Russian-Central Asian relations. Russian
opinion then began to regard the region as being significant as an undivided political
and geographical unit, rather than as a convenient depot on the way to India as had
previously been assumed in Russian strategic thinking.
By the end of the seventeenth century Russia had established economic,
cultural, and political relations with Persia, China, Central Asia, and there had been
18
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sporadic contacts with thdia. Terentiev 26 informs us that the Bukharans, as mer-
chants and missionaries, appeared in Siberia as early as its settlement.c They became
closely involved with the Siberian tribes, helped them in managing their economic
affairs, and as a result they became influential. Until 1834 the Bukharans were the
most privileged merchants in Siberia and the steppe, and they were the only in-
vestors. For the purpose of promoting economic activities, the Russian administration
exempted them from paying any tariffs or taxes. Russia since the beginning of her
conquest of Siberia avoided doing any thing to hinder the Bukharans' enterprise, but
left them to continue their economic and missionary activities among the Tatar
tribes; Aial, Baram, Tchat, and others, who were under Russian administrative
control, were thus at the same time under Bukharan economic influence 27 . Russia
was obliged to acquiesce in this situation due to the inadequacy of her communica-
tions with Siberia, which had to pass through the tundra and forest zones, which
rendered them slow and difficult, thus severely impeding her trade with Siberia;28
whereas the routes between Siberia and her southern neighbours, the Bukharans,
crossed comparatively less impassable desert. After stabilizing her authority and
overcoming the difficulty of communications with Siberia in the late eighteenth
century, Russia terminated all privileges that had been given to the Bukharans and
confined commercial activities in Siberia to Russian merchants, thus cutting Central
Asia off from a profitable market and source of raw materials. After centuries of
Bukharan domination of Siberian economic activities, the Imperial Government, on
February 12, 1834 put an end to Bukharan enterprise in all Russian administered ter-
The Bukharans here means all Central Asians including the Khivans, the Kokandis, the
Turkomans, as well as the Bukharans themselves. Terentiev mentioned that all these nation-
alities were known in Russia as Bukharans and enjoyed the privileges that had been given to
the Bukharan merchants for the purpose of fostering commerce in Siberia. The author
mentioned interesting stories about rich Russians merchants who registered themselves as
Bukharans to enjoy the privileges which were granted to the Bukharans and to avoid the
payment of taxes. See Terentiev, Rossiia i Angliia v Borbe za Rynki, (St. Petersburg 1876),
pp. 15-17.
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ritories. On that date the Emperor ratified a resolution by the Government Council to
limit these privileges to Russian merchants, and restrict Bukharan undertakings to
certain cities where they should be registered as Russian subjects, while Bukharans
who were active in agriculture were subjected to heavy land taxes.29
Phases of the Khanates' history
There were three seminal incidents which inaugurated the modem history of
Central Asia, and radically affected the future development of the Khanates. The
first was the Russian advance in Siberia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
already outlined, which resulted in a permanent Russian presence there and hindered
the traditional Central Asian trade with the Siberian tribes. The Russian frontier was
pushed east through Siberia little noticed due to the predominance in the migration
of farmers, who came as individuals and small groups oppressed in their home land,
who initially represented no external authority, and offered no threat of conflict or
assimilation to the indigenous population. Despite the enormous territorial expansion
that Russia achieved between the fall of Kazan (1552) and the fall of Ak Masjid
(1853), her craving for expansion remained unsatisfied, for reasons which were
essentially economic and demographic, rather than power-political.30
The second episode was the conquest of Bukhara, Khorezm (Khiva), and the
Turkomans' country by Nadir-Shah in 1740•d Controlling these khanates for seven
d Nadir-Shah (1688-1747) was born in a small town called Destejerd in the province of
Dereghez in Khorasan. Originally from a Turkoman tribe known as Kiriklu of the Afshars,
part of which settled in northern Khorasan. He entered the service of Tahmasp II (Safavid)
of Persia and at the beginning was known as Tahmasp-Quli Khan, but after his coronation
he became known as "Nadir", which in Arabic means "rare". He distinguished himself in
fighting the Afshars, his fellow tribesmen as well as Tatars, Uzbeks, and Turkomans. Nadir
fought the Abdalis of Herat controlled Astrabad and Mazandaran. He fought successfully
against the Ottomans who were in control of south-western Persia, and after a successful
campaign in the Caucasus, advanced against Kablan Giray of Crimea in 1735. In 1736 he
came to Mughan where governors and notables wanted to crown him as a king for his
efforts that liberated Persia. He accepted the crown on condition that the Persians abandon
(continued...)
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years (1740-1747), he destroyed not only their political status, but ruined their
economy as well. After sacking Delhi, Nadir went so far as to probe the Ottomans in
the west but found them too hard to conquer. Then he turned his ambitions to
Central Asia. He devastated the region to the extent that some towns were totally
destroyed, and later had to be reconstructed from their ruins. Bukhara was partially
saved because her authorities surrendered the Khanate peacefully, recognising the
futility of resistance31 . Even Samarkand, the capital of Tamerlane, was completely
desolated during his advance in 1740, and the remnants of the population, nearly
1,000 families, were forced to seek refuge in the citadel. 32 The legacy which Nadir
Shah left, in both India and Central Asia, was one of fatally weakened and
inimically opposed dynasties.
The third development, the most devastating and long lasting, was the dis-
covery of the new maritime trade route around the Cape of Good Hope to India in
the fifteenth century, and the formation of British, French, and Dutch merchant
companies a century later: in the long run this fundamental shift in economic activity
notably weakened the old trade routes through Central Asia, a process which was
finally completed by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Consequently, the
Khanates gradually lost their international commercial importance, though they re-
mained of vital and indeed increasing strategic importance to the emerging and rival
d(conhinued)
the Shi'a practices introduced by Ismail I, which contradicted Sunni (Orthodox) sect of his
ancestors. In 1738 he entered Kandahar and reduced Ghazni, Kabul, Djalalabad, Lahore and
entered Delhi in 1739. In 1740 he set out to Balkh and contacted Abul-Faidh, Khan of
Bukhara, with whom he came to good terms, thus Bukhara was saved from imminent
destruction. The same year witnessed the conquest of Khwarizm. Troubles that erupted in
the Caucasus in 1741 necessitated another campaign, mainly against the Daghistanis this
time. He entered Daghistan and remained there until 1743. His long stay in Daghistan led
the Russians to speculate that he had plans against Northern Caucasus, and concentrated an
army of 42,000 men to meet his advance. Nadir's Empire began to disintegrate as a result of
the maipractices of his tax collectors, who caused a number of uprisings in several states of
that vast, multi-national Empire. For more about his life vide Bartold, Sochineniia, vol. II,
Pt. 1, pp. 611-623 and Encyclopedia of islam.
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European powers in the region, Russia and Great Britain.
Despite the irreversible decline that engulfed the region during this period,
Russia's interest did not decline, indeed it increased. Central Asia represented, from
the Russian point of view, both a vital strategic location for the advance towards
India and the warm-water ports; and a region still considered valuable for its com-
mercial resources and its communications with other Asian countries. In Russian
policy, political and military purposes continued to exist side by side with the older
economic interests.
Studying the political map of Central Asia at the beginning the nineteenth
century, we find three Khanates instead of the numerous tiny Bekships which had
existed during the eighteenth century scattered on the peripheries of the main
Khanates.33 The formation of three centralized khanates was a significant stage
towards the unification of the whole region as one political entity.
The pre-Soviet history of the Central Asian Khanates can be divided into
three periods of which the second forms the core of this work. The first period, from
the second half of the fourteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, began
with the breaking of the Mongol yoke, which resulted in a short period of prosperity
under Tamerlane (1370-1405), who conquered the Golden Hord in a series of battles
fought in northern Khwarizm. After the reign of Tamerlane (1336-1405), the steppe
region was inhabited by a Turko-Mongol hord, which Muslim writers referred to as
Uzbeks. In the time of AbuI-Khair Khan (1557-1598) the population of this horde
split into two parts, one part remaining under the authority of Abul-Khair, who
established himself as the master of the Syr Dana,35 and preserved the name
Uzbeks, while the other part, dissatisfied with the rule of Abul-Khair, migrated to
the basin of the Chu river and Semirechie, and became known as Kazakhs. 36 They
formed the Middle Horde and occupied the territory between Aktiubinsk and Semi-
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palatinsk. Abul-Khair conquered Khwarizm in 1430/1431 and entered its capital
Urgench, establishing his authority over the whole region, and suppressing the
rivalries between the tribal chiefs. Existing cities flourished and others were built in
this period, during which Samarkand became the capital of the whole region.37
After the death of .Abdullah Khan II, the last of the Shaibanid rulers, the
Astrakhanid or Janid dynasty (1599-1737) assumed control of the whole Maveraun-
nahf region; they added political disintegration to the unavoidable economic and
cultural decline of both Bukhara and Khiva in the seventeenth century. In addition to
these political factors, the region suffered grievously from natural disasters, such as
the shift of the course of the Amu Dana to empty itself in the Aral sea instead of
the Caspian, in the second half of the sixteenth century, which deprived the western
regions of their only source of irrigation 38. Furthermore, the deviation of the river
stripped the region of its role as intermediary between the East and the West, for it
deprived the region of a vital water-way that had served to connect its trade with the
Caucasus, with western Persia through the Caspian sea, and with the Russian market
through the Caspian and the river Volga. These factors were accompanied by the rise
of Russia's power and ambitious activities in the region, partly intended to offset the
British gains in India. While the rest of the Muslim World was variably touched by
the explosive force of European influences, Central Asia entered the modern era as a
backward region, for two closely inter-connected reasons: firstly, its remote location
and economic decline, and secondly, Russia's colonial ambitions and the spread of
Russian influence in the region.
In the fifteenth century Shaibani Khan, the nephew of Abul-Khair, united all
the Uzbeks and other Turko-Mongol tribes under his authority, dominating Bukhara,
Khorezm, Ferghana, Khorasan, Samarkand, and Balkh. But after the death of Shai-
C This word literally means "the region beyond the river" (Amu Dana river) in Arabic,
and it is known that Arab geographers first gave this name to the whole of the region
extending between the Oxus and Jaxartes.
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bani Khan in a battle against Shah Ismail of Persia in 1510, the Uzbek government
split again into two states: one in Khorezm with its capital in Urgench, later moved
to the city of Khiva so that the Khanate itself became known as Khiva too, while the
other part continued to be known as Bukhara. 39 By the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury a third Khanate known as Kokand began to emerge and consolidate its power in
the Ferghana valley from 1798 under the "Mm" dynasty. The history of the
emergence of Kokand as an independent Khanate was dominated by endless disputes
with Bukhara around the Bekships of Khojent, Ura-Tiube, and Tashkand. From the
1 840s Kokand became the target of the Russian expansion and the Khanate faded
entirely from the political map as an independent entity in 1876 and, after the
reduction of Bukhara and the fall of Khiva, became known merely as the Ferghana
valley."0
The second period in the Khanates' history, which constitutes the core of this
study, extends from the beginning of the nineteenth century until 1885, the year of
the last major extension of Russian territory, following the Penjdeh affair, in which
Russia confronted Great Britain in Asia for the first time since the Crimean War.
This phase was marked mainly by despotic rule, rivalry, and continuous inter-
Khanate wars. Besides the lack of unity and the internal conflicts between the
governors (Beks) of the counties (vilayets) and different clans and tribes, the three
Khanates busied themselves with feudal wars against each other instead of facing the
tide of Russian expansion. 4 ' The three Khanates entered the nineteenth century
under different and antagonistic dynasties 42 and the whole of the region "stood
lowest of all Muslim lands on the cultural scale".43 But it would be inaccurate to
assume, as some Russian historians claim, that Russia found in Central Asia nothing
but barbarism; on the eve of the Russian conquest the Khanates had undoubtedly
reached a level of development higher than that of a century earlier:
Khiva and Samarkand were once more considerable cities..., the Khanates of
Khiva and Kokand could boast of a more animated activity in the field of
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culture, literature (especially historiography)... For the first time Ferghana had
become the centre of a large state, which embraced nearly the entire basin of
the Sir-Dana... After an interval of several centuries, the colonizing
movement towards the steppe was revived and agriculture was resumed under
the protection of Kokand fortffications.
In Central Asia, during the first half of the nineteenth century, internal and external
trade relations continued to develop so that some cities such as Bukhara, Samarkand,
Karshi, Tashkand, and others became once again important centres of regional
trade.45 Western contemporary observers regarded Russia's victims as countries "well
peopled, fertile, rich, and civilized, and whose inhabitants were not in accord with
the conquering power in race, religion, and language".46 Much more on this period
will be found in the following chapters.
The third period runs from the incorporation of Penjdeh in 1885 until 1924
and the disappearance of the last vestiges of Central Asian autonomy. This was a
period of increasing Russian domination, which became total after 1924. The main
features of this period were the increasing predominance of Russian culture, the
destruction of historic names and traditions, the increasing isolation of the whole
region from the rest of the world and its conversion into an internal market and
source of raw materials for the Russian economy. This process, begun under the
Tsars, was completed by the incorporation of the region into the Soviet economy;
thereafter the historic peoples of the region were subjected to severe religious
oppression, cultural assimilation, and the imposition of an alien ideology which
sought to destroy the traditional bases of Muslim society. The present work is not,
however, addressed to this tragic period in the history of these once proud and
independent peoples.
Intensification of the Russian advance
The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed the first combined Franco-
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Russian attempt against India, however when France lost interest in the venture,
Russia assumed the task individually, with the prevailing assumption that "what the
Alexander of two thousand years ago did, with hosts possibly not less numerous than
the armies of modem days, surely the Alexander8 of to-day can do a1so". The
failure of these ambitions convinced Russia of the necessity of establishing herself in
Central Asia in order to turn the region into a power base, from which to threaten
and disquiet the British in India and to influence their stand in Europe. Unable to
expand further in Europe, and meeting the resistance of other European powers in
her designs against the Ottoman Empire, Russia turned to play the game in eastern
lands, where weaker nations and "backward" tribes seemed to wait her rule in utter
helplessness.48 This long process began with measures directed towards the am-
plification of Russia's trade with Central Asia and Persia, which in turn was held to
necessitate commanding their trade routes and consequently, led her by no means
reluctantly into conflict with the governments of the region, over the protection of
trade caravans. These tactics, at first apparently commercial, developed through
manipulation of the manifest weakness of and rivalries between the Khanates,
towards the ultimate goal of subjugation. The liquidation of the Middle and Lesser
Hordes in 1822 and 1824 brought Russia to a stronger position in this direction, and
was followed by the construction of a series of advanced outposts to the south of
Orenburg: Kokchetav and Karkaralinsk in 1824, Bayan-Aul in 1826, and Sirgiopol in
1831.
The 1 830s were noteworthy for the erection of more advanced forts, the most
important among which was Novo-Aleksandrovskoe on the Mangishlak peninsula on
the eastern coast of the Caspian in 1834. These efforts constituted a quick response
. This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter five, "The Russian Threat to British
India".
g Tsar Alexander I, 1801-1825.
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to mounting British political influence in Afghanistan, which was in itself a reaction
to claims laid by the Persian Government to Afghan territories as far east as Ghizni
and Herat. As Lord Tenterden reported:
The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by
Russia, and their Minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution.
Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the Commercial
Treaty, the residence of a Russian Consular Agent, who would from thence
push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout
Afghanistan.49
The 1840s saw the erection of still more strategic bulwarks in the heart of the
steppe; Karabutak, and the Ural forts between the Aral Sea and Orsk on the river Ir-
ghiz, and the Orenburg Fort on the Turgai river. These forts marked a solid step
towards commanding the long-coveted line of the Syr Dana. Russia's efforts in this
direction began to show their effects in India, and were among the factors which led
Auckland,' Governor-General of India, to endeavour to turn Afghanistan into a
more solid barrier against possible Russian attempts on India. The disastrous
outcome of that campaign encouraged Russia to pursue even more vigorously her
"forward policy" in Central Asia.
At this stage the British were not too alarmist about the Russian outposts on
the Aral and the Syr Dana, regarding them as points from which the local
populations could be kept in check and accustomed to the presence of Russian
control. But it was clearly understood that those military posts could also afford to
Russia in the future points on which she could rely in any movement of military
forces from Orenburg towards the south.5°
h• George Eden, First Earl of Auckland (1784-1849), succeeded Lord William Bentinck
as Governor-General of India. To check the Russian political and commercial activities in
Central Asia, he sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837, the same year when Vitkeivich
was there. Dost Muhammad received the envoy courteously, but when he found that the
English had no idea of helping him to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs, he dismissed him
from his court. This incident was behind Auckland's adoption of a policy aimed at
dethroning Dost Muhammad and reinstating Shah Shuja', dethroned for more than twenty
years. This policy led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839.
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In the second quarter of the nineteenth century Russia's emissaries, secret
and public, military and civil, were reconnoitring the region, exploring and collecting
strategic data or negotiating with influential parties in Central Asia, while at the
same time she was busy subjugating the steppe region and establishing herself on the
shores of the Aral Sea and at the mouth of the Syr Dana, under the pretext of
securing her trade routes and protecting her trade caravans. Russia's drive southward
in the steppe region was relatively easy due to the continuous wars between the
Golden and the Little Hordes. Nonetheless, the gradual penetration of the Cossacks
into the steppes provoked turbulent resistance from the Kazakh and Kirghiz tribes,
who tried to defend their pasture lands against the expanding colonization of
Russia's Cossacks. The Kazakhs' struggle against the military administrations of
western Siberia and Orenburg lasted nearly for half a century (1802-1847) under the
leadership of Kenesary Kasimov, who was fmally beheaded by Russian officers, and
his head sent to Grand Duke (Kniaz) Gorchakov.51
The later 1 840s witnessed the resumption of Russian military action in the
region, this time against the Khanate of Kokand, which was accused of spreading
disorder among the Kirghiz after the failure of the Khivan campaign of 1839. This
new policy, against Kokand, revealed an important revision of Russian strategy: the
unsuccessful expedition against Khiva in 1839 had convinced Perovskii,52
Governor-General of Orenburg, that the most favourite route to Khiva lay, not across
the desert, but through the fertile lands of Kokand and Bukhara. Thus was the fate
of these proud and ancient Khanates sealed.
In contrast to British activities in the region, which were restricted to
sporadic political communications, Russian ventures in Central Asia were from the
outset more aggressive and acquisitive despite the setback European Russia suffered
in the Crimean War. Russia's military concentration against Turkey and in the Black
Sea did not deter her from making considerable addition to her naval force in the
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Caspian Sea and indeed may be said to have encouraged it. 53 Russia launched
vigorous military and diplomatic assaults in Central Asia throughout the period of
her Black Sea preoccupation, between 1845 and 1859. These years witnessed the
subjugation of a number of strategic posts formally controlled by Kokand, such as
Raim (Raimsk, 1847), Kazala (Kazalinsk or Fort No. 1, 1847) and Ak-Masjid (Fort
Perovskii, 1853), all on the lower Syr Dana. Russia's advance was "however" not as
easy as it had been in the steppe, her military success being much more costly, and
largely due to the "superiority of their rifles over the weapons of the Kokanese, and
also to the assistance of a small piece of rifled artillery". 54 An Italian eye-witness
of Cherniaev's advance against Kokand mentioned that his expedition was assisted
by ships from the Aral flotilla that accompanied his army by way of the Syr Dana to
within thirty miles of Tashkand.55
On the front of Semirechie the advance was correspondingly successful. On
this line Russia conquered the vast region from Semipalatinsk down to Aiaguz
(1845-47), Kopal (1847), and Almata (Fort Vernoe, 1854). On the diplomatic front
Russia, between 1857 and 1859, dispatched three missions to four courts: N. P. Ig-
natiev56 in 1858 was dispatched to Khiva and Bukhara; Captain Chokan Vali-
khanov57 (1835-1865) to Kashgar; and Ia. V. Khanykov58 to Herat in 1858-59.
These important missions will be discussed in greater detail in chapter II, below.
Ignatiev's mission was mainly dedicated to studying British activities in Central
Asia, to obtain first hand intelligence about the area, and to survey possible routes
leading from Bukhara and Khiva to India.59
Russia inaugurated her advance along the Syr Dana by attacking Ak-Masjid
in 1853, where Yakub Bek6° led the heroic defence of the fort. He was friendly to
England and his resistance caused the Russians some dismay. Later, in 1865, he led
the famous Kashgar rebellion against the Chinese, where he secured for himself the
throne "under the pretext of being the general of Buzruk Khan". 6' This later
29
Historical background
uprising in Kashgar in 1865 alarmed the Russians, since Yakub Bek's advance
northward, after taking control of Kashgar and Yarkand, menaced their positions in
Semirechie. These developments, from Russia's point of view, looked like the spread
of British influence and threatened Russian communications with Western Siberia.
To stop the insurrection from spreading to the north, Kaufmann ordered in June
1871 the occupation of the Iii valley and the Kuldja district as a precautionary
measure against Yakub Bek. The defeat of Yakub Bek by the Chinese, in 1877, led
to the restoration of the province of Kuldja to China;62 but in the meanwhile these
adventures and upheavals had clearly signalled the onset of open competition
between Russia and Britain in central Asia.
Origins of the Anglo-Russian rivalry
Russia's conquests had become increasingly threatening to Great Britain, the
only European power whose interests in inner Asia came into direct conflict with
Russia's own, and whose strength might be sufficient to deter Russia's ambition and
arrest her advance. Until the Penjdeh incident of March 18, 1885, which brought
both powers to the verge of war, neither the Russian politicians in St. Petersburg nor
her Generals in Asia had any clear idea where to stop; instead, one acquisition of
territory led to another, without appreciation of how far "annexation strengthens or
weakens her", and evidently, as the British perceived it, devoid of "plausible
conjectures as to how, when, and where the process of expansion is to stop". 63 By
the early forties Russia had acquired exclusive control over the Caspian Sea and
established paramount influence in Persia, which according to an informed British
observer, Sir Harford Jones, "was delivered, bound hand and foot, to the Court of St.
Petersburg" after the Treaty of Turkomanchi in 1 828P Ironically throughout her
drive in Central Asia Russian opinion complained about the ubiquitous Britain,
which was said to appear on every side "with her treaty rights or prior claims",
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erecting "one barrier after another in the way of Russian progress".65
While Russia was intriguing and instigating Persia to conquer Herat under
Russian protection, and dispatching her officials in diplomatic missions to Kabul,
activities that led to the war between England and Afghanistan in 1839, Britain
had maintained the hope that Russia had reached the limit of her natural expansion
in Asia. The British hoped that their relations with Russia could be placed on a
stable and permanent footing, so that
their rivalry will henceforth be confined to their mutual promotion of peace
and civilization in their respective spheres. Cordially aiding each other in this
philanthropic aim, they may effect much good, and mutually benefit their
own interests.67
This British desire for an accommodation with Russia's expansion, gave the latter a
rare opportunity to exercise a free hand in Central Asia, for that aspiration pacified
British public opinion, and created the conditions for that political course known as
the policy of "masterly inactivity". 68 This policy continued throughout the 1860s,
despite the increasing apprehension of the members of the Calcutta school of polit-
icians, who were aware of Russia's ambition and believed that she
never made a treaty without obtaining a fresh territory, or acquiring the exer-
cise of rights over new provinces which have ever proved the inevitable pre-
cursors of annexation.69
Thus British policy during the decisive 1860s tended to disregard Russia's
rudimentary political practices, evident in all her proceedings in Central Asia, which
routinely exhibited her tendency to handle all events with a view to the "moment
when circumstances may combine to afford a safe opportunity for further advan-
ce" 70
Russian historians of the twentieth century have described all this Russian
activity as a process of gradual penetration of Russian elements into Central Asia,
beginning in the time of Peter the Great. The Russian determination to dominate this
region, the cradle of Empires, which lies between China, the Middle East, and
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Europe, was apparent. This process took one hundred and fifty years of continuous
and irreversible advance, during which forts were built in Kazakhistan and a
"defence line" marked out and strengthened to defend the new acquisitions. 1 ' As
the name of this line indicates it was never acknowledged as a border line by
Russia: the forts which were built on it were not for its demarcation or protection,
for it was never attacked, but to extend Russian power, authority, and influence, and
to accustom the neighbouring tribes to her presence. This line was continuously
pushed forward, till by the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian borders had
reached those of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and by the 1880s adjoined
Afghanistan.
32
(ufiaminad kJizu1agar 7ian cf 2(p1aii1
Chapter Two
RUSSIAN POLICY
AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KHANATES
Her long line of frontier is devious, and not always
thoroughly defined; it wanders along the crest of
mountains, is marked sometimes by the course of
rivers, and occasionally almost lost in pathless desert.
(Quarterly Review, 1877)
Rivalry and conflict between the Uzbek Khanates
The Khanates strove to improve their relations with Russia often at the
expense of their relations with each other; in other words, each tried during its strug-
gle against the others to draw individually nearer to Russia. Their relations with
Russia were thus dictated by their animosity towards each other, and as a result of
misjudging the full extent of Russia's ambitions, they failed to develop any form of
regional political, economic, or military co-operation to face Russia's encroachment.
Turkey and England were the most interested in maintaining the independence of
these states in the face of Russian expansion. Turkey, frequently sent envoys to recon-
cile Kokand and Bukhara, while all Khivan envoys returning from Istanbul delivered
to the Khivan Khan the Sultan's advice to end his war against the Mer y Turkomans,
and join Bukhara and Kokand against Russia. British envoys also tried to secure a
degree of unity against the Russian advance.'
The lack of realization on the part of successive Khans that they had to fight
against an external power intrinsically different from themselves in every respect was
at the root of their failure to apprehend the common danger, and led them to allow
their old patterns of internal rivalries to absorb their energies until it was too late to
take a different course. The Klianates failed to unite around the strong anti-Russian
religious and national sentiments that their people demonstrated when facing the Rus-
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sian troops. They realized very late that they ought to act according to a common
feeling against the Russian advance and infiltration. 2 Internal affairs in each Khanate
were similar to its external relations. A change of Amir or the transfer of power from
one Khan to his successor was usually accompanied by attempts by provincial offi-
cials to secure their own independence. 3 Thus the governors of parasite political
formations such as Dzhizak, Zaamin, Pieshgar, Urmitan, Ura-Tepe and others repeat-
edly engaged in alliances and intrigues against their parent government. Thus the
situation of the Central Asian states can be characterized as dominated by lack of
cohesion, and torn by internal wars that diverted them from an objective evaluation of
the Russian encroachment.
Since the thirties of the nineteenth century, Russia had been monitoring
these regional antagonisms and employed them in her political designs. Investigating
the controversial relations between these Khanates, the Russian government was able
cautiously to begin driving wedges between them. As Zhukovskii observed:
It was impossible not to pay attention to the existing discrepancies between
the Bukharan and the Khivan governments, which were ready to erupt into
open war. About this the Bukharan messenger Balta Quly Bek, who arrived
in Orenburg in 1830 spoke openly. He was authorized to request the Russian
Emperor to assist in putting an end to Khivan impudence.4
The road to Bukhara and Khiva saw all kinds of missions avowed and
clandestine, diplomatic and military, scientific and commercial. The Russian agents
penetrated the Khanates utilizing every possible camouflage, according to Blackwoods
even as petty traders, professing themselves Jews. 5 Russia's designs were assisted by
the negative and hostile relations that prevailed among the Khanates of Central Asia,
who under the pressure of their jealousy and competition with each other, tried ind-
ividually to seek Russia's consent and benevolence. 6 Russia attentively investigated
the issue of inter-Khanate relations, and sent several official envoys to both Khiva and
Bukhara, who confirmed the prevalence of irreconcilable antagonism among the
Khanates.7 In this milieu Bukhara endeavoured to enhance its commercial ties with
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Russia, and sent in July 1836 a second messenger to Orenburg, 8 to negotiate friend-
ship, and to improve political-commercial relations. But Russia, at that time, was
overwhelmed by pacifying the steppe, stabilizing her position in the newly conquered
territories, and pushing her borders southward there. So on this occasion the Bukharan
envoy returned without achieving any tangible results. 9 During the early 1830s the
attitude of St. Petersburg toward Khiva had been influenced by accusations in regard
to alleged Khivan provocation of disaffection and disorder among the nomads of the
steppe over whom Russia claimed nominal authority, and by plunder in the steppe
which was attributed to Khiva as well. The Kirghiz, who were the source of dissen-
sion between the two governments, actually were less stirred by Khivan projects, than
by the corruption and misconduct of the Russian officials. These allegations were
fabricated in order to provide a justification for Russian policy which would conceal
its real motives aimed at expanding her commercial and political influence to domi-
nate the region. In this regard General Cherniaev 1 ° openly acknowledged that:
the Khivans did not excite the Kirghiz to rebellion, on the contrary, they
were made to rebel by the introduction of the regulations composed under
the supervision of the Ministry of War... When the Cossack detachments
were sent out to put down these disturbances, the Kirghiz threw the blame
on the distant Khivans, and the officials accepted these excuses to cover
their own mistakes. In this way the idea grew up at St. Petersburg of the in-
stigation of the Kirghiz by the Khivans, who had no thought for foreign un-
dertakings when they could scarcely maintain themselves at home against the
Turkomans. We must remember, too, this fact, that when we are quiet our
neighbours are quiet, but as soon as we excite the discontent of our own
Kirghiz, some of our neighbours are immediately found to be to blame.'1
Monitoring early Russia's activities in the region through her frequent
envoys to Central Asian Khanates, the Khivan Khan felt that his country's relations
with Russia were deteriorating, because of the lack of trade agreement, and mainly as
a result of allegations of Khivan activities to instigate rebellion among the Kirghiz
tribes in the steppe. But Russia's real motives lay far beyond the Kirghiz question,
mainly in jealousy and desire to encounter British activities against Afghanistan.
Perovskii's 12 expedition of 1839 was already in preparation. So the Khan sought
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support from Bukhara, and proposed the formation of a coalition to confront the Rus-
sian threats and ambitions. However Bukhara in these years of trade prosperity with
Russia did not wish to go for extremes in policy, so the Amir of Bukhara refused the
offer.13
The same allegation, i.e. stirring the Kirghiz, was also made against Kokand.
The Russo-Kokandian rivalry for the domination of the Kirghiz steppes was thought
to have reached such magnitude that Russia should either abandon the steppes or force
the Kokandis out.' 4 Meanwhile the internal situation in Kokand was not coherent and
affected by two factors: the Uzbek intrigues, and wars with Bukhara. Russia in this
environment was naturally encouraged to strike. Thus during the forties Perovskii ad-
vanced along the Syr Dana to regain his lost laurels after his disastrous expedition
against Khiva in 1839. Several small forts to the east and north-east of the Aral sea
were conquered:' 5 Turgai and Irghiz (1845), Raim (Aralskoe), and Kazala (Kazalinsk
or Fort No. 1) in 1847.16 By the year 1857, the Russian line along the Syr-Daria
river consisted of four Forts: Kazala (Kazalinsk), Fort Karmakchi (Fort No. 2), Ak-
Masjid (Fort Perovsk or fort No. 3) which fell to Perovskii after the second attempt in
1853, and the fourth was Julek. Subsequently General Cherniaev, commander of the
Russian army, took advantage of the prevailing hostile relations between Bukhara and
Kokan, contacted Nasrullah,a the Bukharan Amir, taking advantage of the prevailing
bostile relations between Bukhara and Kokand, and invited him to a partition of
Kokand, Bukhara taking the south and Russia the north. The Bukharan Amir was ill
disposed to this offer, not out of solidarity but because he believed the whole of the
a Nasrullah (1826-1860) was well known for his brutality. After the death of his father,
Amir Haidar, he assassinated his brothers to be the only heir of the throne. In the 1840's he
invaded Kokand captured its ruler Muhammad Mi (Madali Khan) (1821-1842) and executed
him together with his two sons and pregnant wife. During his reign from 1826 to 1860 he
tortured and killed unspecified numbers of his people and foreigners, among whom two
British officers, Conolly and Stoddart, who came to Bukhara to assist the Khanate in face of
the Russian avalanche. Ironically he was known in his own country as the Amir "Qassab" or
the butcher. See Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana, v. 2, p. 166.
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Khanate should belong to him. 17 The Bukharan Amir was the only one among the
Central Asian sovereigns who claimed an authority and rights extending over the
whole of Turkestan. Earlier history of relations between the Khanates give evidence of
the Amir's intentions. Bukhara had conquered Kokand in 1842 and killed its ruler,
Madali Khan (Mohammad Au, 1821-1842) and his sons. Kokand regained her
independence under Khudayar Khan (1845-1858 and 18651875) . 18 Disregarding the
Russian invasion, and the fall of a considerable number of Kokandian cities, Bukhara
and Kokand continued to dispute the cities of Tashkand and Turkestan which were
themselves under Russian threat as well. Bukharan-Kokandian relations were unremit-
tingly hostile throughout the nineteenth century, and history bears no instance of
cooperation between the two countries.
As a result of the Crimean War the Russian advance was curtailed for the
next few years, and Fort Julek remained the farthest point of the Russian advance.
Crippled in the Black sea, Russia turned for compensation to Central Asia, where she
concentrated her political, military, and economic energies without provoking much in
the way of opposition from Britain. 19 The new political course was inaugurated in
1858 by General Katenin's and Annenkov's plan" for the unification of the Orenburg
and Siberian frontier lines, by the construction of a line of fortifications from the Aral
sea to the Irtysh that would lead to the annexation of vast Kokandian territories as
well as the large cities of Turkestan, Tashkand. 2° The grandiose military project
derived its origin from a proposal put in front of the Government in 1853 by General
Gosfordt (Hosford), Governor-General of West Siberia, the realization of which would
necessitate an advance of about 1000 km in Kokandian terrtory. General Gosfordt
initiated this plan by suggesting to his superiors that the two lines were hanging in the
air leaving a wide undefended gap between them. His idea was widely approved
b General Katenin, A. A. was the Governor-General of Orenburg from 1857 until 1860.
Their plan was based on Gosfordt's (Hosfordt) plan for the same purpose which will be
alluded to later in this chapter.
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among the military and sanctioned by St. Petersburg though its execution was
delayed.21 The accumulating situation after the Crimean War, and the need for secur-
ing alternative supplies of cotton, which suddenly became acute during the American
Civil War, necessitated the realization of Gosfordt's plan against Kokand in the early
1 860s: General Cherniaev advanced from Vernyi to storm Aulie Ata, while simultan-
eously Colonel Verevkin advanced from Perovsk against Turkestan and took it. The
Russian progress against Kokand led to wide-spread predictions among observers that
Bukhara and Khiva were entirely at the mercy of Russia, and would probably be
conquered as well. 22 Oddly Bukhara and Khiva did not share that apprehension.
After the conquest of part of Kokand, the Russian Government announced that it did
not intend to make any further advances in that direction, but this assurance was soon
followed by the conquest of Tashkand in May 1865, yet another declaration that they
did not intend to annex it but to "form it with the adjacent territory, into an indepen-
dent state".23 Later of course it was incorporated into the Turkestan Province which
had been formed in February 1865. Vambery described the Khanates' relations as
so far from giving each other any mutual support in the moment of peril,
would by their dissension furnish the common enemy with the very best
arms against themselves. Khiva and Khokand are then to be regarded as the
constant enemies of Bukhara: still Bukhara does not look for any serious
danger in those quarters, and the only rival that she really fears in Central
Asia is one that day by day is becoming more formidable to her - Afghanist-
an.
These intense inter-Khanate rivalries were not modified even after the fall of
many of Kokand's strategic cities into Russia's hands. The Amir of Bukhara contin-
ued his aggressive policy in the critical mid sixties, and occupied Gissar, Kuliab,
Dainau, and Karategin. 25 In face of Bukharan aggression, Khudayar Khan of Kokand
sought assistance from General Abramov against Muzalfar. Abramov could not let
slip this unique opportunity of posing as a judge between his enemies, and wrote to
the Amir advising "friendship towards the friends of Russia and enmity towards her
enemies". 26 This cynical advice amounted to saying that national solidarity among
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the Uzbeks should not be the ruling criterion in the relations among the Khanates, but
that Russia's attitude should be consulted, and Russia's interest should be advanced.
Thus the history of the Khanates' relations was a history of a series of dis-
putes and battles. These internecine conflicts, as the Quarterly Review observed in the
critical year 1865, had "raged with varying intensity and in more ways than one facil-
itated the Russian advance". 27
 Accordingly Russia took advantage of the prevailing
discord and dealt with each Khanate separately. Even in time of war with one Khan-
ate, Russia managed to preserve neutral, if not good, relations with the others. This
policy proved to be successful during the Russian invasion of Kokand in 1853 until
the fall of Tashkand in 1865, when Khiva preferred to promote her trade interests
with Russia, and in the mid-sixties when the Bukharan army simultaneously attacked
Kokand when she was combating the Russians. 28 Nasrullah attacked Kokand for the
second time in 1865, when the Khanate was the target of the Russian invasion, and
confiscated all its guns, leaving it nearly disanned in face of Russia.29 Later in 1866,
when the Bukharan forces were engaged against the Russian troops around Ura-Tepe
and Dzhizak, Khiva again refused the Amir's invitation to join in a confederation a-
gainst Russia. 3° Khiva at this time brought the Yomud Turkomans under her
sway.31 The same attitude was repeated afterward during Russia's invasion of Bu-
khara in 1868, other Khanates remained neutral. 32 Kokand was no exception, for she
demonstrated the same hostile attitude and acted similarly, for instance the Govern-
ment of Kokand willfully supplied the Russians, who were engaged against Bukhara,
with corn at prices "under the circumstances remarkably moderate". 33 The Khanates
relations deteriorated to the extent that Khudayar Khan of Kokand sent an envoy to
congratulate Kaufmann on his victory over Bukhara, and in 1868 the same envoy
returned in the same year to applaud the Russian defeat of the Bukharan army at Zer-
bulak.
The Bukharan relations with Russia even after 1868 were mostly motivated
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by the desire of the Amir to weaken his regional rivals. Nasrullah, the Amir of
Bukhara, had agreed on the partition of Khiva together with Russia. 35
 In 1871 Amir
Muzaffar, the successor of Nasrullah, demonstrated the same stand adopted by
Kokand earlier when he assured Struve, Kaufmann's envoy, of his willingness to
provide the Russian troops advancing against Khiva with supply and free passage
through Bukhara's territories. 36
 Again in 1873 the Bukharan ruler hastened to supply
with food the Russian detachment which had run short of provisions during the
Khivan campaign, and even provided the advancing army with extra supply to leave
them a margin of support. 37
 Kaufmann wrote to the Amir saying, "the friendly and
liberal hospitality shown by you to the troops of the Great White Tsar obliges me to
express to you my heartfelt acknowledgement". 38
 Notwithstanding this effusiveness,
Bukharan collaboration did not prevent Russia from imposing a second humiliating
treaty upon her in 1873, directly after the subjugation of Khiva.
The internal situation of each Khanate was often no better than the relations
between the Khanates. Desperate and chronic struggle and intrigues between the
throne and the aristocrats exhausted the Khanates and dominated the internal atmos-
phere, though these struggles began in Bukhara later than in both Khiva and Kokand
as a result of the Amir's position among the Ulema. 39 Nasrullah as well as Muzaffar
his successor laboured to liquidate the authority of corrupt aristocrats and profane
Beks. Both Amirs, assisted by the Ulema, laboured to unite all provinces and bekships
under the sway of the central government and put an end to feudal ravaging wars.4°
Other Khanates were the scene of similar disturbances caused by Beks and governors
of large cities who strived to gain independence.
Russian policy and the moving frontiers
Monitoring Russia's fluid boundaries in the steppe region, the observer
would find them forming series of parallel lines defended by forts leaving the inter-
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mediate spaces wholly without protection; 41
 even the territories between the old and
the new border lines were unprotected, and frequently were the scene for inroads
against Russian caravans. Russia used to blame Khiva and Kokand for fomenting
disorder within her domains, while at the same time uninterruptedly advancing her
frontier to the Jaxartes and claiming,
a right to the country lying immediately north of the Jaxartes, from the Aral
to Ag-Masjid, in virtue of a treaty concluded some time in the last century
with one of the rulers of Turkestan.42
Thus was Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, advised by his man on
the spot, while Blackwoods commented that Russian policy was based on the principle
of "protection leading to subjection". 43 Her policy was characterized as slow but
sure, and "has ever been, and would still seem to be, aggressive". The Russian
treatment of all subjugated nations, civilized or savage, settled or nomadic, began as a
"humanitarian" protection which was developed into allegiance, then into subjection,
until it reached its ultimate phase: complete subjugation and assimilation. "Her steps
were slow but were attended with results and were always carefully planned with the
view of securing what had already been attained".45
Regarding the frontier issue, Tsarist diplomacy exploited the uncertain
situation and considered the lack of demarcated boundaries in the region as beneficial
to Russia, and delayed as long as possible the demarcation of her boundaries.46
Britain's opinion, as reflected in Blackwoods, was clear:
The lines of steppe and the forts along it are not to be considered as fixed
establishments; but the frontier is to be gradually extended as the regime is
propagated and embraces more distant portions of the tribes.47
Russia took advantage of the fact that her policy in the steppe region, during
the nineteenth century, was not challenged by any other power, and was stimulated by
easy annexation, and the success of the policy of intrigue which deliberately instigated
animosity between the Kirghiz Sultans and tribes. These tactics towards the Kirghiz48
led Russia to the construction of a line of military forts in the heart of the steppe.
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This line however could not be considered as Russia's frontier as it was not formally
demarcated and was designed to exercise powerful influence on the nomads beyond
the Russian-controlled territory.49
The boundaries of the Khanates were not demarcated either. Among the
Khanates, this was the source of endless feudal wars, which exhausted their economy,
ruined cities, and destroyed agriculture and irrigation systems in many episodes.5°
Russian policy throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, exploited the
absence of defined boundaries to facilitate its practices and promote its designs in the
region:
It was not only the three Khanates which had no stable frontiers; none of the
countries surrounding them had it either. Persia disputed Khorasan and Herat
not only with Khorezm but with Afghanistan. The latter in addition disputed
Balkh, Gissar, Kuliab, Badakhshan and the Pamir vilayet 51 with Bu-
khara.52
This situation was favoured by Russian diplomacy as long as the lack of
fixed boundaries in the area was in accord with designs; thus Russia avoided not only
demarcation but negotiating the issue as well. 53 Even though Russia's boundaries up
to the early forties of the century were along the Emba river, Orenburg officials
aspired to reach Syr Dana and establish their authority over the whole region between
the Emba and that river in order to be adjacent to Khiva and Kokand. Later she
claimed right over both sides of the river. In their reply to Kaufmann's letter to the
Khivan Khan on December 1, 1867, the Khivans insisted that Russia had no rights on
the left side of the Syr Dana:
Your statement that both sides of the Syr Dana belong to your rule is
apparently an infringement of previous treaties, since the southern side of the
Syr Dana belongs to us. If on the southern side of the Syr Daria, rebels
disturb caravans, we will put them down; but if they attack the caravans on
the other side of the Syr Dana, that is your business.54
In this letter the Khivans required from the Russian administration in
Tashkand an undertaking to respect the existing treaties. The Russians denied the
existence of any such treaties. 55 Kaufmann withheld the reply, stationed his troops
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along the Kuvan Dana and Yani Dana rivers and refused to evacuate the left side of
the Syr-Daria. This incident is a good example of the Russian policy of exploiting its
undefined borders, and reflects clearly enough the methods Russia followed in rela-
tions with her neighbours. Thus in a sense, the Russian boundaries could be held to
extend wherever the nomadic Kirghiz pitched their tents.
Kaufmann began in 1867 a correspondence with the Khan of Kokand, the
ostensible purpose of which was the settlement of trade issues. In the course of these
communications, the Khan sent an envoy to Tashkand to negotiate the issue of the
borders between Russia's domains and the Khanate. Kaufmann carefully abstained
from considering this matter to be part of the negotiations, justifying his position by
appealing to:
the absence of certain geographical and ethnological data, ..., in order that
the final settlement might not afterwards be complicated by any previous
decisions adverse to Russian interests.56
Clearly he hoped to preserve that vague situation and keep the door open for further
advance. Kaufmann insisted on the conclusion of the peace treaty and trade agreement
without discussing the question of boundary demarcation.57
Russia exploited the policy of undefined boundaries even alter subjugating
the Khanates. Alter the conquest of Khiva in 1873, the boundary of Russia's pos-
sessions on the Caspian sea were left undefined to furnish the Caucasian troops with
grounds to undertake another campaign against the Turkomans.58
Russia's political missions to Central Asia:
methods and purposes
Russian missions to the courts of Central Asia were not undertaken in order
to resolve frontier disputes, since as we have seen the Russians had no interest in so
doing, while their territory was never genuinely threatened by the Khanates; nor were
they principally intended to promote commercial intercourse, though this may have
been a fitting pretext. The main task of these missions was intelligence gathering,
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economic, topographical, political, and military. In addition they pursued another pur-
pose which was as important as the others, i.e. sowing intrigues and inflaming
animosity between the Khanates while seeking to attach them individually to Russia.
In the long run, this strategy was designed to establish Russian ascendancy enabling
Russia to overthrow such influence as Britain might seek to exercise there, and ultim-
ately putting Russia in a fitting position to threaten an attack against India.
Usually the Russian envoys were not high level officials, but the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or the Orenburg Military Administration bestowed higher rank on
them before their departure for Central Asia for the purpose of conducting talks, to
facilitate their sojourn in the Khanates, and enable them to meet the highest dig-
nitaries. For the purpose of strengthening Butenev's negotiations with Nasrullah, it
was necessary to give the agent the title of messenger, supplied with the required
authorization from the Russian Government. 59 This procedure was a common one in
Russian policy with the countries of the region.
One of Russia's immediate objectives in the region was to eradicate any
connection between the Khivans and the Kirghiz, an objective which Russia had long
pursued, but talks with the Khivans in this regard did not bring about any substantial
conclusions.60 Furthermore, the Kirghiz themselves were against the idea of becom-
ing Russian subjects.c The Kirghiz issue emerged as a complicating factor, which
contributed to the sparking of conflict with Kokand in 1851 and 1853.61 Subsequent-
ly Russia was forced to postpone her plans under the pressure of her deteriorating sit-
uation before and during the Crimean War: besides the Russians were still insuffi-
ciently informed and needed to complete their reconnaissance activities in the area. In
C Terentiev in his three volume-work Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii tells fascinating
stories about the Kirghiz resistance and objection to the idea of association with Russia.
Nikiforov on his way to Khiva found it worth while to communicate with the Kirghiz elders
and leaders in the steppe, thus in massive gatherings he listened to their opinions which
reflected their aversion to the Russian procedures such as confiscating their land and
imposing heavy taxes on them. Terentiev recorded in his work that they emphasized that
they, as Muslims, cannot be subject to Russia. Terentiev, Istoriia..., vol. I, pp. 185-190.
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spite of those earlier missions to which we now turn, they still had very little inform-
ation about the situation inside the Central Asian governments, and about their mutual
relations as well. 62 However, these early missions are very instructive to the historian
for what they reveal about the covert as well as the overt goals of Russian policy.
De Maizon's mission (1834)
Russian political activities in Central Asia at the beginning of the 19th
century were marked by an observant attention towards the affairs of Bukhara, Khiva,
and Kokand. The first missions to these Khanates was that of Alexander Feodorovich
Negri (1784-1854) in 1820 to Bukhara. The outcome of this mission was a book titled
A Journey from St. Petersburg to Bukhara by Baron Georgii Meiendorf, published in
French in 1826.63 In 1833 Perovskii, a 38-year old General, was appointed as Gover-
nor-General of Orenburg, Russia's operative post in the steppe, and the bastion that
controlled all her communications with Central Asia. The new Orenburg administ-
ration began persistently to scrutinize every event that took place in Bukhara and
Khiva. On September 26, 1833, shortly after his appointment as Governor-General of
Orenburg, Perovskii wrote a letter to Rodofinikin, head of the Asiatic department
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he discussed urgent political and commer-
cial concerns. He expressed his desire to' receive reliable information about certain
foreign activities, notably British, which he believed to be taking place in Central
Asia.65 In the same letter he expressed his worry about British commercial penet-
ration of Central Asia. Perovskii also pointed out that not long ago two Englishmen
visited the Khanates, William Moorcroft and George Trebek. So he suggested they
send an envoy, not directly from the central Government, but from the local authori-
ties of Orenburg to avoid publicity and other complications; in this way, the govern-
ment would avoid large costs, and the envoy might hope to avoid undue scrutiny and
suspicion on the part of the Bukharan government and population. 66 Perovskii's ideas
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corresponded with the intentions of the Government, which was already attentively
watching British activities in the region. It was preparing to expand commercial rela-
tions on the one hand, and endeavouring to exchange embassies with the Khanates on
the other. For this task Perovskii in his letter suggested I. V. Vitkevich as envoy. He
received from St. Petersburg Imperial consent to his proposal except that the Emperor
did not see Vitkevich as a reliable person for such an important mission: 67 for this
purpose it was crucial to chose a highly experienced and reliable official. 68 Perovskii
was quick to find a suitable alternative figure: he was P. I. De Maizon. De Maizon
had been born in the kingdom of Sardinia, and besides his oriental features, which
would give him the advantage of being inconspicuous in carrying out his task, he had
mastered Arabic, Persian, Tatar, and Russian, as well as French in which he later
wrote his report. De Maizon was entrusted with the mission and received his list of
instructions in October 1833. These instructions reveal the extent of Russia's interest
in Central Asia. They revealed that Russia was not mainly interested in developing
trade relations or freeing Russian subjects held captive in Khiva and Bukhara, but
deeply concerned with obtaining intelligence that would facilitate extending her
influence in those circles where final political decisions were taken.69
An analytical investigation of De Maizon's mission, from the point of view
of its design, the high level of authorization, and the statement of its objectives,
reveals it as the first major Russian intelligence mission to the Central Asian Khanates
in the nineteenth century. For De Maizon's assignment, Perovskii designed a list of
priorities to which De Maizon was to pay attention. This list contained points that
were concerned merely with the internal affairs of these Khanates on the one hand,
and on the other points which clearly demonstrate tireless Russian efforts towards the
subjugation of the Khanates. 7° This list of issues included a very wide range of
concerns, which penetrated every sphere of life in these Khanates; political, military,
economic, commercial, and ethnic. This list of issues, however, also demonstrates
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almost total Russian ignorance of Central Asian affairs in the 1830s, touching subjects
such as geography, trade, ruling elites, and the tribes of this region. It demonstrates as
well Russian ignorance about the Khanates' foreign relations. Politically speaking, the
instructors asked for detailed information ranging from the popular attitude towards
the policies of the regime, to the calibre of the rulers of Bukhara, a task requiring a
proficient and observant envoy capable of gathering, without hindrance, the necessary
information. Economically, Russia was interested in expanding her trade and was
therefore inquisitive about Bukhara's commercial relations with other foreign govern-
ments, particularly Great Britain, Turkey, Persia and other regional states.
After a successful journey, De Maizon returned with an official Bukharan
promise not to intervene in any military action in case of war between Russia and
Khiva.7 ' This cleared the way for Russia to subjugate part of the Kirghiz tribes who
occupied territory between her and Khiva, as a step towards encroachment upon Khiva
itself. Russia inaugurated this move by building the fortress Novo-Aleksandrovsk, on
the eastern shore of the Caspian sea, in 1834.
The mission of Vitkevich (1836) and its aftermath
In the following year, 1835, continuing his surveillance activities in the
region and to check the information reported by De Maizon, Perovskii planned a
similar mission to Bukhara, to be executed by Vitkevich, a Russian officer said to be
deeply acquainted with the tradition and the languages of the Asian population after
ten years of service in the steppe region, but whom, as we know, Perovskii had
unsuccessfully proposed previously for the mission carried out by De Maizon.
Vitkevich defined his mission at the beginning of his report saying that the
purpose of his expedition was to insinuate himself into those Kirghiz tribes which lay
beyond the Russian domains in the steppe, to act in a way that might influence the
mind and spirit of those nomads, obtain reliable and detailed information about their
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affairs, and discover the extent of Bukharan, Khivan, and British influence over
them.72 But how he left for Bukhara and what official directions he received from
Perovskii is still unknown. 73 However, in this respect there is one clue, which can be
deduced from the recommendation which Perovskii sent to Rodofinikin, on July 14,
1836 after the return of Vitkevich from Bukhara; 74 this confirms speculation that
Vitkevich had been sent at Perovskii's instigation, and that Perovskii wished to secure
his promotion after long service without advancement.75
The mission was carefully prepared. The same techniques which had been
used in De Maizon's mission were repeated here again. Vitkevich was dressed in
Asiatic clothes and traversed with a trade caravan destined for Bukhara. 76 The offici-
al version maintained that he was commissioned to travel to the steppe, but was
driven to Bukhara under the pressure of a snow storm. 77 There also remains much
confusion about the disguise he adopted. On the one hand, some authorities describe
him as, "in the capital of a closed Muslim country, ... riding his horse in his official
uniform as a Cossack officer";78 on the other, he is more plausibly said to have
travelled disguised as a simple Kirghiz.79 His mission in Bukhara lasted for six
weeks from January 2nd to February 13, 1836, during which time he collected econo-
mic and political evidence and above all intelligence about the relations between the
Khanates.8° He collected interesting information not only about Bukhara, her military
forces, economy, and trade, but also about Khiva, her economy and her relations with
the Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, and Kaisaks. 81 Vitkevich returned to Orsk from Bukhara
on April 18, 1836.82 In 1837 he was recalled to St. Petersburg and was sent to serve
under the supervision of the Russian minister in Teheran, Graf Simonich. He carried
confidential instructions from Rodofinikin to be delivered to Dost Muhammad, the
Amir of Afghanistan. These included a promise that Russia would assist him with two
million roubles in cash and two millions in goods, in return for an alliance against
Khiva. Vitkevich accompanied the Persian army, which included a Russian battalion,
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led by the Shah against Herat, with Simonich as his advisor. Vitkevich however left
the advancing army, and via Sistan and Kandahar arrived at Kabul where he was able
to make contact with Dost Muhammad. In 1838 he returned to Teheran and early in
1839 to St. Petersburg where he was mysteriously murdered.83
In 1837, then he was able to alarm the British in India when he appeared in
Kabul offering Dost Muhammad financial assistance and alliance with Russia. A
contemporary historian described his activities:
The mysterious doings of the Russian officer Vitkevich in Bukhara in 1835
and in Kabul, the Afghan capital, in 1837, had constituted one very solid
cause of the invasion of Dost Mohammad's country by the army of In-
dia.. 84
But the success of his mission to Kabul depended to a great degree on the success or
the failure of the Shah's enterprise against Herat. 85 Russia was so interested in the
expedition that, as British opinion believed, "she remitted £25,000 of the debt
contracted by Persia in 1828, in order that it might be expended in fitting out the
expedition" •86
Russia sought to achieve two goals in this torturous course: to assist Dost
Muhammad via Persia since she could not offer him direct assistance apparently to
avoid irritating Great Britain; and secondly to have Dost Muhammad as an ally
against Khiva. Meanwhile Perovskii wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning
that if Russia would not assist Dost Muhammad, England would conquer Afghanistan
and possibly other nations of Central Asia, which, if supplied with arms, gun-powder,
and money would form a formidable obstacle to Russian expansion in the region.87
From the British point of view, the venture against Herat would have far
reaching repercussions beyond the Afghanistan boundary:
The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by
Russia... The motive cannot be mistaken: Herat once annexed to Persia may
become according to the commercial treaty the residence of a Russian
Consular Agent, who would from thence push his researches and com-
munications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan.88
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It happened, during the advance on Herat, that a lieutenant, Pottinger by name, of the
Bombay artillery was in the city. He took charge of the defence and successfully
conducted it with a "courage and ability which have immortalized his name", 89 as
Blackwoods was complacently to observe twenty years later.
However, the official position of the Russian government vis-á-vis the
Persian attack upon Herat was veiy different from its real intentions. Even though the
expedition was financed by Russia, and the Russian Ambassador Count Simonich
instigated the Shah, and Russian officers and troops accompanied the advancing army,
yet in St. Petersburg Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister "professed to
agree with the British Government as to the viciousness of the course pursued by the
Persian monarch" •90
Perovskii's Expedition against Khiva (1839)
In 1839 Russian policy was impelled by many factors to dispatch an expedi-
tion against Khiva; first, Russia was closely watching British activities in Afghanistan,
and was eager to take counter measures against it; secondly, Russia was instigated by
jealousy of Great Britain's commercial success beyond the Hindu Kush and in Central
Asia, wanted to secure the Khivan market from her avowed rival, and turn it into a
closed market for Russian products which otherwise would be incapable of competing
successfully against British-Indian goods. 9 ' The Russian Government also had by
now accumulated enough intelligence through the missions of De Maizon (1834-35)
and Vitkevich (1836-37). This aggressive policy was facilitated by the absence of any
power near enough to the scene of action able to expose and resist, at the time, the
true nature of her designs, and the invalidity of the pretexts she put forward.92
Perovskii assembled a considerable force and marched on Khiva in the
winter of 1839. This expedition was delayed for reasons connected with the British
operation against Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan. 93 Perovskii marched with an
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army of more than 5,000 soldiers and 22 guns, besides 2,000 Kirghiz to care for
10,000 camels and a number of horses. Most of the men who took part in the ex-
pedition were either Russian convicts or Polish prisonersY4
 The expedition failed
totally, not achieving any of its targets nor reaching Khiva, and most of the men and
transport animals perished "in consequence of the ruinous idea that, on account of the
want of water in the steppe it would be easier to make the campaign in winter and
that Russian soldiers had nothing to fear from the cold". 95
 The expedition failed
utterly after having got no more than half way towards Khiva.
Had he succeeded in securing victory over Khiva, Perovskii was to have
been allowed stay there as long as should be necessary to impose on the Khivans the
following conditions:
1- to stop all hostile actions against Russia;
2- to limit Khiva's authority over the Kirghiz and Turkomans who yielded to
Russia;
3- Khiva's authority should not exceed her boundaries;
4- Khiva should not shelter Kirghiz fugitives who instigate the Kirghiz upris-
ings;
5- caravans should not be forced to pass through Khiva;
6- Khiva should give up claiming any rights on forts on the Syr Dana;
7- no duty should be collected from the Russian merchants, and they also
should be on equal terms with the Khivan merchants in all respects;
8- Russia and Khiva should exchange consuls - the first in Khiva and the
second in Orenburg; the Russian consul, without impediment, should be able
to keep ships in the Amu-Daria river;
News of the failure of Perovskii's expedition reached the English head-
quarters at Kabul, and was naturally received with feeling of intense relief. At least
for the time being, the ominous prediction of Baron Brunnow that the Sepoys and the
Cossacks were about to meet on the banks of the Oxus was clearly premature. But the
Britons did not relax the attention with which they had been monitoring the increas-
ingly threatening nature of Russo-Khivan relations since the early 1830s. Perovskii's
attempt against Khiva of 1839 authentically justified their fears that Khiva would be-
come the first Russian victim in Central Asia. These apprehensions were behind
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Palmerston's decision in 1840 to despatch two British officers, Captain James Abbot
and Sir Richmond Shakespeare on an advisory mission to Khiva. Palmerston having
detected the Russian purpose behind the pretext, the main objective of the mission
was to rob "the Russians of their main pretext for action against Khiva". 97 They
arrived there while Perovskii was retreating with the remnant of his army. In an
attempt to fulfil Russia's demands and eliminate her ostensible grievances, they con-
vinced the Khan of Khiva to moderate his policy towards Russia. 98
 The Khan was
quick to adhere to their advice and abolish the customary practice of seizing and
enslaving Russian subjects.
The ulterior purposes of Perovskii's expedition had been, through military
power, to inspire respect for Russia, to consolidate her influence in Central Asia, and
to counteract the spread of British influence in Central Asia, which would hurt Rus-
sia's industry and trade in the region. Its immediate objective had been to dethrone
the Khivan Khari Alla Quly and to appoint one of the Kirghiz sultans loyal to Russia
in his place. 10° It had been hoped to detach the Kirghiz from their loyalty to Khiva,
but when Orenburg proposed this to some of the Kirghiz elite, they rejected the offer.
Underlying the whole of Russian policy at this time was the need to counteract the
British success in Afghanistan, lest it should encourage resistance to Russian influence
among the Kirghiz, and resistance (encouraged by the activities of possible British
agents) in Khiva itself.101
After the unsuccessful end of Perovskii's expedition, the Khivan Khan
realized Russia's determination to strike against him, while the other Khanates
remained aloof. Thus, in an apparent endeavour to remedy the rift with Russia, he
sent Ata-Niaz Khozha along with Shakespeare to Orenburg accompanied by 418
Russian prisoners,'°2 as a gesture of good will. 103 Simultaneously the Khan issued
his famous declaration of July 19, 1840 prohibiting all practices of slave trade,
plunder, and attacking trade caravans, to be binding on all his subjects. The declara-
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tion said:
To all brave warriors, fighters, heads of the Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks, to all
citizens of our splendid kingdom... we declare that as of Jumadi al-Awwal
1256 (1840), we together with the great Russian Emperor began a new age
of peace, positively we seek his friendship and goodwill; from now on, no
one should attack Russian possession, or purchase Russian prisoners, If any
will act in defiance to our high command, and attack Russian land or acquire
Russian prisoners, he shall not avoid our Royal wrath and will be penalized
appropriately... ,104
This declaration should indeed have eliminated the Russian grievances, if
Russia positively sought merely to end the slave trade and to secure her caravans. But
the Russians perceived this act as a sign of weakness on the part of Khiva (as indeed
it was), while the British efforts were correctly understood as an attempt to deprive
Russia of any reason to attack Khiva in the future. 105
 Abbott's efforts were interpret-
ed slightly differently, as a step towards a projected Anglo-Khivan alliance. Hence
soon after the defeat of Perovskii St. Petersburg began to move so as to increase
political influence in Khiva and Bukhara. In the spring of 1841 the Russians, seeking
to have resident agents in both Khiva and Bukhara, sent missions there headed by
Nikiforov and Butenev.106
There is no reason to believe that the Russians had abandoned their covert
goals, which were no less than the conquest and complete control over the Khanate of
Khiva. For his part, the Khan adopted the advice of Arthur Conolly'° 7 and sent
embassies to both Kokand and Bukhara, in an unsuccessful endeavour to organize a
system of mutual aid and defensive alliance against Russia's aggression.'° 8
 This
proposed confederation received no serious consideration in Kokand and Bukhara and
never was realized in actuality for reasons already explained above.
Russia viewed the British missions and diplomatic negotiation with these
Khanates, as activities directed against her interests in the region. Thus her extreme
sensitivity to them can be explained adequately by pretension, based on doubtful
claims of prior rights, to exclusive relations with the Central Asian Khanates in both
53
Russian policy and the Khanates' Relations
the commercial and political spheres.'°9 The Russians claimed exceptional rights in
Khiva based on allegations that the Khanate was bound to Russia by special relation,
which afforded her a privileged position in dealing with Khiva.' 1° It was apparent
that, even though Khiva was protected for the time being by her geographical
location, as an oasis in a sea of sand, Russia's Generals would not lose time in ac-
complishing their military designs after overcoming that geographical obstacle. Mean-
while the Khans lacked international political vision, they were brutal, and mostly
motivated by hatred towards each other. Thus they failed to make the most of the
opportunity presented to them by the Anglo-Russian rivalry to become active players
in the Great Game and perhaps preserve their independence.
Nikiforov's mission to Khiva (1841)
Russia's policy of reconnaissance purposes and developing trade relations
was re-activated after the ignominious failure of Perovskii's expedition. Her first
mission in the new period was headed by Captain Nikiforov.' Nikiforov, accom-
panied by two topographers, left Orenburg on May 3, 1841112 and arrived at Khiva
August 9, 1841. This time Russia tried a new approach with Khiva, which reveals the
Russian intention of establishing hegemony over the Khanate by reducing contacts
with her to a local level, i.e. with Governor-General of Orenburg, thus aiming to
localize Russia's relations with Khiva and so avoid international complications. These
ambitions were for long hidden behind the facade of such pretences as the slave trade,
the interruption of trade routes, and sovereignty over the nomads. Nikiforov was
instructed to tell the Khivans, on behalf of the Russian government, to contact the
Commander of Orenburg Military District about any problems, as it was the nearest
Russian administration to Khiva.'13
Besides the main points of his mission, which were the termination of the
slave trade, the limitation of Khivan influence over the nomadic tribes, and the
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promotion of Russia's trade with Khiva and other adjacent territories, Nikiforov was
instructed to revive Khivan confidence in Russia's good faith, which had been ruined
by Perovskii's expedition, and to reduce their suspicions about Russia's intentions.
Nikiforov, like previous envoys, was warned to avoid, in his talks with the Khan or
other officials, discussing or answering any question regarding where the Russian
boundaries should be fixed; in any such situation, Nikiforov was to manoeuvre in
order to distract attention to another subject, give general interpretations, and shift the
talks towards the oath which had been taken by the nomadic people who now
accepted Russian citizenship. 114
 Nikiforov was instructed to collect topographic
intelligence about strategic locations. He was directed to extract Khivan recognition
that the eastern coast of the Caspian belonged to Russia, he was warned as well not to
irritate the Khivans by raising the issue of free access to other Khivan cities.5
Throughout his activities, Nikiforov was to do his best to revive the Khivan
trust in Russia's purposes, as this was "the most important prerequisite for the success
of future Russian political influence over the Central Asian Khanates". 6
 He did not
however achieve any success in his talks with the Khivan officials on any of the
above questions. The only outcome of his expedition was a detailed description of the
road to Khiva and of the city itself, which was the work of the topographers who
accompanied him.'7
Regardless of the outcome of Nikiforov's mission, Khiva was not interested
in furnishing genuine attempts to develop fruitful and steady relations with Russia. So
the Khan again sent his envoys, Vaiz Niaz and Ishbai Babaev, to Orenburg where
they arrived on December 12, 1841, and in February 1842 they left for St. Petersburg
to deliver a memorandum from the Khan to the Emperor, as well as to negotiate the
ratification of an act based on a modified version of what Nikiforov brought to
Khiva.' 18
 In St. Petersburg, however, the Khivan envoys were rejected, accused of
having no authority to negotiate, and sent back accompanied by a new Russian
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mission to Khiva headed this time by Danilevskii, to resume what Nikiforov had
already begun. 119 Thus Nikiforov's mission ended without achieving any of its
objectives. 120 If this negative result had any deeper significance, it must be the
demonstration that Khiva's cautiousness about Russia's intentions was still very
strong, in spite of the abolition of slavery and the famous declaration of the Khan of
July 19, 1840. In the meantime the Russians interpreted all their political failures with
Khiva as being the result of the work of British agents.
Butenev's mission to Bukhara (1841)
Conspicuously Russia intensified her efforts to deal with each Khanate
separately. Simultaneously with Nikiforov's mission being prepared to Khiva, Russia
prepared to send a separate mission to Bukhara, in return for a Bukharan mission to
St. Petersburg in 1840, to discuss the Amir' s fears of the appearance of the British
anny north of the passes of the Hindu-Kush. 121 This mission was led by N. F.
Butenev, who left Orenburg for Bukhara on May 3, 1841, simultaneously with
Nildforov, and accompanied by Khanykov and two mining engineers from a group
that had been requested by the last Bukharan envoy. 122 Khanykov, the well-known
orientalist, was commissioned to pacify the Afghans by conveying to them that
Russia's aim was to erect a bulwark against the British drive for conquest. 123
 Before
leaving for Bukhara Butenev conferred in Orenburg with Perovskii, who advised him
how he should conduct negotiations in Central Asia.' Butenev arrived at Bukhara
on 5 August 1841.
When the mission arrived at Bukhara, it was received by the Amir the same
day. Butenev was thereafter to be allowed to come to the palace every Friday morn-
ing,' but there is no record of his talks in the palace, even though the mission
stayed in Bukhara for eight months. It appears that the Bukharans had deliberately
chosen Friday, the Muslim sabbath, for these meetings, so that formal talks with the
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Amir could not be held. 1 When Butenev failed to visit the palace on Fridays, the
Amir authorized one of his counsellors to take charge of conducting the negotiations
with him. The Russians expected that Butenev would negotiate with the Amir directly,
so they considered this as the first misfortune to meet the envoy and his mission.
Though Butenev was able to deliver a list of the issues which concerned Russia, the
Bukharan answer to all the Russian demands was unsatisfactory from Russia's
standpoint. Regarding signing a treaty of trade and transit127 the Amir, because of
previous experience, insisted that the Russian Emperor should sign it first and send it
back to Bukhara with a Bukharan messenger, who would be dispatched to Russia for
the purpose. Concerning the Russian prisoners, the Amir was willing to fulfil Russia's
request for their release, but not before ratification of the treaty. The Amir promised
to reduce the duties collected from Russian merchants in Bukhara if Russia would do
the same in regard to tariffs collected from the Bukharan merchants.1
During his stay in Bukhara Butenev met both of the British officers Stoddart
and Conolly, who were imprisoned there. He was informed that the Amir had written
a letter to Her Majesty the Queen and that upon receiving a reply both would be
released. 129 Both British envoys had been sent to the Uzbek Khanates, to persuade
them to remove Russian grievances and thus be in a stronger position to preserve the
independence of the Khanates. Stoddart was dispatched to Bukhara in 1838, and in
1840 Conolly was sent to Khiva and Kokand. 13° Out of altruism and belief in the
cause he pursued, on his way to Kokand he decided to visit Bukhara to free Stoddart.
Instead he was imprisoned with him.
From Terentiev we learn the surprising fact that the property of Stoddart and
Conolly, their maps, and their papers, were on sale in the market at Khiva, yet
Butenev prohibited any of his associates from purchasing any of the property of the
British agents.' 3 ' This seems odd and inconsistent with usual Russian practice, and
contradictory to Butenev' s instructions which had clearly urged him to collect intel-
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ligence information. It is unlikely that he would miss such an opportunity without
considerable reason. Neither Terentiev nor Zhukovskii, however, tell us why Butenev
abstained from buying at least the maps and the papers of the British agents. The
reader will recall that one of De Maizon' s guide lines was to search for and purchase
the papers of Moorcroft and Trebek. Undoubtedly the papers of Stoddart and Conolly
would have been of great interest in St. Petersburg, so we must conclude that there
must have been a convincing reason which prevented their acquisition: it could be
either lack of money, or perhaps a suspicion that the sale was merely a trap to ensnare
the mission. He preferred safety and evaded the risk.
In April 1842 Butenev left Bukhara. Four days after his return to Orenburg,
a Bukharan embassy arrived to negotiate what Butenev had offered Bukhara.132
Butenev did not achieve any of his objectives in pursuit of Russian policy, whereas
Rawlinson found this mission paradoxically helpful to Britain, for not only did it
place British observers
behind the Russian scenes during the most eventful phases of our Own
Afghan occupation but it also presents us with a report by an eye witness of
many details relating to the captivity of Stoddart... which were before but
imperfectly known to any of us.133
The great game clearly was not always predictable in its results for either of its
participants.
Danilevskil's mission to Khiva (1842)
The frequent Russian missions to Khiva had more than one objective, and
the political negotiations were often a cover for other more devious endeavours. So
Danilevskii's mission (1842), like that of his predecessor Nikiforov, included a
naturalist as well as a topographer, for survey and intelligence purposes. And as
explained earlier, the official instructions to the mission were in two parts: the first
dealt with open matters of public policy, while the second was associated with matters
of strategic interest, which of course were all clandestine. The declared goals of
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Danilevskii's mission were to negotiate the reduction of commercial duties to five per
cent of the declared price of the merchandise, to mediate the liberation of Persian
prisoners 1M to imbue the Khan with a strong sense of Russia's good will, and to
emphasize Russia's influence over Khiva.' 35
 On the other hand he had been warned
to avoid addressing the delicate boundary question; if the Khivans however insisted on
discussing that issue, then he was told to define Russia's borders with Khiva as being
the river of Syr-Daria and the northern shores of the Aral Sea, to the Caspian
Sea.'
Danilevskii succeeded remarkably, and on the morning of December 27,
1842, the Khan who had just returned from the battle field against Bukhara issued a
solemn declaration in the following terms:
1) From now on neither overt nor covert inimical act should be taken against
Russia.
2) No plunder and brigandage neither in the steppe or on the Caspian; if any
Khivan subject committed such an act, the culprit would be immediately
punished, and the stolen property would be returned.
3) Not to enslave Russian captives, and be responsible for the safety and
protection of the property of the Russian subjects who might be in the
Khivan domains.
4) In case of the death of a Russian citizen in Khiva, all his property should
be delivered to the Russian border-guards, to be passed to his heirs.
5) Prevent Russian dissidents and insurgents from lodging in Khiva but to
hand them over to Russia.
6) Duties will be collected from the Russian merchants once a year, and
would not exceed five percent.
7) All Russia's trade in transit through Syr-Daria to Bukhara or any other
Asian country, or goods from those countries designated to Russia, will be
duty free.
8) Not to hinder trade of other Asian countries with Russia, but to collect
from them legal 'zakah'.'37
9) To behave in all cases as a devoted neighbour and sincere friend, and to
enhance more and more the ties of amity with the Russian Empire.'38
This declaration was to be observed by all the Turkomans, Karakalpaks,
southern Kirghiz, and Uzbeks who were under Khivan authority.'39
Russia agreed with alacrity to match all of the above conditions with similar
undertakings. On this basis talks were concluded and Danilevskii left for St. Pet-
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ersburg. Russia had not expected such success, so this agreement received the highest
possible endorsement, and an approved copy was delivered to the Khivan Khan
through his envoy Mm Bashi Muhammad Amin, who accompanied Danilevskii to St.
Petersburg.14°
After this remarkable diplomatic attainment, which was mostly due to
Khivan fears arising out of the British success in Kabul,' 4' it seemed that Russia
might be satisfied with her new friendly relations with Khiva. But for Russia this was
no more than a temporary halt on the road to the full subjection of Khiva. In this
respect Zhukovskii tells us that the major benefit of Russia's improved relations with
Khiva actually amounted to the improvement of her military and geographical intel-
ligence about the Khanates of Central Asia. All the other elements in the negotiations
were in the longer term no more than dead letters.'42
The following period (1842-1845) was marked by the Bukharan-Khivan war
for the domination of Merv. Meanwhile Russia intensified her efforts to control the
lower Syr Dana. By 1847 she had established herself on the eastern shores of the Aral
sea by the conquest of several strategic Kokandian forts of Raim, Kazala, and Aralsk.
In the following year (1848) Russia dispatched a group of scientists, Butakov,
Pospelov and Shevchenko in a scientific mission to study the Aral sea. During the
years that preceded the Crimean War, 1850-1853, Russia was preoccupied by subject-
ing Semirechie and the region beyond the Ili river. Russia's activities in this period
doubtless signalled that she was preparing for a military campaign though the eruption
of the Crimean War delayed her action.
Ignatiev's mission to Khiva and Bukhara (1858)
In mid-1857, only one year after the humiliating treaty of Paris which
concluded the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander 11(1855-1881) recalled Colonel N. P.
Ignatiev, the military attaché in London, to report upon British activities in Asia.
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Ignatiev worked out a project for sending an expedition to Afghanistan, the purpose of
which was to study the region and to discover possible approach routes to India. In
the event of another rupture with England, he concluded that only in Asia could
Russia fight against her with any prospect of success.143
On October 16, 1857 Tsar Alexander H approved Gorchakov's suggestion to
dispatch yet another envoy to Khiva and Bukhara. On January 4th, 1858 this sugges-
tion was sanctioned by the Special Committee of the Government council. It was
there resolved to send two missions; one, diplomatic and led by Ignatiev, to Khiva
and Bukhara, and the other scientific and headed by Khanykov, to Mghanistan.
Ignatiev's mission left Orenburg in May 15, 1858 and arrived at the capital of Khiva
on July l9.'
Russia strictly observed her usual policy towards Central Asia, the policy
that tended to justify each Russian proceeding in the region as a response to British
activity which threatened her interests. The justification for this mission was the claim
that a British agent had arrived in Bukhara and was trying in every possible way to
wreck Russia's trade with both Bukhara and Khiva. At the same time the old
issue of directing Central Asian trade towards the Caspian sea was revived, even
though Russia had no reliable position on its eastern shore.'47
Russia dispatched Ignatiev in a mission to both Khiva and Bukhara with the
usual two-fold purposes, on one side to negotiate the question of sending trade agents
to both Khiva and Bukhara, while on the other Ignatiev was instructed to make a
topographical diary, to describe geographically and statistically the countries on his
way, to collect information about the old bed of the Amu' 48 in the hope that it could
be re-directed to the Caspian; he was also to report upon the Turkomans, their
military strength and their relations with their neighbours, about the roads leading
from the Khanates to adjoining countries and about the military forces of the Khanates
and adjacent countries.'49
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Ignatiev with a force of 117 men crossed the Ust-Urt desert and arrived at
Chernyshev Gulf at the Aral sea, where he met two vessels commanded by Butakov.
The two vessels sailed with Ignatiev to the mouth of the Amu Dana. Here he con-
ferred with Ata Murad, the Turkoman Khan who at that time was leading a rebellion
against Khiva and was besieging Kunia-Urgench. Ignatiev preferred not to be involved
in this dispute to avoid complications in Khiva, and proceeded to Kungrad.' 5° The
reason why the mission was accompanied by several ships from the Aral flotilla was
that it was hoped to reconnoitre the Amu and occupy Kungrad or the mouth of the ri-
ver.' 51 In the meantime Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg, was in contact
with Ata Murad. His letter to the Yomud Khan was intercepted by the Khivans, and
this misfortune contributed much to the ultimate failure of Ignatiev's mission in
Khiva.'52
Regarding the exchange of trade agents, Ignatiev was sceptical about the
Bukharan and the Khivan governments agreeing to the proposal, in contradiction to
what the St. Petersburg newspapers were reporting about the imminent exchange of
resident agents between Russia and the Central Asian states.' 53 Ignatiev wrote to the
Director of the Asian Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they appear-
ed likely to ask in return for accepting Russian trade agents that they might send their
agents to the Novgorod exhibition. 154 Ignatiev was convinced that trade agents in the
Khanates would be of advantage to Russia, and suggested that it would therefore be
politic to include an article in the agreement, to allow them to send their agents to
Orenburg. As he reported, "I intend to convince them of the profit they would gain
from sending their agents to Orenburg".' 55 Lord Wodehouse, the British ambassador,
was dismayed by the Russian proceedings until he was assured by them that no
military demonstration was intended in that part of Asia. 156 After the failure of his
mission Ignatiev observed that he could not foresee any profit in associating Russia
with such a cunning Amir. 157 This scepticism was no doubt based on the experience
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of Butenev's unsuccessful mission to Bukhara in 1841.
Convinced of the sterility of his talks in Khiva, Ignatiev decided on August
31, 1858 to leave Khiva for Bukhara, after informing St. Petersburg of his intention,
and emphasizing to his superiors not to allow any Khivan embassy to visit Orenburg,
unless the Khivan Khan would agree in writing to all the Russian requirements.
Clearly Ignatiev had been disappointed in his intrigues in Khiva. For a long period
Russian policy had aimed at the overthrow of the ruling Iltuzer dynasty, which it
regarded as "usurpers", 158 and as we have seen one of the objects of Perovskii's
expedition of 1839 had been to depose the Khan and appoint a Kirghiz Sultan in his
place. 159 The new Khan encountered by Ignatiev, Sayed Mohammad Bahadur, had
just taken control of Khivan affairs and had already aroused the hostility of the Turko-
man tribes. The Russians therefore tried to encourage the Turkomans so as to subvert
the recalcitrant Khanate from within. When the Khan detected this design in the
military force and especially the warships which accompanied Ignatiev's mission, he
denied them passage;' 6° the military party accompanying Ignatiev also became an
obstacle to agreement with the Khivan negotiators, and all of this obstructed his
attempts to reach an agreement with the Khan. The other ostensible aim of the
mission, to secure Khiva's agreement to Russian navigation of the Amu Dana, was
also frustrated; not only because of Khivan opposition, but also because of Bukhara's
refusal, based on the fear that, once allowed, it would attract all the trade of the
region into Russian hands.161
Ignatiev arrived in Bukhara in September 20, 1858 while the Amir was
leading an expedition against Kokand. Bukhara at that time was isolated in the region;
she was in dispute with Khiva and Kokand, and with Afghanistan over the region of
Balkh and other possessions on the left side of the Amu Dana.' 62 Upon his return
from the front against Kokand, the Khan consequently accepted the Russian demands
and issued a directive to ensure their fulfilment.'63
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Russia was more satisfied with the results of her surveillance efforts than
with the diplomatic venture. Through this mission Russia studied thoroughly the Amu-
Dana river and the southern shores of the Aral Sea, explored inter-Khanate relations
still further, and obtained vital information for a future invasion of the Khanates. Ru-
ssia was assured of the possibility of invading Khiva in the summer, 1M and was now
confident that agreement with one Khan would not be binding to another, and that
invading the territory of one Khan would not damage relations with another.'
These ideas encouraged Russia's underlying disposition to use her armed forces on a
greater scale in order to settle her disputes with these Khanates. After Ignatiev's mis-
sion, Russia singled out Kokand to be the first victim, as it had such strained relations
with the other Khanates, and its geographical location made it more vulnerable and
accessible to Russian troops.
Consequences of the Crimean War
The defeat in the Crimean war was the main reason that turned Russia once
again toward Central Asia for compensation, in so far as her hands were now tied in
the Balkans. Crippled in Europe, where she would meet efficient and powerful rivals,
she remained vigorous in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where she found feeble and
decaying neighbours. However, in the Asian direction Russia also found herself
heading towards British possessions and interests where, unlike in Europe, Britain had
no allies and "rivalry and hostility were less disguised". 1 Though Russia believed
the British to understand that her affairs in Europe were damaged for a long time to
come, nevertheless:'67
by guarding the line of the Danube, while leaving open the Transcaucasian
frontier and the shores of Anatolia, you change the main line of Russian
advance from the western to the eastern side of the Black Sea. You divert it
from Europe into Asia, and by so doing change the powers by whom such
southward progress brings her into collision.1
Russia was not slow to resume progress in the Central Asian arena after the
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Treaty of Paris. Perovskii was advancing successfully, though slowly, on the Jaxartes
and Russia's intrigues against India were apparent and felt in Afghanistan. Lord
Lawrence understood the Russian strategy when he, during the Crimean War said that
he was "looking out sharp towards Kabul. If the war continues, Russia will no doubt
intrigue there".169
As observed in the late 1850s, after the Crimean War, the Russians re-
cognised their advantage in Central Asia, where their actions were "fraudulent and
defiant",' 7° the Orenburg authorities dashed across the steppe subjugated its in-
habitants and erected fortresses on the frghiz and Turgai rivers, while the British
perceived that process as guided by "natural law of increase". 17 ' Russia moved
vigorously to secure profitable trade with the less competitive, but cotton producing
countries of Central Asia, which became more valuable to her during the American
Civil War, which of course resulted in a sharp reduction in the cotton supply. Central
Asia doubled her cotton production which saved Russian industry on the one hand,
and of course besides other factors, elevated Russia's desire to dominate the region on
the other. 172 Commerce, ambition, and the pressure of rivalry propelled her to re-
sume the process of conquest on her south-eastern Asian peripheries.
Russia's activities in the period that followed the Crimean War were in full
contrast to Britain's, despite the fact that that war had revealed the decadence and im-
potence of Russia. Russia sought to avenge her defeat by following a full-scale
expansionist policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus; whereas Britain seemed unable
to take advantage of her military superiority after the Crimean War, to retard the
Russian advance in Central Asia and in the Caucasus.
The defeat in the Crimean War came as a violent shock which opened
Russia's eyes to her defective social system and pushed her towards reform. It
revealed the decay and weakness of the state and the social structure. The new Tsar
Alexander 11(1855-1881) and his advisors realized that Russia was paralysed by the
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old system of serfdom (krepostnichestvo), and accepted the humiliating clauses of the
Paris treaty in the belief that peace was necessary and would provide the opportunity
to take care of domestic matters, of which they must take advantage. The first step
must be to free the serfs because, according to Prince Gagann, "there was the centre
of all evils".' 73
 Despite the strong objection of the serf owners and even of the serfs
themselves who objected to the new reforms on the ground that they had been
deprived of their land,' 74
 the Tsar held firm to the conviction that serfdom must
come to an end on the terms devised by his government.'75
Even though the foreign policy of the Russian government remained the
same, it accused field Generals and laid the blame on them, however never rejected
any "unauthorized" acquisition by its Generals so long as it resulted in success. Its
policy, in Central Asia, was based on one of the most destabiising principles in
public affairs, i.e., "waiting upon events" and "profiting by the blunders of others" in
order to achieve its objectives.' 76 An explicit pattern of such a policy can be demon-
strated from events which followed the Anglo-Russian agreement about the northern
frontiers of Afghanistan in 1872, upon which General Cherniaev commented that "he
attached no importance whatever to it, and that it was in fact of no use to either
country", because it was of such a character "that Russia will easily find a number of
pretexts for breaking it when necessary". 177 From this point of view Russia merely
behaved like any other imperial power of the same period. It is difficult if not
impossible to find a dispassionate way of describing Russian policy in Central Asia
which will not appear to be prejudiced, for one principal reason, that is to say Russia
was the most influential actor, militarily, politically, and economically on the Central
Asian arena, while other parties, mainly Britain, even though interested in the region,
were mostly interested in stopping Russia at a distance from India. Historians should
take in consideration Russia's predominant position in Central Asia before making
judgement. Hence it would not be far fetched to conclude that Russian practice and
66
Russian policy and the Khanates' Relations
policy in the region was founded upon deceit, duplicity, and disregard of all principles
other than Russian self-interest.
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Chapter Three
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE
AGAINST KOKAND AND BUKHARA
British reactions to the Russian advance
The antagonism that prevailed between Russia and Great Britain in Asia in
the nineteenth century had developed out of the pressure of those jealousies which
had arisen gradually during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In that
period both Empires were expanding their territory and stabilizing their rule in the
areas of their preponderance. In that era of acquisitions the lure of the wealth of
India, which had flattered Russian ambitions since the time of Peter the Great,
became a concrete element in Russia's political projects, and as it crystallized
became a permanent irritant in the relations between the two Empires, British and
Russian.1
The rivalry between these Empires was not motivated by racial feeling,
religious hatred, or national glory, but developed out of the apparent incompatibility
of their interests and ambitions, so that without the conscious intention of either
nation, it arose by slow degrees from small beginnings, until it became the dominat-
ing factor that shaped their relations.2 Russian practices and designs in the East
were already perceived to be threatening to Great Britain after the imposition of the
treaty of Gulistan on Persia in 1813. It was in that treaty that historians and polit-
icians consider that "the rivalry of England and Russia had its birth". 3 This treaty
gave Russia control of all the western shore of the Caspian Sea and the territories
extending to the west as far as Erivan and parts of Georgia, and so made Russia the
unchallenged master of the Caspian.4
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Russia reinforced her position in the Caspian by occupying the island of
Ashur-Ada in the southernmost corner of that sea in 1837-38, under the pretext of
stopping Turkoman piracy. The occupation at the time did not attract much attention
in Britain until 1842 when the matter reached the Foreign Office following a Persian
request for British assistance to end the Russian occupation of that island. Under
Anglo-Persian pressure Russia instead sought an alternative base on the eastern
coast, although she failed temporarily because of Turkoman resistance. In subsequent
political developments Russia acknowledged Persia's title to Herat in exchange for
Russian rights of expansion to the east of the Caspian and in the basins of Syr Dana
and Amu Dana.5
In face of these expansionist designs, England tried to implement in Central
Asia the policy of a balance of power, which had proved to be so effective in
protecting her interests in Europe. However, this policy was less effective in Asia,
mainly because Britain's European allies, out of jealousy of her powerful position in
Asia, proved unreliable and tended to side with Russia or perhaps at best adopt a
neutral policy.
As early as 1830 the conflict between the interests of both empires in Asia
had reached a level of chronic suspicion and serious animosity; on the Russian side
this can be deduced from Russia's escalating intelligence activities during the
1 830s.6
 Hence their rivalry crystallised and their interests in Asia began to make an
impact on their relations in Europe. The steady Russian advance in the direction of
India, even though it was still involved in the remote Central Asian steppe,7
 alarmed
British politicians, who considered an early military confrontation with Russia a
likelihood and a necessity in order to terminate the threat to British interests and
security. Lord Ellenborough, the president of the Board of Control, remarked in 1830
that,
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our policy in Europe and in Asia ought to be the same, to pull down Russian
power... I would, in Persia and everywhere, endeavour to create the means of
throwing the whole world in arms upon Russia at the first convenient time.8
Britain's policy in Central Asia was thus influenced largely by the needs of
the defence of India against the Russian menace. Britain at this stage began assess-
ing Russian policy in the steppe region and appraising her influence over the Uzbek
Khanates, in the search for ways to counter and limit that influence. For that purpose
Britain investigated Russia's naval strength in the Caspian and the volume of her
trade in the region.9
 Consequently this led to intelligence of other useful matters:
the condition of routes between Orenburg and Bukhara and Khiva, the duration of
the journey, and the number of caravans. 10
 During four decades, i.e. from the late
1 820s to the late 1 860s, attention was directed towards collecting information about
Russia's settlements on the eastern coast of the Caspian, and interest in the Aral sea.
Britain was concerned as well to assess the military capability of the Khanates and
their potential to resist Russia's aggression, and their revenue from trade with her."
While it may be observed that both empires during the first half of the
century made comparable advances, England extending her possessions from the
Indian ocean along the Indus to Peshawar, while Russia assimilated the Kirghiz
steppe, confirmed herself on the eastern shores of the Aral sea, and advanced along
the Syr Dana,' 2
 it was also reasonable, as did Vambery, to describe British policy
in Central Asia in the first half of the century as "inactive", and certainly her mil-
itary influence extended no further than the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. 13
 The
failure of the Persian expedition against Herat in 1838, despite Russia's support, and
the failure of Perovskii's expedition against Khiva the next year, revived a feeling of
relief in India and a renewed feeling of security. The same events created unaccus-
tomed indifference towards the activity of the Russian Government, that prevailed in
British policy and engulfed British public opinion as well up to the 1 860s.' 4 The
fears of the Indian Government did not echo in London, basically because Russia's
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stumbling efforts during the period that preceeded the Crimean War, contributed to
what later became known as the policy of masterly inactivity. The advocates of this
policy argued that the sense of alarm formerly deluded Britain into errors, and led to
the ill-considered war with Afghanistan in 1838.15
The players in the Great Game were not necessarily antagonistic in all fields
at all times. Britain viewed Russia in Europe as different from Russia in Asia. There
were even instances when Britain regarded the Muscovite advance in Central Asia as
being advantageous to the interests of England, 16 while in Europe Britain some-
times considered Russia as a
great conservative power of the West, [which] might be expected to render
important aid to the cause of peace and order, by checking the revolutionary
mania of France and Germany.17
Apparently St. Petersburg noticed the ambivalence behind Britain's inactive policy,
and felt confident enough to launch the military campaigns that marked the 1 860s
and ended in the subjection of both Kokand and Bukhara.
The rivalry between the two empires had three different but connected forms:
military, political, and economic. Although none of these can be considered in
isolation, Russia's ability to combine all these factors was unrivalled. She masterful-
ly mixed economic with military considerations and her trade served as a mask for
political intentions.' 8 This policy usually obligated her Asian neighbours by com-
mercial treaties, which inevitably would be followed by expanding political influ-
ence, and once commercial installations had been established, military protection
became mandatory.'9
Economically speaking, St. Petersburg laboured to secure Central Asian
markets, and sought to turn the region into a base for advancing Russian trade
further with Afghanistan, Eastern Turkestan, and India. These ambitions were
checked by Britain who controlled the Iranian market through superior merchandise
and had won the same position in Central Asia, almost effortlessly, by supplying the
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Central Asian market with reasonably priced goods. 2° As a result Russia was the
loser in this commercial rivalry with Britain in that market, and as a result the
amount of her potential exports to the Khanates was severely limited. 21 This situa-
tion remained the same until the Russian military presence became paramount in
Central Asia in the 1860s, and adjusted the balance in her favour by imposing pre-
ventive duties on British commodities.22
The apparently irreconcilable confrontation between the interests of Russia
and Great Britain led on both sides to the conviction that the weakness of one meant
the strength of the other; hence "each nation had identified the other as a major
threat".23 To conceal her designs and to avoid open political clashes with England,
Russia was, in addition, unique in the conduct of its foreign policy: it had an Asian
policy engineered by the Asian Department of its Foreign Ministry, which was
functionally dissociated from the European Department.A Whereas the Foreign
Ministry ostensibly harmonised the work of both departments, in practice this
division assisted the prosecution of Russian plans in Central Asia, in such absolute
secrecy that the right hand did not know what the left was doing. 25 It was from this
propensity that the character of Russia's apparently ambiguous policy took its origin:
she strove to pacify Britain and assure her of Russia's blameless intentions, while in
no way actually slowing down her expansionist efforts. While Russian troops were
subjugating the steppe, advancing along the Syr Dana, and conquering key cities of
Turkestan, Chemkend, Samarkand and elsewhere, her politicians maintained that the
antagonism between Russia and England proceeded only from the latter's fears about
the security of India.26 Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister (1856-1882), frequently
and in categorical terms confirmed and insisted to British politicians and diplomats
that the Emperor was opposed to Russian expansion in Central Asia. St. Petersburg
adhered to this policy from the mid 1 860s up to the conquest of the Akhal Tekke
and Mery Turkomans in 1884.27 Even when evidence of military expansion, against
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Kokand and Bukhara in the sixties, was conclusive, the Emperor himself assured the
British of his pacific intentions and Gorchakov echoed his words:
the probable eventuality of hostilities between the Russian and Bukharan
forces in Central Asia did not modify the determination of the Emperor to
abstain from conquests... no change had taken place in the policy of Russia,
and that the Emperor is as determined now as in 1865 to abstain from
conquest in Central Asia, His Imperial Majesty being convinced that such
accession of territory would be injurious instead of proving advantageous to
the Empire.28
Repetition of analogous assurances became characteristic of the imperial
policy in Central Asia for years to come and in connection with several issues.29
Russian officials were in no doubt about the advantages of their Asian
possessions in relation to their strategic plans. Ignatiev,a the Military Attaché in
London in 1857, reported after the Crimean War that in case of another rupture with
England, only in Asia could Russia confront her with probability of success. He
emphasized that controlling the Amu Dana waterway was a necessity, as it would
powerfully assist Russia in threatening Great Britain on the Indian front. 3° Miliut-
in,3 ' the War Minister, wrote to Gorchakov in 1861 about the same strategy,
justifying the fever of expansion and conquest that consumed the activities of the
Russian Generals in Central Asia:
in case of European war, we must value the occupation of that region, which
brings us nearer to the northern borders of India and would assist our ap-
proach to that country. By controlling Kokand we can constantly threaten the
possessions of British East India. This would be exceptionally important,
since only here we can be perilous to our enemy.32
The official press in St. Petersburg was engaged in a fierce polemic, the purpose of
which was to pacify British politicians by insisting that the real objectives in
Russia's advance were limited to commercial gains but not strategic. Obviously
commercial interests did not contradict with strategic plans. It was clear that she
desired a market where she had no strong competitors and which would secure
a Later in the same year he was recalled to St. Petersburg and dispatched in a diplomatic
mission to Bukhara. See his mission in chapter two.
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economic advantages on the one hand, and enable her to compete with European
rivals on the other. Securing this market from Russia's point of view evidently
meant complete control over Central Asian states, which meant the realization of her
political as well as economic goals; and the temporary success of her trade would
not therefore lead to abandoning her strategy of eventually controlling the Indian
trade, as the Gobs observed:
neither the commercial nor the political object will be attained, until Russia
has taken complete possession of Bukhara, the great centre of the trade and
political life of Central Asia.33
The success of Russia's aggression throughout the 1860s in the lands between the
Syr Dana and Amu Dana rivers secured to her an unchallenged position in that
region; and contributed to her political, military, and economic weight not only in
Asia but by extension in Europe as well. Thus her ambitions and desire for expan-
sion grew wider and new hopes for further expansion were raised. The accumulating
evidence of these aspirations provoked increasing suspicion among other European
powers with interests in Asia, of which of course the most prominent was Great
Britain.34 Russia launched a political offensive, which began with Gorchakov's
circular of November 21, 1864, and was designed to portray Russia as the carrier of
the banner of civilization obliged to subdue barbarism, while in reality her troops
were advancing, contrary to her allegations, against stable nations with unique
culture and history. 35 Britain however accepted Russia's justification, despite the
fact that there remained serious uneasiness regarding the future of the Khanates.
Russian politicians aspired to exclude the issue of Central Asia from surfac-
ing and affecting the relations between the two Governments. In an effort to divert
attention away from Central Asian toward European affairs, during a meeting with
Buchanan, the British Ambassador in December 1868, Gorchakov deliberately
pressed forward issues concerning both governments in Europe rather than those
taking place in Turkestan. To Buchanan, who was directed by his Government to
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discuss the nature and dimension of Russian military activities in Central Asia, he
insistently avoided addressing the subject and instead expressed his hope that the
two governments would be able to put into effect the good understanding which
existed between them in Europe.37 Responding to Buchanan's expressed concerns
and interest over the state of affairs in Central Asia, Gorchakov again diverted
attention towards England's desire to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe.
He pointed to the identity of their interests in the Ottoman Empire, saying that
Britain wished
to secure the Christian subjects of the Sultan against oppression, and so does
Russia.... would it not be wise and prudent were they to act together in
endeavouring to carry out by moral influence their common objects, and to
guard against eventualities which may arise at no distant future of a nature to
disturb the balance of power in Europe?38
Gorchakov thus, by emphasizing the similarities in the interests of both
Empires in Europe, evaded discussing the Russian campaign in Central Asia, which
ended by the annexation of vast territories and several important cities of Kokand in
1865 and the following year.
Prince Gorchakov's circular of November 1864
In less than a quarter century (1845/68) Russia occupied vast territories
extending from the Emba river to the heart of Central Asia. She controlled the Island
of Ashurada in the Bay of Astrabad, erected Fort Novo-Alexandrovsk, and occupied
Chikishlar on the eastern shore of the Caspian in 1842, established a line of for-
tifications on the Syr Dana, conquered Dzhulek in 1853, and captured Turkestan and
Chemkend in 1 864. This vast expansion created an image of non-stop expansion
in Russia's proceedings in the region.
Sir Robert Peel's doctrine, that "when civilisation and barbarism come into
contact, the latter must inevitably give way" may be taken as encapsulating the
general response of western European civilisation to these enigmatic proceedings.4°
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The circular of November 1864, in which Gorchakov set out arguments to reassure
other European Governments about the scope and purposes of Russian expansion in
Central Asia, concealed, especially from the British, the true magnitude of Russia's
territorial ambitions, and Russian strategic goals with regard to India. The circular
stated that
it always happens that the more civilized State is forced in the interest of the
security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain
ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make
most undesirable neighbours.4'
Further it went on to legitimize Russia's forward policy:
the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect
submission... Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring
expeditions against an enemy whom his social organization makes it impos-
sible to seize.., if, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn,
...its withdrawal is put down to weakness... The work has then always to be
done over again from the beginning.42
It may however be remembered that it never happened in the history of the Russian
advance in Central Asia that she withdrew voluntarily except perhaps in the excep-
tional instance of Chinese Kuldja in 1881. Consequently, to pacify European
opinion, and particularly to preserve the "indifference of Englishmen towards
Russian progress in those regions", 43
 Gorchakov prepared the ground for further
Russian advance, legitimated the fluidity of the Imperial borders in the Steppe, and
their steady encroachment and irretrievable absorption of land as well as people:
in order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are
established in the midst of these hostile tribes, . . .soon beyond this second line
other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten the same dangers
and necessitate the same measures of repression.
Indeed, it was true to say that Russia, after subjugating one group of tribes, would
then accuse their neighbours of stirring up trouble against her, would then subjugate
the second and so on unblushingly until all the Uzbek Khanates fell prey to a well
designed Russian execution in Central Asia. This process began to alarm the British,
especially following the Russian conquest of a number of important cities in Turk-
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estan and Kokand, raising the prospect that the Russian advance in Central Asia if
unhindered would eventually endanger the security of India. 45 Receiving a report
concerning the new situation which had been created by the recent Russian con-
quests Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, commented that the Russian
encroachment in Central Asia caused "an uneasy feeling in countries to which it re-
lates".46
 Though the Russian advances were alarming, yet not all her proceedings
were revealed to the world. Lumley, the Secretary at the British Embassy in St.
Petersburg, was instructed to collect intelligence on the actual Russian conquest in
Central Asia. Although his endeavours were hard, the results were "vague and scan-
ty".47
 Some of the intelligence he gathered was from an Italian mission which had
visited Central Asia. From this mission he learnt that all Russia's proceedings were
kept secret. He was told that an officer wrote a letter to a friend and mentioned to
him some of the actions that had taken place at the front. The letter was censored
and returned, and the officer was warned. Already Russia intended to keep her
proceedings in the region as secret as possible. Gorchakov himself, when M.
Gianotti, the Italian Chargé d'affaires, spoke to him admiring the success of the
Russians against Kokand, dismissed the topic and evaded conversation in a way to
preclude decisively any further mention of the matter.48
Despite the Russian efforts to keep the matter confidential, however, reports
began to circulate not only in diplomatic circles but in the public domain as well.
The Times published a telegram from Paris informing its readers about the fall of
Kokand to the Russian army.49
 These revelations were alarming to Russia, and
Gorchakov began to recognise the need to allay the fears of the European powers
regarding Russia's proceedings in Central Asia even though Tsarist policy regarded
Central Asia as an appropriate region for conducting the competition with Britain.50
In his circular Gorchakov explained Russia's Central Asian policy to various Courts
of Europe, presenting Russia as the carrier of the banner of civilization faced by
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wild and nomadic tribes. In the circular Gorchakov stated that Russia's advance was
necessitated by the lack of fixed frontiers with the migratory tribes: hence her for-
ward push would cease only when she reached a point where settled nations of suffi-
cient social organization could be met. This Russian claim may have been designed
to pacify Europe and to fit the occasion; it was however likely to appear very
ominous to a neighbouring imperial power such as Britain.5'
In his circular Gorchakov traced the successive stages by which a civilized
state would find itself compelled to advance to spread order, having come into
contact with the nomads. He explained that a territory inhabited by a migratory
population could not be a fitting frontier for a civilized government, which must
then find itself pushing forward until it reached a stable political grouping. He com-
pared the Russian position in Central Asia with that of the United States in North
America, France in Algeria, Holland in Indonesia, and England in India, thus hoping
to win sympathy in the West for Russia's actions in the East. He confided that:
it has been judged indispensable that our two fortified lines, one extending
from China to the Lake of Issyk Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral, along
the Syr Dana, should be united by fortified points, so that the posts should be
in a position of mutual support leaving no gap through which the nomad
tribes might make with impunity their inroads and depredations.52
Gorchakov masterfully avoided stating definitely that the final point of
Russia's advance had been reached in 1864, leaving ambiguity around Russia's fu-
ture plans, as well as about the affairs of the nomadic tribes and the issue of
Russia's undefined boundaries. Nonetheless this circular was the first Russian offi-
cial document to deal systematically with her policy in Central Asia.
It must be noted that the circular was not communicated verbatim to the Brit-
ish court, neither through the British embassy at St. Petersburg nor through the
Russian embassy in London. Evidently it was designed to guide Russian diplomats
abroad in their verbal explanations to the courts to which they were accreditied.
Russell reflected that it was highly desirable that Great Britain should receive a copy
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to be aware of the Russian intentions in Central Asia. 53 Gorchakov however con-
sidered the British request for a copy of his manifest to be unwarranted, 54 though
he read it to Buchanan, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, as a personal and
confidential communication.55 He also told Buchanan that Baron Brunnow, the
Russian Ambassador to England, would communicate the contents of the circular
confidentially to Russell. Russell was unimpressed by these concessions and instruct-
ed Buchanan to inquire why it had been sent to Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and other
courts, if the matter was so secret.56
In spite of the protestations in Gorchakov's circular, the Russian government
wasted no time in creating, on February 12, 1865, the new Province of Turkestan;
Tashkand was stormed, and the city of Khokand was taken in the same year.57
Again St. Petersburg found it expedient to blame the Generals in the fie1d.' Cher-
1) It seems that some politicians and historians believed the Russian claim that
difficult communications with the officers in remote regions rendered it difficult for
St. Petersburg to control the situation. However it should be clear that there was no
Russian General or officer who would take a risk and carry the responsibility if he
knew that he would be accountable for his deeds before his superiors. Besides, all
the Governors of Orenburg and Western Siberia used to adhere to the opinion of St.
Petersburg (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the War Ministry); in case the
directives were of general character, they would feel free to execute what they saw
to be in the interest of Russia. Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg was
enthusiastic to occupy the cities of Turkistan and Tashkand to secure Russia's
possessions in Central Asia; when the Minister of War rejected the plan, because
ofthe unsuitable international situation, Katenin refrained and deferred to his super-
ior. Later he strictly observed the directions when he was allowed to occupy only
Dzhulek. The Governor-General of West Siberia, in connection with Kokandian
activities in the region of the river Chu, asked St. Petersburg to occupy Peshpek.
Meanwhile Bariatinskii, the Commander of the Caucasian Army, when he intended
to occupy a point on the south-eastern shores of the Caspian in the late 1860s,
sought permission from St. Petersburg first. But if Great Britain would remonstrate
and ask for explanation, St. Petersburg would blame deficient communication with
the field officers. MID, Gl. Arkh., 1-9, 1852-1862 gg., No. 8, 11. 240-266; and 1858-
1860 gg. 11. 20-31 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Main Archive, 1-9, 1852-1862, No.
8, sheets 240-266; and 1858-1860, sheets 20-31) quoted in Popov, "Iz Istorii...", pp.
204-5. Blackwoods was in no doubt what interpretation to place upon these expedi-
ent fictions in Russian policy: "it is a maxim of the Russian government to repudiate
the conduct of its officers until their project is accomplished, thus preventing oppos-
(continued...)
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niaev was recalled in 1866 and replaced by General Romanovskii, who maintained
that he would endeavour to pacify Russia's neighbours by a durable settlement of
the frontiers rather than by conquest.58
Romanovskii's declared intentions, if maintained, would have given Russia a
peaceful period to adjust herself and assimilate her newly conquered territories. The
chief qualification to his intentions, (if we assume that he meant them seriously),
was the instructions he received from St. Petersburg before taking up his new posi-
tion. These instructions were no different from the general frame of guidance usually
communicated to his predecessors; they reminded him that:
the true interests of Russia should be kept in view. As regards Bukhara, it is
above all desirable to re-establish speedily friendly commercial relations with
that Khanate, but at the same time, the immediate local chief is bound to
remember that the Asiatic respects only the force of arms. The main object of
the commander should therefore be to make the Amir understand that we are
not desirous of conquest, and that we do not threaten the integrity of his
dominions, but that we shall not allow him to extend his dominion in the
direction of our limits.59
Furthermore, his instructions prepared the ground for justifying further
advance, either for protecting "legitimate trade, or in the general interests of human-
ity".60 Like Gorchakov's circular, they were concealed in terminology suited to a
forward policy in a situation of fluid boundaries. It was so far impossible to recon-
cile Russian assurances emanating from St. Petersburg with Russian procedures in
Central Asia. It was impossible for politicians then, as it in some cases still is for
historians now, to divine the true purposes of Russian policy in any given situation,
and to separate the transient from the permanent in Russian policy. Price Gorchakov
said in his circular:
b(conhinued)
ition until it is too late for other governments to interfere". Blackwoocls, vol. LXXXI
(Feb. 1857), p. 139.
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In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier, these motivesc had been
powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish this line
between Lake Issyk-Kul and the Syr-Daria, by fortifying the town of Chem-
kend, lately occupied by us.
He continued that this position
puts us in the immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural and commercial
populations of Kokand. We find ourselves in the presence of a more solid
and compact, less unsettled, and better organized social state; fixing for us
with geographical precision the limit up to which we must halt, ... any further
extension of our rule, meeting, as it would, no longer with unstable commun-
ities, such as the nomadic tribes, but with more regularly constituted States,
.would draw us on from annexation to annexation with unforeseen complica-
tions.6'
These assurances were given just six months before the assault against
Tashkand in May 17, 1865; but of course a pretext was easily found and Bukhara
was to be blamed this time.
In a conversation between Lord Augustus Loftus, Britain's ambassador at St.
Petersburg, and Prince Gorchakov regarding the adventurous policy of Russia's
Generals in Central Asia, who aspired to obtain the order of St. George by laying
new acquisitions at the feet of the Emperor, Loftus suggested that "St. George might
be given to the Governor-General before he entered on his functions, which might
C These motives mentioned earlier in the same circular were: "1. It has been
judged to be indispensable that our two fortified frontier lines -one extending from
China to the Lake Issyk-Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral along the Syr-Daria-
should be united by fortified points, so that all our posts should be in a position of
mutual support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes might make with
impunity their inroads and depredations. 2. It was essential that the line of our
advanced forts thus completed should be situated in a country fertile enough, not
only to insure their supplies, but also to facilitate the regular colonization, which
alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for the occupied country, by
gaining over the neighbouring populations to civilized life. 3, and lastly. It was
urgent to lay down this line definitively, so as to escape the danger of being carried
away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive measures and reprisals, into
an unlimited extension of territory". FOCP 3785, analysis by Lord Tenderden of the
papers presented to the Parliament respecting Central Asia 1838-1878; also Parlia-
mentary Papers, 79, p. 682 ff; and appendix II.
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render him less bellicose and ambitious for glory". 62 It does not appear however
that this sage counsel was adopted by the Tsar.
As soon as General Romanovskii arrived in Turkestan in the spring of 1866,
he was met with confusion, with the grievances and the unrest of the local popula-
tions as well as their rulers within and beyond Russia's frontiers, which were caused
by the rapidity of the recent Russian military operations. Sorting out his priorities, he
found himself, like any of his predecessors, acting according to the first portion of
the Imperial guidance i.e. "the true interests of Russia should be kept in view". He
resolved that a military blow was necessary, sent a reconnaissance party into
Bukharan territory, which looted large herds of sheep from Bukhara and returned to
the Russian camp. His next step was directed against Irjar: two weeks later he cap-
tured Nau and the commercial emporium Khodzhand. 63 Obviously St. Petersburg
did not find any contradictions between these actions and its intentions, for it formed
a special commission in the winter of 1866/1867 to study the situation and to
consider the best system of administration. Following the recommendations of this
commission, the Imperial Ukaz of July 23, 1867 was issued, declaring the formation
of the Province of Russian Turkestan and the appointment of General K. P. Kauf-
mann as its first Governor-General. The borders of the Province of Turkestan were
accurately defined on every side except the south, which clearly indicated Russia's
intentions towards further advance. The following events soon justified the expecta-
tions and further expansion followed in that direction.M
Throughout all of these developments in Central Asia, Russia's policy in the
region was decided and executed by military officers; political decisions in St.
Petersburg were a matter of dispute and competition between the Ministry of War
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 65 Miliutin, the War Minister, was a strong
advocate of the annexation of Central Asia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
more sensitive to the complexities of the international situation, was reluctant and
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less enthusiastic regarding these military designs and their timing. Miliutin blamed
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for following in its Asian policy a system of passive
conservatism, and for being worried about maintaining friendship with England.66
At a slightly deeper level, these differences were resolved into a harmony of
purpose, which confused their opponents and enabled them to achieve their goals
without any serious protest or opposing action.
The conquest of Tashkand (1865)
In the spring of 1864, Colonel Cherniaev, the strongest supporter of the
unification of the Orenburg-Siberian frontier lines, advanced from Fort Vernoe and
conquered Aulie Ata; meanwhile Colonel Verevkin' was leading another column
from Fort Perovskii against Turkestan, which the Russians historically considered as
a centre of pan-Islamism. The two colonels were competing with each other, and in
this spirit of rivalry Verevkin endeavoured to move ahead of Chemiaev and conquer
Chemkend. The force he sent for the purpose was however defeated with heavy
losses and retreated back to its camp. Cherniaev had the same target in mind. He
advanced against Chemkend, and arrived at the vicinity of the city; he did not attack
it however at once, but waited until September 1864, when he was reinforced by the
return of Verevkin's forces. The joint force was put under his command and the city
was besieged on September 22, 1864.67
The Kokandis tried to break the Russian blockade by a counter attack. They
were defeated and retreated into the city with their leader Alim Kul fatally wounded.
Upon receiving news of the death of Aiim Kul, Cherniaev hoped that not only
Chemkend would be easy prey but Tashkand also. Thus after the fall of Chemkend
he advanced against Tashkand, placed his batteries in position and made the first
assault, only to fmd that this city was more strongly defended than he had thought.
d Both Cherniaev and Verevkin were promoted to Generals.
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He was repulsed and retreated to his camp at Chemkend with heavy loss.68
 The
death of the regent of the Khanate disheartened the population and boosted the
ambition of the Russians. Chemiaev, repulsed for the moment but now thinking not
only of Tashkand but also of the future of the Khanate of Kokand, communicated to
the Amir of Bukhara a message warning him that his advance against Kokand would
be regarded as an act of aggression against Russia.69
Cherniaev's warning to the Amir of Bukhara, and the efforts to conquer
Tashkand revealed Russia's real intention behind the unification of the Siberian and
Orenburg lines.70 The retreat was temporary and upon receiving intelligence about
the intention of the Amir of Bukhara to assist the defenders of Tashkand, Chemiaev
adopted measures to prevent it. Immediately he strengthened his position at Niaz
Bek, sixteen miles from Tashkand, and controlling the water supply of Tashkand. He
diverted the river Chirchik, and isolated the city from communications with Kokand
or Bukhara. He delayed attacking Tashkand, hoping that the city would be reduced
by intrigue, if not then by confrontation in line with the sentiments of Gorchakov's
circular:
It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable
force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet
no hold upon them. The work has then always to be done over again from
the beginning.71
Since his aspirations for peaceful reduction of the city were fruitless, Cher-
niaev strengthened his blockade. In May 1865 he received essential reinforcement
from Orenburg which, according to Soviet historians, was essential for this cam-
paign.72 Meanwhile he contacted the merchants of Tashkand who were desirous for
peace with Russia. He received a merchant called Muhammad Saat Bai said to be in
close relation with trade houses in Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Troitsk. Cher-
niaev described Saat Bai as "a civilized Muslim ready to go against the Quran if this
would not jeopardize essential teachings of Islam". 73 This characterization of Saat
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Bai denoted that the Russians had influenced certain elements in the city (some
historians called them the disloyal party, others the peaceful party).74
In the meantime the Muslim clergy of Tashkand decided to appeal for
Bukharan assistance. They dispatched a mission to Bukhara, and upon receiving
news of the advancing Bukharan army the Tashkandis declared their acceptance of
Bukharan citizenship. In a precautionary move, Cherniaev therefore advanced to
Chinaz to prevent the arrival of the Bukharan force. The Russian detachment
returned before reaching its destination upon receiving news about the withdrawal of
the Bukharan garrison from Chinaz.75
The city was under increasing pressure from the Russian siege, and suffering
from lack of water and provisions. In addition, the population was placed under
psychological stress by Russian rumours that a fifth column in their city would
attack the defenders from inside: uthis subterfuge placed the inhabitants in great
distress".76 The Russians were both intriguing within and were strengthening their
forces outside. Further encouragement from the General-quartermaster of the General
Staff of Orenburg army was sent to Chemiaev urging him to take decisive action,
saying that "the conquest of Tashkand had become a necessity". 77 While this was
the situation around Tashkand, there arose a dispute between the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of War over the objectives and timing of the advance.78
This controversy was triggered as a result of Britain's political remonstration in St.
Petersburg in 1 864.
Due to uncertainty about his prospects of victory, Cherniaev sought to
achieve the separation of the city from Kokand, without giving any evidence that
Russia was behind this design. Stremoukhov, head of the Asiatic Department in the
Foreign Office, proposed that this separation should be achieved without the visible
assistance of Russia, 8° since Russia could not afford further sacrifices which would
end up by maintaining the present situation and could not annex the city because of
85
The Russian Advance against Bu/chara and Kokand
the "undesirable consequences" that this would entail. 81 Stremoukhov clearly was
influenced in his recommendations by the pressure of Britain's protest against his
country's proceedings in Central Asia. A nominally independent Tashkand under a
Russian protectorate was favoured by Gorchakov, and became the guiding principle
of the Russian Foreign Office's view of future relations with all the Khanates after
its reduction to full dependency on Russia. Instructions for separating Tashkand from
Kokand were enough for Cherniaev to act freely.
To pacify Bukhara, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized Kryzhanov-
skii,82 Governor-General of Orenburg, to explain to Muzaffar, the Amir of Bukhara,
the political changes that were taking place and to assure him of Russia's desire to
develop commercial relations with Bukhara and her determination to avoid territorial
augmentation. Gorchakov, by this communication, aimed at neutralizing Bukhara so
as to be free to weaken Kokand by cutting off Tashkand, its largest city and
economic centre. Meanwhile Cherniaev received further instructions from Kry-
zhanovskii warning him, in order to evade future complications, to separate Tash-
kand from both Kokand and Bukhara and put it under a direct Russian protect-
orate.83
While these transactions were going on, the situation in Tashkand grew more
tense, and more favourable for military action by the Russian forces after the arrival
of the Kokandi force in the city. The Russian commander sent a message to the
inhabitants of Tashkand conveying to them his desire to receive their representatives
"to hear their requests and wishes".84 This apparently political manoeuvre was
however more of a psychological ploy to gain advantage ahead of the forthcoming
assault. On the night of 14-15 June 1865 Cherniaev gave orders to storm the city.
The Russian army breached the walls and entered the city after a three-day battle,
15-17 June, to find the whole city committed to resistance and the streets barricaded.
However, on 17 June the aksakals (elders) met Cherniaev to offer him their condi-
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tions for submission and peace. Cherniaev tried to extract from them a document
stating that the city had voluntarily accepted the Russian authority, 85
 so as to justify
his action before European public opinion. In his effort to extract that document he
summarily arrested all those who rejected his proposal and refused to sign. Under
this threat from the victorious Cherniaev the elders found themselves obliged to put
their seals to Cherniaev's declaration.86
Sir Henry Rawlinson,e a member of the India Council, commented most per-
ceptively and prophetically after the fall of Tashkand that "the fate of Kokand may
be considered to have been sealed... The loss of Tashkand is in fact a death-blow to
the independence of Kokand".87
The Russian success naturally caused uncommon urgency in diplomatic cir-
des. Lumley, Secretary of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg, was directed to
raise the issue again with Gorchakov. He was assured by the Russian Foreign
Minister that the Central Asian Khanates had become troublesome neighbours; 88 the
occupation of Tashkand was explained to Great Britain as a necessary precondition
for "organizing a fertile province.., capable of supplying the Russian army with
every necessary".89 This explanation was followed by the usual assurances that the
Tsar was not willing to expand his dominions and opposed any further advance.90
Russian officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured Lumley that Russia re-
quired no further territorial aggrandizement on the frontiers of Kokand, since by the
conquest of Chemkend and the territories she controlled, Tashkand and environs, she
had in her possessions a fertile country capable of maintaining Russian armies
between the rivers Chu and Syr Dana. 91 Furthermore, to reduce British criticism,
the Russian Government declared that Tashkand would be treated and considered as
e Sir Henry Creswich Rawlinson (1810-1895) instructor to the Persian army
1833-1839, and in the following year was appointed as political assistant in Kabul;
in 1843 political agent in Turkish Arabia, promoted to Consul-General at Baghdad in
1844; in 1856 became director of East India Company; in 1858 he became member
of the India Council until 1895.
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an independent city. Nevertheless on November 7, 1865 Buchanan reported to
Clarendon his suspicions regarding Russia's intentions there saying that Russian
authority seemed to be de facto established in Tashkand.92
The seizure of Tashkand was not only a turning point in Central Asia, it also
had far-reaching reverberations in Persian politics. The Shah reacted to it by urgently
calling upon Great Britain to take steps to halt the Russian advance and to raise the
urgent question with St. Petersburg of stopping it; also to open channels of com-
munications with the Central Asian principalities for the assessment of the Russian
aggression.93 The Shah believed that, if the Russians reached Mer y and Maimaneh,
he would not be able to save Khorasan and Astrabad from their clutches. 94 He
assured the British that his Government would do all it could to prevent the Turko-
mans of Mery and Maimaneh from provoking the Russians to further acts of
aggression.95
British public opinion was no less alarmed by Russia's forward movement in
the region. The Times informed its readers that Russia was taking possession of key
points in Central Asia from which she would be capable of threatening India. 96
 Six
months later, the Times repeated its warning, though this time it came in an article
by Vambery in which he stated that "the approach of Russia to Bukhara and Afghan-
istan is to be effected much sooner than the English politicians believe". 97
 In
response to these expressions of anxiety, and after the military operations of 1865
which gave Russia control over Tashkand, Prince Gorchakov again explained that
Russia's intentions in Central Asia would prove to these alarmed persons in England,
that their apprehensions were unfounded, and that the Emperor had no wish to
extend the limits of the Empire, but was only desirous of establishing an orderly
state of things on the frontiers. 98 These assurances may be added to the pile of
empty undertakings, issued over the years temporarily to pacify Russia's opponents,
but having no weight when Russia's interests were involved. The city of Tashkand
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was annexed in 1867 and became the seat of Russian Government in the Region, the
Turkestan Governorate with Kaufmann as its first Governor-General.
The period that followed the conquest of Tashkand in 1865 thus saw no
diminution in the expansionist character of Russian policy. The fall of Tashkand was
accepted with alacrity by the Emperor, and Cherniaev was rewarded with a diamond-
hilted sword, in spite of the jealousy of Kryzhanovskii, his direct superior and
Governor-General of Orenburg? The Bukharan Amir remained ioyal to the goal of
relieving the population of Tashkand, although his forces were at the same time
engaged on another battlefield, against Kokand. He contacted Cherniaev and
demanded the evacuation of the city.'°° The situation thus became one of direct
rivalry between Bukhara and St. Petersburg over Kokand. Miliutin, aware of
increasing British pressure in regard to Russia's swift expansion, urged Cherniaev to
be cautious and to adopt a policy of peaceful relations with Kokand.'°' The Rus-
sian commander dispatched his envoy Struve to Bukhara, where however he was de-
tained as a response to the detention of Najmud-Din, a Bukharan envoy had been
sent to St. Petersburg but had been arrested at Kazala and deported to Orenburg.102
Thereupon Bukharan merchants in Russian controlled territories were detained as a
reprisal for the detention of Struve. Kryzhanovskii not unnaturally became worried
that these complications were leading Russian policy into an uncontrollable pre-
dicament. To reduce tension with Bukhara he declared Tashkand an independent city
in September 1865: an action that probably would satisfy the Amir so long as Cher-
niaev did not at the same time attack Dzhizak. 103 Cherniaev was therefore accused
of serious indiscretions and was recalled to St. Petersburg; he was replaced by
General Romanovskii in March 1866.'°
The instructions which Romanovskii received from the Ministry of War
included advice to guide him in his new position: it was said that Asians respected
only force, and that the slightest lull or hesitation, not to speak of retreat, would be
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interpreted as a sign of weakness.'° 5 It may therefore be understood that a newly-
appointed General would hardly behave pacifically in the light of such provocative
advice, especially as it came from the War Minister himself. Besides the soldier's
usual eagerness for gloly, which could not be obtained without a dramatic victory
which would be appreciated in St. Petersburg, Romanovskii encountered several
explosive issues that could provide a pretext for justifying the resumption of combat;
of these not the least was the detention of Struve.106
After the defeat by Romanovskii of the Amir's army near Ura Tepe on 8
May 1866, Bukharan resistance was notably enfeebled. Romanovskii took advantage
of this to attack Khodzhand, a strategic city on the left bank of the Syr Dana
between Dzhizak and Kokand, and took it on 24 May. 107 The new situation in-
duced Kryzhanovskii in June 1866 to consider the conquest of the whole of Kokand.
For this purpose he laboured to stabilize his authority in the already conquered
territories, and to cover the expenses of the forthcoming campaign he began levying
taxes. Meanwhile he directed Romanovskii to treat Khudayar, the Khan of Kokand,
as a vassal of Russia, intimating to him that if he should resist then the Khanate
would be liquidated.' 08 Kryzhanovskii coveted for himself the conquest of Naman-
gan and Kokand. He resorted to deception to get the necessary funding from St.
Petersburg for the campaign: he wrote to Miiutin on 18 August 1866 that Romanov-
skii had reported to him that the Khan of Kokand behaved in an unfriendly manner
towards Russians, and asked the Minister for assistance to the extent of 200,000
roubles, in addition to the 50,000 he had received earlier, for the reduction of either
Kokand or Namangan!
. Terentiev says that Kryzhanovskii lied to the Minister because Romanovskii
did not report to him about unfriendly attitude from Khudayar or ask for extra
financial assistance. To cover the gloomy situation in which he found himself,
Kryzhanovskii complicated the situation by escalating hostilities with Bukhara,
giving Romanovskii free hand in that front in order to reconcile him. Terentiev,
Istoriia..., v. I, p. 362.
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In September 1866 a Bukharan embassy arrived at Khodzhand to announce,
as Terentiev put it, Bukhara's "full readiness" to meet all of Russia's requirements
and to sign a peace treaty. 109 Kryzhanovskii was not looking for peace, and ex-
ploited the gifts which were sent to him by the Amir into a reason for further
escalation in their conflict. He invented the idea that the Amir had intentionally sent
such an insignificant gift, which was a piece of silk, in order to disdain him and the
prestige of Russia. He included this story in his report to Miiutin. These proceed-
ings indicated that he had already decided to go to war against Bukhara even before
the end of the talks with the Bukharan envoy, who was told on 13 September 1866
that Bukhara must pay an indemnity of 100,000 tillas within ten days or Ura Tepe
and Dzhizak would be taken.' 1° Kryzhanovskii's full intention will be readily
understood if the reader considers that the ten-day period was not enough for the
envoy to travel from Khodzhand to Bukhara and return back even if the money were
already collected!
Kryzhanovksii wrote to Miiutin on 5 September 1866 that he would attack
Bukhara forthwith if the conditions were not met. On September 20, three days
before the expiration of the period, he moved his forces to a striking position against
Bukhara. In the following month he conquered vast territories including three cities,
Ura Tepe, Dzhizak, and Yani Kurgan. 11 ' These Russian conquests were large
enough for the formation of a new military district, the Turkestan oblast, under
General Kaufmann who replaced Romanovskii in 1867.
The formation of the Turkestan General-Governorship (1867)
The beginning of the 1 860s had witnessed intensive political preparations for
the second wave of conquests in Central Asia. Russia at that time achieved at home
a number of essential reforms the most important of which was the liberation of the
serfs in 1861, which released a not inconsiderable proportion of the peasantry for
91
The Russian Advance against Bukhara and Kokand
resettlement or employment in remote parts of the Empire. Apparently the newly
conquered regions of Central Asia were regarded as the optimum place for the
purpose. Meanwhile St. Petersburg resolved to unite her Siberian and Orenburg
frontiers in conformity with the plan of General Bezak which had been put to the
government in 1861. The Russian conquests in the first half of the sixties were in
part regarded as essential to the process of linking up and consolidating her fron-
tiers.112
By 1867 Russia's conquests were vast and spectacular and led St. Petersburg
to think of reorganizing its new acquisitions in the region. For this purpose a
committee was created under Miliutin's presidency, the members being General
Kryzhanovskii, governor of Orenburg, Stremoukhov, director of the Asiatic Depart-
ment, Adjutant General Geiden, the chief of the General Staff, and all field Generals
who had taken part in the recent operations in Central Asia, namely Cherniaev,
Romanovskii, Vorontsov-Dashkov, besides Galkin, the State Counsellor. The
committee included as well the four members of the Stepnoi Committee which was
formed in 1865, Girs, Gutkovskii, Gems, and Protsenko. Kryzhanovskii was the only
one among all of these to protest against the creation of a General-Governorship of
Turkestan, and that for one main reason: the creation of this government would
deprive him of his almost unlimited powers in Central Asia and turn him into a mere
governor of an internal Russian oblast.H3 The Emperor issued the decree (Ukaz)
for the formation of the Turkestan Governorate on 11 July 1867 including in it the
oblasts of Syr Dana and Semirechie, with its seat at Tashkand. These two subordi-
nate oblasts were entrusted to two Military Governors accountable to the Governor-
General himself. Kryzhanovskii continued to oppose the creation of the new admin-
istration, protesting that its remoteness would complicate communication with St.
Petersburg, but his real reasons behind these objections lay in his fears that the result
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would be an encroachment by St. Petersburg on his virtual independence of action in
Central Asia.114
In practice, however, the formation of this government marked a new stage in
Russia's advance without involving the central Government directly. The new
governorate had many of the powers and authority of an independent state. It had its
separate judicial, economic, political, and civil organisation, while the Governor-
General had extraordinary powers both within the boundaries of the governorate and
in dealing with its neighbours."5 On the eve of his departure from St. Petersburg
to Tashkand, Kaufmann received directions to facilitate the colonisation of the newly
acquired territories. For the extraordinary powers which had been endowed on him,
Kaufmann won locally the title of "half-Tsar" (Yarym Podshah). St. Petersburg's
purpose in creating such an administration was precisely to safeguard itself against
Britain's political objections on the one hand, and to erect a centre of operation
close to the Khanates to deal with them without international complications on the
other. The success of the Government of Turkestan, which was the first Russian ex-
perience of the kind, led Russia to repeat the procedure by creating further centres of
authority adjacent to her next targets.5 The last of these was the creation of the
Transcaspian oblast in May 1881 with its seat in Askabad.116
g The Russian administrational division of Central Asia consisted of five oblasts,
while each of them was divided to regions (uezdy). The structure by 1900 was as
follows:
- Syr Dana oblast consisted of the following uezds: Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Chimkend,
Aulie Ata, and Tashkand (seat of the Government of the oblast).
- Ferghana oblast (Kokand): Kokand, Novyi Marghilan (capital of the oblast, later
Skobelev), Andizhan, Namangan, and Osh.
- Samarkand oblast: Samarkand (administrative centre of the oblast), Katta Kurgan,
and Dzhizak.
- Semirechie oblast: Vernyi (capital of the oblast), Kopal, Lespinsk, Prezhevalsk, and
Pishpek.
- Transcaspian oblast: Mangishlak, Krasnovodsk, Askabad (seat of the Government),
Tedzhen, and Merv.
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The Reduction of Bukhara (1868)
As we have seen, Russia's conquests were large enough by 1867 for the
formation of a new governorate headed by an Engineer-General, Kaufmann, who
was chosen by Alexander II personally." 7
 The Tsar himself invested him with
exceptional authority to deal with the Khanates of Central Asia. He began his task
together with Kryzhanovskii by working out a draft treaty in September 1867,
according to which the Bukharan Amir would be required to grant safe passage for
Russian merchants, to give Russia's nationals equal rights with Bukharans, to accept
Russian agents in Bukhara, to pay a war indemnity, and to consult the Russian
authorities in Tashkand before getting entering into relations with any foreign
power:' 18
 this last provision involving a near protectorate status.
Kaufmann reported to Miiutin on 13 November 1867 that Russia's authority
in Tashkand was not yet secure, and that only inhabitants of the Indian minority
expressed their loyalty, while the rest of the population showed restraint, indiffer-
ence, and even disrespect towards the administration. He concluded his letter by
stating that the mood there was unpleasant, and readiness existed among the popula-
tion to take advantage of any suitable opportunity in a fitting situation, to rid them-
selves of Russian authority.119
Terentiev commented that the conquered territories were vast enough and that
the time had come to organize and stabilize. In July 1867 the Turkestan oblast
became the Turkestan General-Governorship, and, as mentioned earlier, included Syr
Dana and Semirechie with its seat in Tashkand and Kaufmann as its first Governor-
General.' 2° The new government of Turkestan was no less ambitious than the
previous ones: its officials almost at once in 1867 sent a report to the Asiatic
Department of the Foreign Office emphasizing the necessity of annexing Samarkand
for the safety of Russia's other possessions in the region. This report coincided with
the prevailing tendency in St. Petersburg, which was towards augmenting Russia's
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influence in Bukhara, the key to the Amu Dana basin. St. Petersburg evidently
feared the expansion of Britain's influence in that Khanate, and Britain's attempts to
turn it into a buffer state. Both Tashkand and St. Petersburg feared that the British
would finance and arm the Amir of Bukhara, which they regarded as threatening and
as inevitably leading to the end of Russia's influence. Hence the Russians in
Tashkand resolved, as we have already seen, to insist on Russia's merchants having
a free hand in the Bukharan market, and to demand such political privileges as
would lead to binding the Khanate economically and politically to the Empire. The
Tsar was in favour of this approach,' 2 ' which was intended to lead to the exclusion
of British influence and the incorporation of Bukhara.
While the correspondence between Kaufmann and the Amir of Bukhara con-
cerning the ratification of the proposed treaty of 26 September 1867 was proceeding,
the situation was tense and rival factions within Bukhara were opposing the Amir's
policy.' Receiving the draft treaty which was signed by Kryzhanovskii and ap-
proved by the Tsar, Kaufmann added two articles: one providing for free access to
all the towns in Bukhara, and the second stipulating that future communications
between the two countries should be exclusively between the Amir and the Govern-
or-General of Turkestan, i.e. Kaufmann himself. The draft treaty included twelve
articles: the first drew the border line between the two states along the Kashgar-
davan range along the Nurata mountains to Kizyl-kum desert, then along the Bukan-
tau chain to the mouth of the Syr dana. The second, closely related to the first and
designed to guard against geographical error and to provide Russia with reliable
reasons for future modifications, stated that the "contracting parties reserve to
themselves the right of deputing trustworthy agents for the purpose of making a
more precise definition of the boundary on the spot".' 23 The other clauses gave
Russia free access to all the Bukharan towns, and the Russian merchants the right of
possessing caravanserais, acquiring permanent property in Bukhara, and appointing
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their agents in Bukhara.' The Amir was to be held responsible for the safety of
Russian caravans.
Kaufmann handed the treaty to a Bukharan envoy for ratification by the end
of October 1867, and at the same time he entrusted the envoy with a letter to the
Amir. The letter incorporated the usual pretensions to Russian hegemony and
employed the same intimidating language that had been used in previous com-
munication with the Bukharan Amir and the other Central Asian rulers. In this letter
Kaufmann affirmed that war was inevitable,
if our neighbours do not observe the sacredness of treaties, the inviolability
of our frontier, and the necessity for acting with justice towards Russian
subjects. Recent events will doubtless have afforded an example of this, and
will restrain every one from becoming the enemy of Russia.'
The Bukharan ratification of the treaty and reply to the letter was however delayed
until mid-November due to an unintended geographical error: the Russians had con-
fused the location of some localities included in the treaty and thus rendered its
ratification impossible. The Russians had assumed that there was one mountain
range called Nurata, but it turned out that there were two and that a Bukharan
Bekship by the same name existed between them. 1 Kaufmann affected to con-
sider the delay as a refusal on the part of the Amir to accept the treaty, and rejected
the Bukharan explanation. In St. Petersburg the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured
Rumbold, the British ambassador, that Kaufmann was a loyal adherent of the views
of the Emperor and opposed any further advance in Central Asia.' 27
 Gorchakov
reassured Rumbold that Kaufmann
had gone back to his command with the amplest instructions to live on terms
of peace and amity with Bukhara and the other states bordering on the
Russian possessions.'28
The Voennyi Zhurnal, the organ of the War Ministry, wrote on 1 June 1868, in
direct contradiction to Gorchakov's assurances, that Russia would be obliged by
circumstances, and by strategic considerations, after the arrival of reinforcements "to
advance, and that not later than next year".' 29 In these matters, the British were
96
The Russian Advance against Bukhara and Kokand
hampered by the absence of reliable intelligence except for reports based on individ-
ual observations, which mostly were either incomplete or not to the point and exag-
gerated.'
During this period Muzalfar, the Amir of Bukhara, communicated to the
Governments of Kokand, Afghanistan, Khiva, and Kashgar a proposal for the
creation of a coalition to resist Russian advance.' 3 ' The Amir, taught by the exper-
ience of previous failures, resolved to avoid opposing Russia alone, and sent
Muhammad Fans as far afield as India and Turkey for assistance; the negotiations
with both Governments were however fruitless.' 32 The Bukharan Amir found
himself with only one realistic option, that is to try to secure the recovery of Ura-
Tepe and Dzhizak by political means. The Russians as well were ready, for the time
being, to avoid another round of hostilities while Kaufmann was arranging to visit
St. Petersburg. However, after receiving intelligence reports about Bukharan activiti-
es in Naryn and Altishahr, the Governor-General resolved to postpone his journey
which had been fixed for April l868.'
Skirmishes on the frontier between the Bukharan possessions and the Russian
domains, between ambitious Russian officers and disaffected Bukharan Beks,
inflamed the situation. A group of Bukharan troops arrested Captain Sluzhenko with
three soldiers, who apparently were engaged in a reconnaissance mission between
Chinaz and Dzhizak. Kaufmann demanded their immediate release and ratification of
the draft treaty without delayJ'' The officer and his companions were released in
March 1868, but no word about the treaty was received, for the Bukharan authorities
were still insistent upon defining the exact location of the boundaries mentioned in
it.' 35 Despite the release of the officer and his companions, Kaufmann thereupon
determined to attack Samarkand after receiving a messenger from a disloyal Bu-
kharan party, led by Jura Bek and Baba Bek, promising him assistance against the
Amir, on the condition that their neutrality should not be compromised.'
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The Amir was under increasing pressure from his subjects, and notably the
Ulema, to fight Russia. In search of funds for a costly war, he imposed new taxes,
not exempting the Mullahs' 37 and even so delayed the war due to fmancial diffi-
culties, while claiming he was seeking a better opportunity to combat the Russians.
The Amir thus began to be publicly criticized and accused of cowardice.' 38 His
internal foes became almost as formidable as his external: "the clergy (Ulerna) of
Bukhara and Samarkand were urging him to declare holy war".' 39 While he was
away from the capital the Mullahs and militant Beks agitated the people and
declared war against Russia. The Amir had then little alternative, but to lose his
throne or to consent to war, before he had completed his political arrangements and
military preparations.' 4° Hastily he sent an envoy to the Russians with a modified
peace treaty. His proposed treaty was rejected by Kaufmann, who ordered his army
to march from Yani Kurgan and Samarkand if the Bukharans would not consent to
his original treaty within two days.' 4 ' In this tense situation a Bukharan Bek, Jura
Bek by name, led an attack upon the Russians at Dzhizak.' 42 Kaufmann cancelled
his proposed trip to St. Petersburg and attacked Samarkand. The Amir personally
had little hope of success; even though he was in a desperate situation in confronting
the war party in his own country, he made an appeal to Russia to halt the hostilities
for two days. Kaufmann, who was rejoicing in these opportune developments,
granted him two hours.'43 On the resumption of hostilities the Bukharan army
could not withstand the Russian forces and dispersed, and the gates of Samarkand
were locked by the inhabitants. On the next day the aksakals (elders) of Samarkand
were sent to Kaufmann asking for the safety of the city and the safety of its inhabit-
ants.' Samarkand was conquered on 14 May 1868.' For this dazzling victory
the forward party in St. Petersburg, voiced its opinion the Voennyi zhurnal and
offered the following justification:
We have reached the limit where we have no longer any choice and where
any delay or irresolution could only complicate matters. Our troops have
98
The Russian Advance against Bukhara and Kokand
taken Samarkand and are only three or four marches from Bukhara... If we
are to remain in close contiguity to the Emir under a treaty which will only
give the enemy time to rally, it will be indispensable to increase our force in
Central Asia by several battalions and some sotnias of Cossacks, to strength-
en our garrisons, establish more forts, and that is to say that we are to waste
our strength year by year in teaching the Bukharans how to fight.1
The fall of Samarkand gave Russia exclusive control over the water supply of
the Zeravshan upon which Bukhara depended for irrigation. The Amir therefore
marched with his army against Katta Kurgan, half way between the city of Bukhara
and Samarkand. Golovachev, the commander of the Russian army, who thus found
himself in a perilous situation, asked Kaufmann for assistance. 147
 Kaufmann rushed
to his General's help, and the Amir was defeated at Zerbulak heights on 26 June
1 868.1
Following the Bukharan defeat the Amir fled to Kermineh and declared his
intention to end the war with Russia unconditionally, giving Kaufmann the necessary
permission to annex the Khanate in its entirety. 149 However, Kaufmann was fully
aware of the international difficulties that might face his country if he annexed
Bukhara. Thus he re-instated the defeated Amir and assisted him to put down the
revolt which was led by his son Abdal-Malik in Karshi.' 5° The authority of the
Amir was firmly re-established, and Karshi was annexed to Bukhara on 27 October
1868 . 151
 After the victory over Abdal-Malik, Kaufmann formed the Zeravshan
district from territories newly annexed at Bukhara's expense, regardless of the
protest of his opponents in the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who
were mostly worried about the financial burden that might be involved. Kaufmann
however had presented them with an accomplished fact.' 52 Furthermore, Kauf-
mann's forward policy was favoured by many influential elements of Russian
society, such as merchants and industrialists, who established in December 1865 an
organisation called the Moscow-Tashkand Trade Association. Members of this
committee were heavily involved in attempting to influence Russian policy in the
region. Thus when the Bukharan Amir was short of money, as a result of his war
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against his recalcitrant son, and could not therefore pay the due instalment of the
imposed indemnity to Russia, one member of this association, Khludov by name,
offered a loan to the Bukharan Amir if the Imperial Government would guarantee
the loan.' 53 Kaufmann duly welcomed the enterprise, believing that it would put
the Bukharans under the influence of Russian capital, and so enhance Russia's
political as well as economic influence.154
This victory over Bukhara opened to Russia the horizon for further conquests.
In St. Petersburg, despite the repeatedly declared policy of no further advance or
new acquisitions, voices were raised advocating the annexation of what Russia had
conquered. The Emperor's previous assurances were abandoned. Regarding Samar-
kand, Gorchakov assured the British Government that it was the desire of the
Emperor to restore it to Bukhara, but that there was some difficulty in ascertaining
that this could be done without a "loss of dignity" and without obtaining some
"guarantee for the welfare of the populations which had accepted Russian citizen-
ship".' 55
 In view of the fact that Kaufmann had no intention or instructions to
withdraw, Gorchakov's promise was meant merely to gain time for consolidating
Russia's position, a reminder of earlier and by now traditional Russian practice. The
guide lines of that policy would deter any Russian official from withdrawal so long
as the conquest was perceived as an advance achieved
at the cost of so many sacrifices, and to face back.., would evidently be
incompatible with the dignity of Russia and with the views of the Govern-
ment.156
There was therefore no reason to suppose that Gorchakov's assurances would bind
Russia to any action other than what St. Petersburg perceived to be in conformity
with its larger interests.
Even so Gorchakov tried to reassure Buchanan that Kaufmann would be able,
in compliance with the instructions sent to him, to make arrangements which would
enable the Russian troops to withdraw without compromising the safety of Samar-
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kand and its inhabitants. However in the absence of impartial observers, Russia
would be able to create conditions and influence events in the way that would serve
her purposes. The Russian goal was to pacify other interested and anxious parties,
mainly Britain, until it would be too late for them to protest, and Russia's occupa-
tion would have become a fait accompli. In pursuit of this goal of reassuring the
British, speaking to Lord Clarendon in September 1869, Prince Gorchakov stated
that the Emperor considered, and that he entirely shared his opinion, that an exten-
sion of territory would be an extension of weakness, and that Russia had no inten-
tion of going further south. As a proof of this determination, he added that it was the
intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand.' 57
 In practice no efforts were
made by either the War Ministry or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to realize that
intention, and instead they followed a completely different course. Abramov, the
commander of the Russian troops in Samarkand, with the consent of Kaufmann, sent
a message to the Bukharan Amir offering him peace based on terms which revealed
that Russia had no intention of withdrawal: first, Bukhara should acquiesce in the
cession of Samarkand and Russia's sovereignty over the city; second, she should pay
a war indemnity; and third, she must recognize Russia's rights over all the territories
conquered since 1865.158 These terms were designed to create difficulties which
would so complicate the situation that a Russian retreat from previous assurances
would be held to be justified.
It was clear from procedures adopted by the Russian Government that there
was no intention of evacuating the town or restoring it to the Amir. 159 Gorchakov,
in order to deflect attention from intended action against Khiva, to justify his
government's policy in Central Asia and to provoke British action against Afghani-
stan, expressed his desire in an interview in 1872 with Loftus, the British ambassa-
dor at St. Petersburg, to see the Governments of India and of Russia exercising their
influence over the "Asiatic States on their frontiers", and blamed Great Britain for
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paying "money to the ruler of Afghanistan, while Russia was exacting a war
indemnity from the Khan of Bukhara". It is obvious from Gorchakov's discussion
that he was anxious to see Britain involved in expansionist activity against Afghani
-
stan, instead of monitoring Russian activities in Bukhara. His aim was no less than
inflaming the region through political intrigues: he even reflected in favour of a
more active British policy in the region when he said that the influence of the
Government of India "should be greater at Kabul, and more should be expected from
it',.160
All these political manoeuvres were aimed at providing a justification for
retaining Samarkand. Buchanan reported in July 1870 that the Imperial Government
now maintained that it could not with credit to itself, nor in justice to the inhabit-
ants, restore Samarkand to the Government of Bukhara. 16 ' On these grounds Rus-
sia annexed the city.
Throughout its advance in Central Asia, Russia insisted on its willingness that
a "complete entente cordiale should be maintained between Russia and England in
Asia".' 62 Even though both Britain and Russia were in many respects similar as
colonial powers in Asia, there were also essential differences between them, the
most evident being that the conquering Russian armies were followed by Russian
settlers to reshape the demography of her colonies. Russia's assurances to Great
Britain and other European powers in the diplomatic circles in St. Petersburg were
no doubt temporarily convincing, but her real practices in Central Asia were totally
different and guided by other principles. While her Generals, Cheniiaev, Romanov-
skii, and Kaufmann were advancing from Peshpek and the river Chu, to Tashkand,
Khodzhand, Samarkand, and the capital of Bukhara, Prince Gorchakov was feigning
innocence, denying any desire for annexation, and justifying Russia's practices as
uncontrollable wars imposed upon her by the Central Asians.'63
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The fate of Bukhara was decided by the treaty of 14 June 1868, which was a
modification of the draft treaty of September 1867, and by the treaty of 23 July
1873. These treaties determined the fate of Bukhara in the Russian strategy in the
region. Kaufmann himself acknowledged that the terms of these agreements resolved
the Bukharan issue in Russia's favour. After the imposition of Russia's dominion
over Bukhara, and the liquidation of her independence, the Amir became totally
reliant on the Russian agent in Bukhara, although nominally he was still in charge of
the internal affairs of his country, and Bukhara became totally dependent on Russia
and her regional administration, the government of Turkestan province.'TM
After victory over Bukhara, Russia's hegemony over the whole region was
notably enhanced. 165 The Central Asian markets became dominated and exclusively
controlled by Russian merchants. Tenacious Khiva and the Turkomans then became
the next target of Russian intrigue in promoting her inexorable southward advance.
103
MUHAMED RAHIM W)GAr)UR KHA. From I/ic 'Gra/iic.'
-	 jeneraC oCovatcfiev
Chapter Four
THE SUBJECTION OF KHIVA
AND THE MENACE TO AFGHANISTAN
The conquest of Khiva left Russia face to face with the
Turkomans. These hardy Sons of the desert, kinsmen of the
Osmanli who all but conquered Europe ... The capture and
practical annexation of Khiva secured to Russia possession of
the central point in the curved line which threatened the
frontier of India...
Malleson, The Russo-Afghan Question and the Invasion of
India, (1885).
Traditional attitudes and new prospects
British alarm about Cherniaev's campaign against Kokand in the early 1860s
was to some extent pacified by Gorchakov's wordy circular to which reference has
already been made. Yet the following years, despite repeated Russian assurances that
the Emperor had no desire to acquire more territory at the expense of his
neighbours, 1 witnessed the fall of Central Asian cities one after the other, until
Kokand was crippled, the prestige of Bukhara was destroyed, and the Khanate was
reduced to a Russian satellite by the treaties of 1868 and 1873 . Khiva was
dismembered and the Khan acknowledged himself as the "humble servant" of the
Tsar. Meanwhile the British Government made several protests against the extension
of the Russian dominions.2 The British policy of "masterly inactivity" 3 relied upon
the frequent promises that Russia had given, and the belief that she would be bound
by her verbal assurances and written guarantees to Britain. 4 This policy was based
also on the assumption that it would be to the advantage of British rule that British
India have as its neighbour in Central Asia a powerful Russian Empire for two
reasons: first, Britain would have a reasonable and responsible neighbour with which
to conduct political negotiations, instead of hordes of fanatical savages; and second,
in a settled condition, Central Asia would be a better customer for the export and
import trade of India.5
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Public opinion as well as political opinion was captured by the idea that the
Russian expansion in Central Asia promised
to substitute civilization, albeit not of the highest type, for the grovelling
superstition, the cruelty, the depravity, the universal misery which now
prevail in the Uzbek and Afghan principalities.6
There was an apparent disposition, prevailed among British politicians and observers,
to overlook Russian ambition in its early stages and to believe that the Russian
annexation would result in
a reasonable and responsible neighbour with whom to conduct political
negotiations, instead of hordes of fanatic savages on whom no reliance can be
placed; and secondly, because Central Asia, in a settled condition and under
European Government, would naturally be a better customer, both in regard
to the export and import trade of India, than the barbarians who now encircle
our North-West frontier with transit duties and prohibitive tariffs, who are too
poor to purchase our manufactures, and too indolent to supply our markets
with their own produce.7
The image of the Central Asian states as the cradle of barbarism and anarchy,
that dominated the liberal press in England, substantially contributed to welcoming
the Russian advance as a progress of civilization against barbarism, and knowledge
against ignorance. This assumption was however coupled with a conviction of the
inviolability of the Indian north-western frontier. The Russians on their side were of
course interested in nourishing this theory, and in that direction they portrayed the
Central Asians in the worst possible light to European opinion, assisted in their
exertions by the mischievous internal and external policies of the Khans and Amirs
of Central Asia.
All of these opinions took as their starting-point the celebrated observation of
Sir Robert Peel in 1844, when he said that "when civilization and barbarism come
into contact, the latter must inevitably give way". This phrase was so effective that
some observers were evidently prepared to regard the extinction of the governments
of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva as both necessary and desirable, and to regard any
effort on the part of the British government to stop Russia as groundless.8
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Russia subtly exploited these opinions and implanted them in her foreign
policy, which was designed to portray Russia as the carrier of the banner of
civilization against Asiatic barbarism: an image that later crystallized in the alleged
"civilizing role of Russia", and was then introduced to the European Courts officially
in A. M. Gorchakov's circular of November 21, 1864.
This duplicitous Russian policy, which was the natural result of Russia's
insatiable thirst for conquest and susceptibility to Britain's reactions, 9 was expressed
in the assurances of Prince Gorchakov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of other
officials in his office, and even on occasion of the Emperor himself, and it evidently
reassured to some extent British official opinion, and activated the Russophile party
in England, which up to 1878 asserted that Russia had no intention of disturbing
British India. 10 While preparing for the invasion of Khiva, Russia succeeded in
eliminating British apprehension about the security of the Afghan frontiers.
Buchanan, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, reported to Clarendon that he
was assured by Prince Gorchakov that Afghanistan lay entirely without the range of
Russian political interests and it was hoped that this would be considered equivalent
to an engagement that Russia would abstain from any interference in the affairs of
that country." Russia frequently affirmed the neutrality of Afghanistan and
expressed its readiness to negotiate on the issue with Great Britain; and Prince
Gorchakov received this idea positively.' 2 These Russian promises not to intervene
in Afghanistan neutralized Britain's opposition. Meanwhile Russian policy was
concerned not to irritate Britain or appear to threaten her possessions in India before
the conquest of Central Asia should be complete, otherwise Britain would have been
obliged to pursue a much more active policy regarding Central Asia, in order to
safeguard Afghanistan and secure her Indian possessions, a line of policy that would
have severely affected Russian designs in Central Asia.'3
The first serious Russian move against Khiva from the west was in 1856
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when it was declared that the Russians intended to remove their station on the
Caspian island of Ashurada to the mainland, at Hasan Kuli at the mouth of the River
Attrek, on the ground that the sea, driven by heavy gales, had made serious
encroachment on the island.' 4 In the following November the Russians dispatched
3,000 men with four guns from Petrovskii on the Caspian to Kizyl Su (later renamed
Krasnovodsk) at Balkan Bey, with the avowed object of occupying that place, in
order to open out a road thence to Khiva and the rest of Turkestan. The Persian
Government did not detect at that time that the Russian objective was the
subjugation of the Turkoman tribes who were inhabiting the territory between the
Attrek river and Khiva, and believed the Russian story. The Shah addressed a
Firman to the Governor of that regiona saying that the Russians "intended having a
port at Kizyl-Su for their commerce with Turkestan, and that such a step would in
no way injuriously affect Persia, its subjects or tribes".' 5 The governor warned in
his reply that many evils would rise from the Russian presence at Kizyl-Su. During
this period of slow correspondence between the Governor and Teheran, the Russians
made considerable advances on the eastern coast of the Caspian and inside Turkestan
in the direction of Khiva.' 6 Prince Gorchakov denied in 1869 that the Russian
Government had any intention of dispatching a military expedition against Khiva,
and repeated to Buchanan that recent Russian activities on the eastern coast of the
Caspian sea were intended for the protection of a factory and fort at
The Russian press began a campaign against Khiva, urging the government to
consult only the interest of Russia in determining the course to be pursued after the
capture of Khiva, and loudly protested against the right of any foreign power
(particularly Britain) to interfere in the progress of Russia in Central Asia.'8
a The issue of confused boundaries between Russia and Central Asia. which I have
discussed earlier, existed also between the Khivans and the Persians. This territory was
disputed between the two Governments, while the Turkomans, with their feudal wars and
internal rivalry against each other, contributed to the confusion of which Russia took full
advantage.
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However the Gobs even went to the extreme in order to alienate increasing
suspicion in Russian political assurances saying that "the reduction of Khiva would
not be understood in Central Asia, except a symptom of weakness on the part of
Russia". 19 Nevertheless Russian policy and intentions were clearly reflected in the
semi-official press, and was marked by its warning language towards Britain:
Russia is not Bunnah or Kashmir that she should be compelled to have
recourse to duplicity and humiliating insincerity, she can lay down rational
territorial boundaries for herself, and defend them when necessary, with a
powerful hand.2°
Despite all evidences, Prince Gorchakov denied categorically to Buchanan
during an interview that Russia had any plans against Khiva, and opened the
Turkoman issue by saying that they were not under either Khivan or Persian
sovereignty; he maintained that the claim of the Shah over the Turkoman territories
was no stronger than the claim of "the King of Italy to the throne of Jerusalem".2'
He declared that the conquest of Khiva would actually be embarrassing to the
Russian Government rather than an advantage.22 The British consul at Teheran was
absolutely correct when he reported in 1869, just after the reduction of Bukhara, that
future Russian activities in the region would start from Krasnovodsk, the nearest port
on the Caspian to Khiva and the Turkoman country.23 Russia, after the reduction of
Bukhara in 1868, began preparing for the absorption of Khiva, her long standing
objective in the region. Meanwhile in March 1873, she diverted the attention of the
British Government and the Government of India towards Kaufmann's activities and
correspondence with the Afghan Amir regarding the provinces of Wakhan and
Badakhshan, which nearly led to war between Afghanistan and Bukhara backed by
the Russian Government. 24 The Russian purpose behind this manoeuvre was
obviously to screen her preparations for invading Khiva.
Even before the campaign against Khiva, British public opinion once again
became concerned at Russian proceedings in Central Asia. Granville communicated
this to Loftus, saying that as a result of Russia's advances a "certain amount of
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excitement and susceptibility had been caused in the public mind of this country on
account of questions connected with Central Asia". This state of affairs was the
natural result of Russia's advance in a period characterized by a Russian
contemporary account as follows:
under the pressure of Government necessities, Russia, in the last eight years
[from 1865 to the conquest of Khiva in 1873], stood on a firm foot in Central
Asia, parts of which are either incorporated in the Empire, or recognize her
moral and political influence.26
At the close of 1872, while St. Petersburg was busy planning for the invasion
of Khiva, Count Shchovalov was dispatched by the Emperor on a confidential
special mission to London, to have a personal interview with Earl Granville. 27 The
Emperor sought to pacify and prevent any misunderstanding with England. 28 Rus-
sian policy was influenced by two factors; the first, was that the growing British
interest in maintaining Khiva's independence required Russia to be more cautious in
her dealings in Central Asia; the second, was the growing tension with Germany.29
The British Government seems to have received confidential information about the
expected Russian encroachment upon Khiva, but was nevertheless willing to trust the
assurances which came from St. Petersburg. In 1872 confidential and reliable news
of Russia's military preparations against Khiva were received, but they were
regarded as no more than reconnaissance moves made by Russia, with the double
object of obtaining information, and for the purpose of proving to the Khan that he
was not beyond the reach of Russian military action. 30
 British susceptibilities
obliged Russia to soften her tone in Central Asia. Thus the mission of Shchuvalov
was followed on January 31, 1873 by Gorchakov's dispatch in which he agreed to
the boundary line of northern Afghanistan which was drawn by Britain. 31 Thus,
while the preparation and the concentration of four Russian armies in striking
positions was going on quietly, the Emperor agreed to all demands made by Great
Britain as regards to the security of Afghanistan.
Prince Gorchakov, in a meeting with the British ambassador at St. Petersburg
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in 1869, had assured him that Afghanistan was looked upon by Russia as a neutral
territory to separate the possessions of the two Empires in Asia. Gorchakov had even
stated that he was willing to include in this neutal zone some territories south of the
Oxus disputed between Khiva and Bukhara before the Russian conquest. 32
 The
Amir of Afghanistan however in 1873, before the conquest of Khiva, expressed
alarm about Russia's real political conduct, saying that it was "impossible for the
Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations". 33
 His fears sprang from the
expectation that the Russians, once in possession of Khiva, undoubtedly would
endeavour to extend their influence southward over the Turkomans of Merv. Sher
Au assumed that these tribes would seek refuge in Badghiz in the province of Herat,
providing the Russians, "if they do not desist from their misbehaviour", with the
needed pretext to intervene in AfghanistanY' Subsequent developments proved the
validity of his judgment, and the Chief of the Mer y Turkomans sent his son to
Kabul for permission "to take shelter in Badghiz in case they should not be able to
oppose the Russians".35
The main point at issue over the Afghan frontier at that time was that of the
provinces of Badakhshan and Wakhan on the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. The
information received in London from the Government of India showed that these
provinces belonged to Sher Au. Russia made the appropriate concession and St.
Petersburg, in a designed move to secure Britain's faith, agreed that these regions
"should not be a cause of difference between the two countries". 36 Later Stremo-
ukhov, Director of the Asiatic Department, in defiance of these recent assurances,
disputed the existence of any rights of the Amir of Kabul over Badakhshan and
Wakhan, saying that the information of General Kaufmann, who opposed any
concessions, was more reliable than that of the Government of India. When Loftus
asked him why Russia had consented to including them in Afghanistan, he replied:
"the English were very violent on the subject and even threatened us with war.
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There was therefore nothing else for us to do".37
The British Government was fully aware that Russia would retaliate against
Khiva for its supposed subversive activities among the Turkomans on the shores of
the Caspian sea: 38 but did not oppose it actively, trusting in Russian assurances that
the Emperor had no desire to acquire territory. The Imperial Government informed
London that the Khivan expedition would have the object of punishing acts of
brigandage, of recovering fifty Russian prisoners, and of teaching the Khan that such
conduct must not continue; in the same communication Russia assured Britain once
more that she would not take possession of Khiva, and that instructions were given
not to prolong the occupation of Khiva. 39 It was not only "far from the intention of
the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to
prevent it".4° Count Shchuvalov during his visit to London at the beginning of 1873
requested Earl Granville to give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.41
Prince Gorchakov repeated that the Emperor was determined that "on no pretext
whatever was the Expedition to remain at Khiva" and positive instructions to this
effect had been given to General Kaufmann, commander of the expedition.42
 The
objectives of the expedition as communicated to the British Government were "to
punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan
that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the
moderation of Russia had led him to believe".43
On his return to St. Petersburg Shchuvalov called on Loftus and repeated to
him the assurances given by the Emperor regarding Khiva, and his opposition to the
extension of Russia's territory southward. Similar assurances of course had been
given by the Imperial Government regarding Samarkand and Bukhara, but when the
favourable moment came, these assurances were discarded without the smallest
hesitation.45 When Russia breached these promises, justification was readily found
in changing circumstances which were held to oblige the Imperial Government to
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renounce its previous promulgations. There was equally no guarantee that
circumstances would remain the same regarding the assurances about Khiva. From
Russia's repeated assurances, as circulated by the Emperor and Prince Gorchakov,
compared with her actual practice, the sceptical observer might reasonably entertain
doubts about the validity of the word of the Tsar as well as of his ministers.47
Soon, indeed, the Moscow Gazette, the mouthpiece of the Russian foreign
ministry, questioned whether the promise given in the name of the Emperor in
respect of the evacuation of Khiva had the force of an international engagement, or
was merely a declaration of views subject to modification according to the march of
events.48 The Gazette, seeking to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to acquire
more territory, observed that Russia had left both Kokand and Bukhara independent
not by compulsion, but by her free will. 49 However it avoided the uncomfortable
truth that Russia had annexed a considerable part of the territories of Kokand and
Bukhara leaving them weakened, and ignored the treaties that bound both Bukhara
and Kokand to Russia, put them at the mercy of the Governor-General, turned them
into a closed market for Russian trade and severely restricted their independence. In
general the Russian semi-official press orchestrated the denunciation of "the idea of
giving up Khiva if it should fall into the possession of Russia".5° Britain's stand-
point regarding the contradictions between Russia's declarations and practices, was
exemplified in Gladstone's statement to the House of Commons, that:
England had entered into no engagement towards Russia, and that Russia had
consequently entered into no engagement towards England.51
This declaration evidently left both parties free to act as they might deem fit.
Subsequently, Gorchakov himself insisted on clarifying the terms "assurances" and
"engagements" used in Loftus' dispatch of May 10, 1873 and referred to in another
dispatch dated May 14, 1873: in a further interview with Loftus he stated that he
could not accept these terms as applying to his statements regarding Russia's policy
towards Khiva.52
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Russia by that time had completed her preparations and wanted to rid herself
of engagements that would limit her freedom of action during and after the conquest
of Khiva, as her earlier practices had shown that she usually preferred to wait for
suitable circumstances and then formulate her policy, rather than declaring
proceedings in advance which might then be falsified by events. Count Shchuvalov
stated at the end of May that "no assurances have been given nor engagements taken
by Russia towards England in regard to Khiva". 53 This language on the eve of the
Khivan expedition, was no doubt ominous for the future of Khiva. Loftus observed
that the situation was analogous to recent Russian practice regarding Tashkand,
which Russia had undertaken to restore to independence but which had ended up as
the seat of the Russian administration in the region; and also Samarkand, which had
been annexed to Russia regardless of repeated assurances that it would be restored to
the Amir of Bukhara.54
The conquest of Khiva (1873) and the confrontation with Bñtain
The Russian Government began concentrating its forces and dispatching war
material from Baku to Krasnovodsk. St. Petersburg attacked Khiva with four armies;
the Caucasian from the west, the Orenburg combined with the Turkestan armies, and
the west Siberian regiments." The Russian forces, according to Western and Russian
I) The invasion of Khiva by four armies meant that Russia either ill-informed about the
strength of Khiva, or that she could not withstand a risk of defeat in Central Asia. She
mobilized four armies to attack Khiva from three different sides: Turkestan and West
Siberian armies advanced from the east, consisted of 21 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry sotnias,
20 guns, 8 rocket propellers. Total infantry were 3,420 soldiers, 1,150 cavalry, 677 artillery
soldiers accompanied by 1654 horses. Russia did not need any more the huge number of
transport animals which she used to mobilize in her previous expeditions because this time
she was operating from bases in Central Asia itself not from remote Orenburg. Khivinskii
pokhod, pp. 11-12. The second army was that of Orenburg, advancing from the north, and
consisted of 3,461 combatants carried on 1,797 horses. Khivinskii pokhod, pp. 48-49. And
the third army was the Caucasian, which advanced from the west and was divided into two
divisions: Krasnovodskii division, 20 companies, 3 sotnias, and 18 guns; and Mangishlakskii
division with unspecified number of soldiers or equipment, for it was engaged in suppressing
(continued...)
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sources, exceeded 10,000 soldiers, among which there were at least 4,000 infantry,
5,000 cavalry, and twelve guns.55
After stabilizing her position in Bukhara, the Russian Government had begun
as early as 1869 to concentrate contingents from the Caucasian army in Krasnovodsk
on the eastern coast of the Caspian, under the command of Stoletov. During the
period from 1869 until 1873 this army was occupied in extensive reconnaissance
activities.56 By the occupation of Krasnovodsk Khiva became encircled from three
sides. The Tsar this time wanted to ensure the success of the expedition, and decided
to send four armies from three sides: two armies from the west; the Caucasian army
under Colonel Markozov,c and another from Kinderly Bay under the instruction of
Colonel Lomakin; from the north the Orenburg army under General Verevkin, and
from the east the Turkestan army under the command of Kaufmann himself. The
Caucasian army due to better supply and communications with Baku took charge of
covering the southern flank. Thus from the beginning the officers of this army
included in their reconnaissance activities territories inhabited by the Turkomans and
b(continued)
the Mangishlak uprising in January 1873, and was decided to join the expedition in later
time. Khivinskii pokhod, pp. 5 8-60, 75-76.
C Markozov could not reach Khiva and retreated. On June 16th this news were
confirmed in St. Petersburg to stir deep feeling not only of regret but of apprehension and
disappointment as well. Notwithstanding the General was not blamed for failure to reach his
destination because the Minister of War evaluated his officer's position in his diary as
"physically impossible to go forward". Nonetheless Markozov was mildly blamed for
unfortunate choice of his route to Khiva. Miliutin mentioned that Markozov made a mistake
by irritating the Turkomans and surveying the Attrek at the beginning of his march. If he
had managed to avoid these acts, he would have not faced any difficulty in obtaining needed
camels and safe passage, and if he marched from Krasnovodsk, not Chikishlar undoubtedly
he would have reached Khiva. See Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1875, v. I, p. 88. Miliutin's
first reaction, on May 16th, demonstrated his concern regarding Russia's prestige and moral
influence over the local population. He criticized Krasnovodsk Headquarters (part of the
Caucasian Army) for assuming leading role in the expedition against Khiva. The engineer of
the expedition was Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan. Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina
1873-1875, v. 1, p 86.
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were engaged in skirmishes with the southern and the Khivan Turkomans.d The
command of these armies was given to General Kaufmann on the eve of the
expedition against Khiva in 1873.
General Kaufmann headed the Turkestan army from Tashkand against
Khiva's eastern borders. His army consisted of two divisions; the first which he was
heading, and the second started from Kazala. The two columns were to meet in the
Bukan-Tau mountains. Kaufmann changed his plan and shifted his route to Khala
Ata in northern Bukhara, and sent the Kazala column to meet him there, which
meant that they had to cross 120 extra miles of desert. Both columns reached Khala-
ata on May 6, 1873 and the meeting took place the same day. 57 Even so Kaufmann
was about to give order to retreat under the pressure of the desert heat and lack of
water, when "he was saved by one of those trivial circumstances which often
intervene in the most unlooked for manner in the affairs of men". 58 One of the
volunteer guides succeeded in finding three wells four miles away and saved this
expedition from being added to previous disastrous attempts.
The Russian armies advanced against Khiva gradually and cautiously.
General Verevkin captured Kungrad on the western edge of the delta of the Amu.
The first strategic town that fell to Kaufmann on May 14 was Khazarasp on the left
bank of the Amu Daria.e From Khazarasp, Kaufmann began his move against the
d The Turkoman tribes of Khiva were mostly the Yomuds (frequently called the
Yomuds of Khiva) and the Chadoors, and the Southern Turkomans whose territory extended
from the Persian borders to the southern fringe of Khiva were the Ja'farbai Yomud, Gokian,
and Tabai.
e Kaufmann was unable to conquer the city and control it on first assault, he was
compelled to retreat to Pitniak. This fact would explain why Kaufmann could not reach the
capital before General Verevkin, who waited for instructions from Kaufmann until May 28.
Upon the arrival of news that Kaufmann withdrew from Khazarasp in front of strong
resistence, Verevkin attacked Khiva city. When he was informed that Kaufmann recaptured
Khazarasp, he was motivated to have the honour of capturing the capital of Khiva, although
he was instructed to wait for the arrival of the Turkestan army. Kaufmann wanted to be
himself on the head of the conquering army so the honour of the conquest of Khiva would
(continued...)
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Khivan capitaj. The Khan was unable to resist the advance of Kaufmann because of
the advancing armies of Verevkin and Lomakin from the north and the north-west.
As Mac Gahan observed, "It was they who did the greater part of the fighting, and it
was by them Khiva was really taken".59
The Khan sent to Kaufmann asking for a three-day truce, during which he
aspired to reach an agreement with the Governor-General. The Khan's request was
not answered, but Kaufmann orally told the envoy to tell the Khan that talks would
be carried on in Khiva, a similar message to Verevkin received no answer. 6° Khiva
fell on May 29, 1873 and the Khan, after a short period of hiding among the Yomud
tribes, unconditionally surrendered himself on June 14, 1873. The Russian
Government declared that the occupation of Khiva would be very short, and that the
principal object of negotiations would be to secure a wider sphere of operation to
her trade, to open up profitable new markets. 6 ' British observers affirmed in
defiance of Russian assurances that "after Russia has occupied Khiva, she will
inevitably retain that city, in order to avoid further costly and difficult campaigns in
that country".62
Among their discoveries in the Khan's palace, the Russians found letters
exchanged between the Khivan Government and the Government of India. One of
these letters was a reply from the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, to the Khan's
request for help against the Russians. 63
 Kaufmann wrote to the Khan while he was
in disguise among the Yomuds in June 1873, that he would be treated with all
honours if he would surrender himself, but in case of his refusal "somebody else
would be made Khan in his stead". Kaufmann had in mind as the alternative his
brother who had been in prison for the last year, and pleaded his claim to the throne
to Kaufmann.M
( ..continued)
be his. Terentiev gives a minute account of the Khivan expedition, vide Istoriia zavoevaniia
srednei Azii, vol. II, pp. 250 ff.
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The Khan thus returned to Khiva on June 14, 1873 and had a meeting with
Kaufmann the same day. After exposing his willingness to accept the conditions
imposed by the conqueror, he was allowed to resume his government under the
supervision of a Divan or council, which was not only formed for the purpose of
collecting money for the payment of a war indemnity, but for advising the Khan of
the best way to follow the directions coming from the high military command,
which virtually controlled the country. Members of the Divan were, besides the
Khan himself, three Russian officers, and three Khivan ministers. 65 The Khan,
according to the agreement already signed between him and Kaufmann, lacked any
power in the internal or external affairs of his country. The membership of the
council speaks for itself about the distribution of power.66
Following the occupation of Khiva, naturally the British were speculating
with scepticism whether Russia would hold to her previous assurances and withdraw
or the same practice of her classical policy would be resorted to again. 67
 They very
soon received the disquieting news that the Russian army would remain in Khiva
until she had paid the war indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles demanded by Kaufmann,
which meant that the Russian troops would remain there indefinitely. 68
 All the
Russian procedures indicated that the occupation would be a prolonged one, and in
contradiction to the assurances given to the British Government, the Emperor
sanctioned the Russo-Khivan agreement of August 1873; a pretext was given that the
earlier assurances referred to the town of Khiva rather than to the Khanate itself.69
On August 24, 1873 Kaufmann forced the Khivan Khan to sign the Russo-Khivan
treaty which turned the Khanate into a Russian protectorate. Moner, dismayed by the
Russian coup, wrote to Derby that:
it is now quite clear, from the publication of the Khivan treaty, that Count
Shchuvalov's promises were merely made to humour the English Government
for the moment.70
After the publication of the Russo-Khivan treaty, which crippled Khiva, re-
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duced her status internationally and restricted her freedom of action internally, the
British Government saw no practical advantages in examining too minutely how far
these arrangements were in accordance with the assurances given to Granville in
January 1873 by Shchuvalov as to the intentions with which the expedition against
Khiva was undertaken.71 After the Khivan campaign Russia's assurances
evaporated, her language and conduct were severely changed. It was now time for
Russia to reconsider the position of Afghanistan. The Russian assurances that
Afghanistan would remain out of the sphere of Russian control dissatisfied General
Kaufmann "for if strictly adhered to it completely dispelled all prospect of an
invasion of India", he believed that abstaining from intervening in Afghanistan
"meant nothing more or less than the abandonment of the main object of the advance
into Central Asia".72 Such a change in policy would however be entirely
contradictory to the affirmation by Prince Gorchakov that:
His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the
sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence.
[There will be no intervention or interference whatever.73
Five years after the fall of Khiva, and with Khiva and Bukhara under control,
the question of establishing connections with Afghanistan with the purpose of
influencing her policy was put on the agenda and discussed thoroughly in St.
Petersburg and Turkestan. Kaufmann wrote to Sher Ali in June 1878 that a high
ranking Russian envoy would visit Kabul. 74 The envoy was General Stoletov, who
together with General Cherniaev had an audience with the Tsar in March 24, 1878
just before leaving for Central Asia. 75 Activization of Russian policy in this year
was undoubtedly enhanced by the success of her armies against Turkey in the Near
Eastern crisis of 1877-1878. Sher Ali and his Government made a vain attempt to
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prevent his arrival and to avoid receiving him. 1 The reply came from Kaufmann that
the envoy was already on his way to Afghanistan, and his protection and decent
reception were the responsibility of the Amir.76 Russia's main aim in mounting
Stoletov's mission was the discovery of the countries located to the south of the
Amu Dana, and to study the geography of Afghan territory as well. The Russian
envoy was accompanied by a considerable number of personnel. He left a group of
his men on each stage of his route from Bukhara to Kabul, as claimed to "convey
dispatches", but actually their main purpose was to survey the country. 77 This
mission was regarded by Britain as a violation of the engagements which Russia had
entered into with England earlier regarding Afghanistan. Russia's response to
Britain's objections came from M. de Giers, head of the Asian Department in the
Russian Foreign Office (1875-1878), who denied that the Emperor or General
Kaufmann had the intention of sending a mission to Kabul. The mission was
intended to be so secret that M. de Giers either did not want to admit it or may have
not been informed of it; Gorchakov later explained that the mission was "one of
courtesy" and that M. de Giers "had not been informed of it".78
Thus after the collapse of the Central Asian Khanates of Kokand, Khiva, and
Bukhara, Russia had her ambitious Generals monitoring the Afghan borders.
However the prevailing assumption among the British was that Russia, after the fall
of Khiva, had reached the limit of her advance southward, and that her relations with
Britain in Central Asia would rest on
a firmer and more lasting basis than before, and that their rivalry will
henceforth be confined to their mutual promotion of peace and civilization in
their respective spheres.79
. Sher Au was far from being in harmony with the Government of India, however
promises from Tashkand were more attractive. While the British Government became more
"persistent in making inconvenient demands upon him", he regarded the Russian alliance as
his last resource. Russia's policy was totally different. The Russians required nothing from
him and "drew pictures of greater power and wider empire yet to be secured". Vide Boulger,
Central Asian Questions, pp. 66-67.
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This assumption did not appear to have been seriously disturbed by the
Stoletov mission to Sher Au. On the other hand, the predominant drive among
Russian officials, military and civil, in Central Asia was towards intrigues in
Afghanistan and the discovery of "the spirit of disaffection" among the Afghans and
British subjects in India. Thus they began to cultivate the opinions of that
"unimportant clique" in Afghanistan that might seek in the Russians its ally and
supporter.8°
After the conquest of Khiva, Kaufmann began correspondence with Sher Mi
for the purpose of establishing "neighbourly relations". 81 Though there was no
particular reason for correspondence with the Afghan sovereign, Kaufmann had little
difficulty in fmding an agreeable subject to open his correspondence with him. He
stressed the advantages to Afghanistan of closer relationship with Russia, while
Stoletov stressed the duty of making common cause against the British in India.8
g One of Kaufmann's letters to the Amir says: "Be it known to you that in these days
the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require
deep consideration ... be it known to you that your union and friendship with the Russian
Government will be beneficial to the latter and still more so to you. The advantages of a
close alliance with the Russian government will be permanently evident". FO 65/1071 No.
26, October 27, 1879, Roberts to Lyall.
In another letter from Stoletov to the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan
dated the 8th of October 1878, Stoletov says:
"whatever our Government advises you, you should give ear to it. I tell you the truth that
our Government is wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove. There are many things which
you cannot understand, but our Government understands them well. It often happens that a
thing which is unpleasant at first is regarded as a blessing afterwards. Now, my kind friend,
I inform you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace with you through
the Kaisar (Sultan) of Turkey. Therefore, you should look to your brothers who live on the
other side of the river (i.e. in India). If God stirs them up, and gives the sword of fight into
their hands, then go on in the name of God (Bismilla), otherwise you should be as a serpent;
make peace openly and in secret prepare for war; and when God reveals His order to you,
declare yourself. It will be well when the envoy of your enemy wants to enter the country, if
you send an able emissary possessing the tongue of a serpent, and full of deceit, to the
enemy's country, so that he may with sweet words perplex the enemy's mind, and induce
him to give up the intention of fighting with you. My kind friend, I entrust you to the
protection of God. May God be the protector of the Amir's kingdom, and may trembling fall
upon the limbs of your enemies, Amen". FO 65/1071 No. 26, October 27, 1879, Roberts to
Lyall.
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Kaufmann's purpose was not anything else but to open a direct channel for
communications which inevitably would lead to the exchange of envoys, discussing
trade issues, and obtaining information about Afghanistan necessary for political
intrigues and sowing destabilization: the same policy, in other words, which had
proved so successful in Central Asia during the previous half century.
Kaufmann styled Sher Au "the friend of the all-powerful Tsar" to win his
sympathy, but also emphasized the formidable power of the Tsar, and the success of
his arms, using the conquest of Khiva as a veiled menace:
Your highness may have heard that the Khan of Khiva had commenced
committing unjustifiable and unlawful acts whereupon His Majesty the
Emperor of Russia directed me to go to Khiva with a view to compel him by
force of arms to act according to law. This undertaking was attended with
full success. Having obtained a victory over the army of Khiva, I conquered
the country... At present peace has been established in the country. It is not
the wish of His Imperial Majesty to add territories to his extensive
Empire.82
The British chose to rely upon Russian assurances and did not take seriously
Sher Au's appeal for assistance, assuming that there was no ground for his
apprehension and that England and Russia were good friends. Great Britain, as
Boulger put it, might have "taken up a bold position, and stood upon the
inviolability of international obligations", but was instead contented with "the weak
arguments of the Tsar and Prince Gorchakov".83
In their diplomatic offensive which contained a holocaust of broken
assurances, Count Shchuvalov distributed a note from Prince Gorchakov in April
1878, on the eve of the Turkoman campaign designed to prepare the political ground
for the forthcoming conquest, which contained "positive assurances" that the
Emperor again had no intention of further extending the frontiers of Russia as they
then existed in Central Asia. In a memorandum forwarded to Her Majesty's Chargé
de Affairs at St. Petersburg Lord Derby stated that:
Her Majesty's Government fully accepted the assurances of the Imperial
Cabinet as to the extension of the southern frontiers of Russian territory, but
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they equally admitted the force of the arguments which had been advanced to
explain the repeated annexations which, in spite of those assurances, had
taken place 84
There could hardly be a more poignant statement of British disbelief in
Russian intentions and powerlessness to influence them. Following the conquest of
Khiva the Imperial Government in 1873 declared the formation of the Transkasp-
eiskii Voenny Okrug or Trans-Caspian military district. The purpose of creating the
new military district was stated to be the security of the regions recently acquired.
Besides this, the new district was given the task of securing communications
between the Russian positions on the Attrek and Mikhaiovsk on the Caspian, and to
deal with the Turkoman tribes, whose subjection and the occupation of their main
city, Merv, had already been "decided upon as an inevitable necessity, connected
with the security of the district recently acquired by Russiatt.85
Following the fall of Khiva the Russian activities in Afghanistan increased
and General Abramov was dispatched to visit Kabul in 1878. The British
Government became convinced that the Russian pledges and words were useless,
thus Lord Lytton suggested to Queen Victoria the occupation of the Hindu Kush as
the "only remaining chance of permanent security". 86 Just as the visit of Vitkeivich
in 1837 to Kabul had led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in the century, General
Abramov's visit led to the third Anglo-Afghan war of November 1878.
Just on the eve of the Turkoman campaign General Abramov arrived at
Kabul on July 22, 1878. As he laid it before the Amir, the purpose of his visit was
to "strengthen and perpetuate" the existing friendly relation between Russia and
Afghanistan by a "treaty of amity".87 The envoy endeavoured to convince the Amir
of Afghanistan to break off all friendly relations with the British and the Indian
Governments and to contract an alliance with Russia. As a precautionary strategy in
case of an unsatisfactory outcome to Abramov's mission, the Russians planned to
offer their support to Sher Au's nephew, who was residing at Samarkand, to secure
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control of Maimanah, Balkh, and Badakhshan "and annex the country thus
conquered to the Russian domains". 88 Abramov also discussed issues of trade and
the reduction of duties on imported Russian goods, and asked for permission for free
travel through Afghanistan for Russian merchants. 89 The methods of this mission to
Kabul were essentially the same as those by which Russia had extended her
influence in the Central Asian Khanates over the preceding half century.
Britain and the policy of the buffer zone
The idea of a buffer zone, or buffer states, between the possessions of both
Empires in Central Asia began to appear as a political question in the early 1 840s
after Perovskii's expedition against Khiva and the first Anglo-Afghan war. The first
Afghan War and the contemporaneous Russian activities against Khiva had directed
the attention of British politicians to increasing Russian military activities in Central
Asia and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan. Two years before the first Khivan
expedition in 1839, Vitkeivich was offering Dost Muhammad Russian arms and
support. These events and the subsequent Russian operations on the Syr Dana
suggested the desirability of barriers between Russia and England in Asia.
Henceforth the policy of the buffer zone was adopted and developed. The political
efforts in this direction resulted in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1844, which
constituted the territories between the British possessions in India and the Russian
possessions in the steppe, including the Central Asian Khanates, as buffer states
between the two Empires.9° As a result of the progress of the Russian advance this
issue gained exceptional urgency, and reappeared in the correspondence between the
two Governments after 1868, simultaneously with the issue of the security of the
Afghan borders. While Russia was preparing for the invasion of Khiva and
reconnoitring the Turkoman country, she exhibited an unusual degree of willingness
for a mutual understanding with Great Britain and was "waiting to be asked to enter
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into treaty engagement respecting the neutrality of Afghanistan", according to
Buchanan.9'
The buffer zone issue had been discussed frequently by officials of the two
Governments and seemed at that time to be an idea accepted by both Empires. After
an interview with Gorchakov, Rumbold, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg,
stated that Gorchakov "proposed Afghanistan as a territory well suited to serve as
buffer ground between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia". Gorchakov
added in the same meeting that he was ready to
include within that neutral ground the whole tract of country coloured in
yellow [the Turkoman land to the south of the Oxus]. He could not go further
because the competent persons who had been consulted raised objections, and
because any greater extension of the neutral zone would include portions of
the Bukharan territories south of the Oxus.92
This issue was discussed back and forth, not without some misgivings on the
part of the Indian Government, from the beginning of 1869 until 1873 when it lost
its momentum after the fall of Khiva. It was a first priority for Forsyth, an officer of
the Government of the Punjab, during his visit to St. Petersburg in 1869 as
representative of the Indian Government, where he held several meetings with
Gorchakov and other officials the outcome of which was however a deep conviction
that "a neutral zone in its strict sense was impossible". 93 Lord Mayo regarded the
proposal of a neutral zone as a limitation on the free action of the Indian
Government. He suggested that Russia should implement this policy by assisting the
independence of the Khanates along her southern borders, i.e. Kokand, Bukhara, and
Khiva, while the Government of India would do the same regarding Kelat,
Afghanistan, and Yarkand. Thus the two Governments would create jointly a buffer
zone and the Russian advance would be halted. 94 Nonetheless this proposal was of
course impractical because of Russia's determination not to strengthen but to weaken
the Uzbek states. Russia's intentions were made obvious by the declarations in mid
1 860s by officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Russia must eventually annex
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Bukhara and Kokand, as India must eventually annex Afghanistan.95
As a result of Russia's vigorous advances between 1865 and the fall of Khiva
in 1873, the map of central Asia was altered dramatically. 1' Faced with this vigorous
expansion, Great Britain made an effort at least to secure the northern boundaries of
Afghanistan, which resulted in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1872 concerning the
northern borders of Afghanistan. The Afghan boundaries were delineated the same in
both Russian and British maps. The Russian Government did not protest or make
any reservations regarding that line until her frontiers became conterminous with
those of Afghanistan in 1884.96 Russia during the twelve years that preceded 1884
absorbed Khiva and the Turkoman country, and pushed her frontiers forward until
Afghanistan was the next natural target and could be reached conveniently through
the Transcaspian railway. Thus Russian diplomacy provided a convenient cover for
the reality of the Russian military and political advance. On March 27, 1869
Clarendon had suggested to Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador in London, the
recognition of some territory as a buffer or neutral zone between the possession of
England and Russia. He drew Brunnow's attention to
the rapid progress of the Russian troops in Central Asia, and made a proposal
for the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of
England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and
which should be scrupulously respected by both powers.97
Clarendon assured the Russian Ambassador that such an engagement was necessary
for the purpose of allaying the excitement and suspicions that were arising in British
public opinion and the British press as well.98
Gorchakov accepted the suggestion and expressed his full assent to the
h• This period witnessed the formation of Turkestan Oblast in February 12, 1865,
followed in May of the same year by the conquest of Tashkand. In October 1866 Khoj and
was conquered, and Turkestan Governorship was declared as an independent military district
(Okrug). Bukhara was defeated in June 1868, folloved by the annexation of Katta-Kurgan
and Karshi to Russia's domains. And in 1873 Khiva the old enemy was conquered, and in
the same year Russia launched her campaign against the Yomud Turkomans.
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proposal of Clarendon to keep a zone between the possessions of the two Empires in
Asia, stating that the "idea expressed by Lord Clarendon... suits the views of the
Emperor"Y9
 He further instructed Brunnow to express to Her Majesty's
Government the Emperor's positive assurances that Afghanistan lay outside the
sphere of Russia's influence. 100 Later Gorchakov while discussing the issue with
Buchanan repeated the same opinion and the Emperor's will that Afghanistan should
be looked upon as constituting the neutral ground which it was appropriate to
establish. Clarendon had some reservation on the ground that Afghanistan alone
would not fulfil the conditions of a neutral territory, because Russia might get
involved in disputes with the chiefs on the borders and thus feel herself justified in
breaking the arrangement she had entered into with Britain. 101 Clarendon informed
Brunnow, that in the opinion of the Secretary of State of India:
Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was
the object of the two Governments to establish, as the frontiers were ill-
defined; and if the Russian forces advanced to those frontiers disputes with
the Chiefs on the border would sooner or later but infallibly ensue, and
Russia might be compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard the
arrangement she had entered into, and it was, therefore, thought advisable to
propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bukhara, should be the
boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross.102
To Clarendon's proposal that the Oxus formed "the most desirable line of
demarcation for a neutral ground between the Russian and the British possessions",
Gorchakov showed at this time no objection, though Baron Brunnow expressed his
reservation as Khiva was to the south of the Oxus and such an arrangement would
encourage the Khan's hostile attitude towards Russia. 103 The Russian Government
declined to accept the proposal on the ground that it gave an extension to the
frontiers of Afghanistan.
Granville in October 1972 authorised Loftus to explain to the Russian
Government that "the right of the Amir of Kabul, Sher Ali, to the possession of the
territories up to the Oxus as far as Khoja Saleh is fully established".' 04
 The
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response of the Russian Government was positive and they concurred that
Badakhshan, Wakhan, Sarikul (Woods Lake) to the junction of Kokcha river with
the Oxus, as well as Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh, should all be acknowledged as
belonging to Afghanistan. The Russian Government authorized Kaufmann, as the
nearest authority, to investigate the issue on site, though due to local difficulties "he
was unable to accomplish his task".'°5 Even so the Russian Government admitted
that the Amu Dana constituted the Afghan boundary from Kokcha to Khoja Saleh,
and this recognition was beyond dispute.1°6
Kaufmann however, in a letter to Gorchakov, disputed this view of the matter
as being inaccurate and "far from being complete".'°7 The Russian Government,
notwithstanding Kaufmann's protest, accepted the boundary as defined by Granvile
in his dispatch to Loftus dated October 17, 1872. Meanwhile the Government of
India advised the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali to preserve the "peaceful policy
in accordance with the advice formerly given to him by Lord Mayo".'° 8
 Gorchakov
however protested that Badakhshan and Wakhan should be excluded and regarded as
independent, though he pledged that the boundary of Afghanistan and Bukhara
should be regarded as both sides of the Oxus respectively.
In the meantime the Afghan Government was trying to secure itself in the
face of Kaufmann's attempts against the Turkomans and instigation of the Amir of
Bukhara. For this purpose Sher Ali asked for British assistance but he was ignored.
This was because the British had decided to place their confidence in their mutual
understanding with Russia over the frontiers of Afghanistan. In any case the Viceroy
of India had no power to provide assistance without the consent of the Home
Government. 109 Sher Au became more and more convinced that the security of
Afghanistan could only be secured by an "offensive and defensive alliance with
Great Britain", 110 which would be of equal advantage to England and Afghanistan.
The Amir was routinely ignored. His envoys to India usually went back with "cold
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words of comfort and without the material assistance" their country needed." This
neglect led to the estrangement of the Afghan Government from the British.
Notwithstanding the Amir was far from being friendly to Russia, it was in a real
sense British policy which lay behind his reception of Russia's envoys on the one
hand, while the declaration of war against him by his brothers also accelerated his
inclination towards Russia on the other.'12
For the British it was important that the frontiers of Afghanistan, as the
bulwark of India, should be strictly delimited in a formal agreement with Russia. For
this purpose Loftus suggested to Granville, who was visiting St. Petersburg early in
1872, that they take advantage of the presence of Kaufmann at St. Petersburg in the
winter of 1872 to bring the issue to a conclusion. During the talks Loftus tried to
convince the Russians that Britain understood the benefits of consolidating Russia's
influence in Central Asia by peaceful means and developing the resources of the
country."3 M. de Westmann, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that
these opinions fully corresponded with those of the Imperial Government, and that
Russia required peace in Central Asia. Gorchakov also acknowledged that the two
Empires considered it as "expedient to have a certain intennediary zone for the
purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact"." 4 The
British party suggested that the neutral zone should include those Khanates to the
north of the Oxus, i.e. Bukhara and Kokand, or all the territories between the
Afghan and the Russian frontiers." 5 The Russian Government did not sympathize
with this extensive suggestion, evaded commenting directly and delayed their
answer, and justified their delay by saying that they should wait until the proposal
could be translated and submitted to the Emperor.'16
Westmann assured, in relation to an observation from Loftus regarding the
matter, that it was in the interest of the Government of Great Britain and Russia
that:
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the frontiers of Afghanistan and Bukhara should be strictly defined, and that
the conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government had come was in
complete harmony with the understanding which had been agreed upon with
Mr. Forsyth when he visited St. Petersburg in 1869... M. de Westmann
assured him that the views and opinions of the Imperial Government were
identical with those he had expressed.117
Westmann added that Russia required peace in Central Asia, and even stated
that a cordial understanding between the two countries was more necessary to Russia
than to England. 8 He entertained some plan of establishing a neutral zone
between the English and Russian frontiers in Central Asia, which "would necessitate
two frontier lines". 119 Loftus drew Westmann's attention to the fact that a neutral
zone should include those independent states lying between the frontier of
Afghanistan and the Russian frontier and that "this idea would be represented by
Bukhara on the north and even perhaps by Afghanistan south of the Oxus".'2°
Loftus added that there should be no obstacle to creating a buffer zone. Westmann
appeared entirely to agree. But this was before the fall of Khiva in the following
summer.
Despite British eagerness to resume the definition of the buffer zone, the
Russian Government delayed proceeding, pending Kaufmann's opinion which was to
be based on the position on the ground in Central Asia. In pursuit of these delaying
tactics, Russian officials in order to distance themselves from previous assurances,
adopted a technique of contradictory announcements to the extent that a subordinate
would apparently dispute his superior's opinion. Thus in 1872 Russia appeared
officially to have accepted the line of the frontiers proposed by Granvile, and the
acceptance was communicated to Brunnow by Gorchakov, who stated that Russia
"does not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England".' 2' However
the head of the Asiatic Department, Stremoukhov, protested and expressed the view
that the Hindu Kush, not the Oxus, would be the frontier line separating the two
Empires in Central Asia.' 22 The British considered that any Russian attempt to
cross the Oxus would entail serious consequences, and that any Russian move in that
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direction would be regarded as threatening to India. In view of the efforts being
made by Kaufmann in Central Asia, the British Government communicated to Sher
Ali through the Government of India the advice that he had the right to defend his
northern provinces if invaded.' 23 The stronger line of the British Government
encouraged by the apparently conciliatory attitude of the Russian Government, was
exemplified in Loftus' observation that:
the eye of England in that quarter is not obscured, nor her arm shortened
when it is a question of protecting her interests and those of her Indian
Empire.'
The semi-official Russian press demonstrated against what it saw as rest-
rictions imposed on the policy of Russia in Central Asia through engagement in a
buffer zone policy, and demanded the abrogation of all previous agreements entered
into between the two Governments, including that of 1872. In a sharp tone the
Moscow Gazette wrote in March 1873:
What right has England to interfere in the affairs of an independent State, to
control its action, and to enter into diplomatic negotiations with it, in respect
to subjects which do not come with the province of international law? Just as
a man in a civilized state of society, possessed of complete civil rights,
attaches great value to his independence, so, in a still greater degree does an
independent power value that independence, and any uncalled for interference
in her affairs is an insult to her dignity... In the policy of England towards
Russia it is impossible not to see great irregularities, and every irregularity
lays the foundation for future difficulties.1
This attitude was known to be held as well by the military, scientific, and
literary persons who took an interest in Central Asian affairs.' It also
demonstrated explicitly that Russia regarded Central Asian affairs, without
justification, as an internal matter.
The relentless Russian drive into Central Asia continued and increasingly
alarmed London. Russia was coming almost within arm's reach of the most precious
jewel in the British diadem, India. Less than a year after the fall of Khiva, Russia
began pressing towards the conquest of Merv. According to Colonel Glukhovskii,
who reported to General Kaufmann on the state of affairs after 1873, and the need to
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press forward against the Turkomans:
if Afghanistan (that is England) first occupies Mery
 then the degree of quiet
in the Turkoman steppe will entirely depend on that power, and Russia
cannot then easily guarantee the security of the commercial roads from the
Caspian to the Amu Dana, nor have the possibility of directing the European
trade through Persia and Mery
 into Central Asia, which would be detrimental
to the development of our commerce and to all our Trans-Caspian
possessions.'27
Hardly had Russia replied to Britain's proposal about the buffer zone than
Kaufmann forced the Khan of Khiva to submit to his demands and accept vassal
status and acknowledge himself as the humble servant of the Emperor.
Britain began to complain more audibly about the bear walking like a man on
the roof of Asia. As the British along the northern borders of India felt the breath of
the bear descending southward, the diplomatic atmosphere in London became more
tense. It was not until after the turn of the century and under the influence of more
compelling developments that Anglo-Russian relations were improved and an
agreement was reached.'
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Chapter Five
THE RUSSIAN THREAT TO BRITISH INDIA
No Russian pathot, recognizing the possibility of a successful
achievement of the purpose, and placed by destiny in a pos-
ition to guide the operation, can hesitate to point Out the
immense resources which, I will permit myself to say, our
Government has accidentally accumulated on this frontier, and
by means of which, with adequate resolution and with timely
preparation, it is possible, not only to strike an effective blow
at England in India, but also to crush her in Europe.
General Skobelev, Project for the Invasion of India, (1877).
Early projects against India
France was the first among European colonial powers to target British India in
her rivalry with Great Britain. Napoleon considered India as the most vulnerable
target in the British domains, and seriously considered making a strike there. In 1791
a French emigrant in Russia, by the name of St. Jenis, had suggested to the Empress
Catherine 11(1762-1796) a plan for the conquest of India from the British, with the
ostensible purpose of restoring the dynasty of the Great Moguls. 1
 Catherine rejected
the idea but her successors, for their own reasons, were more supportive of and more
interested in the venture. 2 As the French threat diminished the Russians took over the
Indian strategy and adopted it as a means of exercising political leverage over events
in Europe and of influencing British attitudes regarding the Eastern Question. This
long-term political and strategic programme accompanied the intensification of
Russian attempts to gain access to new markets in Asia.3
Long before the fever of the 19th century rivalry with Great Britain, Russia
had already coveted India, initially for largely commercial motives. The first Russian
merchant who endeavoured to reach India was Afanasii Nikitin (Tverskii), who was
dispatched in 1469 by Prince Mikhail Borisovich, a contemporary and rival of Ivan Ill
(1440-1505). Nikitin could not proceed through Central Asia, and was obliged to
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change to an alternative route along the western shores of the Caspian Sea through
Derbend, Baku, Persia, and Khorasan, where he was unable to continue and failed to
reach India. Later Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (1629-1676) endeavoured to establish
contacts with the Mogul dynasty in India, through Bukhara. 4 He sent Pazukhin in
1669 to Bukhara for the purpose of reconnoitring the route to India via that state.
Following Pazukhin's confirmation of the possibility of reaching India through Bu-
khara, a Tatar from Astrakhan named Yosip Kasimov (Yosif Qasim) was commis-
sioned to establish contacts with India. Kasimov reached Kabul in 1676, but he was
prevented from proceeding, being considered by the Afghans a government official
not a merchant, and so returned to Moscow in 1678. Simion Malenkii, encouraged by
the ambitious Peter the Great (1682-1725), made a successful attempt in 1695, this
time as a merchant. He reached Delhi, but died on the way back and only one of his
companions returned to Astrakhan, and he was incompetent to deliver any useful
information about their trip. 5 Thus Russia remained without any detailed information
about the road to India.
Peter the Great equipped two expeditions in 1717; the first, setting out from
Siberia to reach Yarkand was headed by Gagarin; while the second, led by Bekovich-
Cherkasskii, was to overawe Khiva and to persuade the Amir of Bukhara to send to
India a caravan consisting of thirty five merchants, thirteen of whom must be
Russians. The outcome of this adventure was the disastrous fate which Bekovich's
expedition met in Khiva. The Russian Government then waited until 1750, when an-
other caravan was dispatched to India. The initiator this time was the Governor of
Orenburg, Nepliuev. The caravan met with the same obstacles that had impeded
earlier efforts, and was blocked because it was not carrying merchandise. As a result
of these endeavours Russia discovered that it was easier for a merchant to cross the
distance to India than for a government official, Thecause everywhere he is needed,
and everybody is his friend". 6 Apparently, it was this recognition which led Russia to
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colour all of her subsequent designs in Asia with a commercial character. This will
explain why all of Russia's succeeding designs against Central Asia were executed
under the pretence of enhancing or protecting her commercial interests, to the extent
that it became difficult to distinguish commercial from political matters in these
Russian procedures. In this respect Lord John Russell in 1860 perceptively observed
"how far political are mixed up with commercial views" in Russian procedures.7
Reaching India was a target that had been contemplated by Peter the Great,
halted under Catherine, and entered the stage of execution under successively Paul
and Alexander. As Blackwoods observed after the Crimean War, "the invasion of
India is a design never laid aside at the Court of St. Petersburg". 8 Besides the
military and political components of this strategy against India, Russian policy was
also motivated by other and vital considerations: strategic, to obtain an outlet to warm
seas, and economic, to open up potential markets for her growing industry. By the
year 1830 the recognition of these ambitions had crystallized an explicit Russophobia
in British opinion which resulted in classifying Russia as "Britain's great enemy".9
Under Alexander, Russia's aspiration to reach India was enhanced by an
ambitious plan for trade with India submitted in 1802 to the "Neglasnyi
committee". 1° The project was studied and approved and efforts were made to secure
communications with India, but at this stage the ambition was beyond reach in this
direction. With her trade in the west ravaged by the Napoleonic wars, Russia doubled
her efforts in the east to establish trade relations with Afghanistan and India through
Central Asia, which however proved to be a formidable obstacle to Russia's caravans.
Russia therefore endeavoured to find an alternative route from western Siberia through
Aksu, Kuidja, Kashgar, and Chinese Tibet to Kashmir and India. This road proved to
be extremely long and expensive and the same merchandise could be obtained in the
markets of Central Asia via Orenburg. Nevertheless, as a result Russia succeeded in
establishing relations with certain principalities of India,' 1 though this was met by
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the spread of Britain's influence in Afghanistan and by a vigorous boost to Britain's
trade in Bukhara and other Khanates of Central Asia.'2
Napoleon, unable to demolish Britain's naval supremacy but able to take
advantage of the deteriorating relations between England and Russia in the first
decade of the century, found that the most attractive and vulnerable target among
Britain's possessions was India, with its extended communications and exposed
frontiers.' 3 After the failure of his grandiose plan to invade India with French forces,
of which the Egyptian expedition was a preliminary and unsuccessful stage, he
devised the idea of a joint Franco-Russian expedition against British India.'4
Increasingly therefore he became more friendly in his relations with Paul I (1796-
1801) and freed 6,800 Russian captives and restored to them their arms. 15 According
to this plan a combined force of thirty-five thousand Russians, to be joined by an
equal number of French troops, would land at Astrabad and march on India via Herat
and Kandahar.'6
Central Asia was considered merely as the second route towards India in the
early stages of Russian strategy, so long as the region was not yet included in
Russia's sphere of influence.'7 The main highway was regarded as lying through
Persia, Herat and Kandahar to India. This route was also not under effective Russian
control particularly as long as Persia was still protected by the formidable Caucasus
mountain-range. Russian encroachment against Persia at the beginning of the
nineteenth century should be at least partly understood in light of Russian attempts to
open a route towards India. In that campaign she conquered Georgia in 1801,
Mingrelia in 1803, and Imeretia 1804, while Shervan, Derbend, and Baku were ceded
by Persia to Russia by the Gulistan treaty of 1813. That treaty was however counter-
balanced by the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814, which was concluded largely as a
response to the Franco-Russian designs against India. Under the terms of this treaty
Britain promised assistance to Persia against external invasion; however, when
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Napoleon's threat was over, Britain "dropped all interest in Persia".' 8 Even so, in
view of the Persian obstacle, the Russians began to favour the Central Asian route to
India, despite the fact that it was long and passed through the harshest deserts of Asia,
the Kara-Kum and Kizyl-Kum.
While Napoleon was tied up with the war in Europe, the idea seemed
extremely attractive to Paul I, who decided to act alone by penetrating into the heart
of India, not under the guise of a mercantile undertaking, but with fire and sword.'9
Consequently, on January 12, 1801, he issued a written order to Orlov, the Ataman of
the Don Cossacks, to march with a force of 22,507 Cossacks and twenty four guns to
Orenburg and then proceed by three routes via Bukhara to the Indus. To charge his
Cossacks with fervour, the Tsar assured them in a letter, dated 24 January 1801 and
addressed to Orlov, that the whole of India would be their reward, saying "all the
wealth of India shall be your reward for this expedition". 2° The main purpose and
extraordinary ambition of the campaign in this early stage of Russia's advance was
apparently to destroy the British factories and establishments in India, to bring the
country under Russian control, and to win over Indian trade in favour of Russia.2'
The Emperor gave his order for the release of 1,670,285 roubles to the Cossack
army.22
Paul's letter to Orlov however demonstrated Russia's utter ignorance of the
character of the peoples inhabiting the region between Orenburg and India, as well as
the geography of the area. The leaders of the expedition not only confused the roads
to India, but also confused India itself. 23 The Imperial letter said:
I authorize this expedition to you and your troops... You can gather them and
advance towards Orenburg, from there you can select one of the three roads or
march with your artillery by all three roads at once, by way of Bukhara and
Khiva to the river Indus and the British establishments located around it. The
military forces to be found there are of the same type as yours; having artillery
you possess an advantage. Prepare every thing necessary for the expedition,
send your scouts to prepare or discover the road, our reward would be all the
wealth of India as a result of this expedition... this enterprise will crown you
with glory.., and will hit the foe in his heart. I am sending you all the maps I
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have. They only cover as far as Khiva and the Amu river. It will be your
business to find out about the peoples living under Indian domination?A
In another letter he wrote defining the policy the Cossacks ought to pursue in India,
and the tactics which they should employ. The Emperor felt himself obliged to define
the road which his army should follow:
Vasiii Petrovich, I am sending you a new and detailed map of India. Re-
member that you are to be concerned solely with the British, you are to offer
peace to all those who would not help them, and assure them of the friendship
of Russia. Proceed from the Indus to the Ganges against the British. On the
way secure the domination of Bukhara so that the Chinese should not get hold
of it, and in Khiva liberate our prisoners. If you require infantry I will send
you some later, but not otherwise can I dispose of any. It would be better if
you were able to do everything alone.25
The sudden death of Paul I in March 1801 however terminated the projected
expedition. His successor Alexander I (1801-1825) was no less fascinated with the
idea, and discussed it with Napoleon during their meeting in Tilsit in 1807.
Napoleon was however less enthusiastic, and Russia found herself with no option but
to shelve her ambition. The next half century witnessed severe set-backs in Russia's
efforts; in 1839 Perovskii retreated with heavy loss in man power and transport
animals.27 Russia was unable to repeat her expedition and was as yet slowly trying to
establish herself on the lower Syr Dana. The 1 840s and 1 850s saw intensive Russian
efforts directed towards the conquest of the Kazakh tribes and erecting advanced forts
in the steppe and Semirechie as well.28 England successfully annexed the Punjab in
1849, which added to the difficulties facing Russian plans to communicate with India.
Thus the new development in India put an end to direct and regular economic and
cultural connections between Russia and India, and hindered for an unforeseen period
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Russia sought
compensation in Central Asia where her diplomatic efforts explicitly concerned
Bukhara and Khiva.29 England did not see a direct threat to her position in India
from Russian activities in Central Asia. Up to the mid 1850s Russia was busy
discovering routes to India through Kashgar, which they regarded as a natural road
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suitable for camels and baggage. 3° The Crimean War naturally renewed interest in
the idea of threatening Britain in India, and General Dugamel (Duhamel) submitted in
1854 to Nicholas I (1825-1855) a project for the invasion of India in retribution for
Britain's hostility in the Ottoman question.a General Perovskii's advance along the
Syr Dana during that war in 1853-1854 was partially a move in that direction, and
timed to inflict pressure on Britain during the Crimean War.
Russia resolved to overcome the many obstacles in her way: thus the strategy
was shelved but was never forgotten. Russia resolved to advance her bulwarks in
Central Asia before attempting any adventure against India. Abbott in 1855 wrote:
Russia should rather resolve on absorbing within her vast empire the principal-
ities of Khiva, Kokan, and Bukhara, before attempting anything against India,
the recent advance of her frontier to the Jaxartes would now render the former
merely a question of time and convenience to Russia, unless some new com-
bination is effected against her; as it cannot be supposed that any one of these
states could offer availing resistance to even a single division of the Russian
army.31
Obstacles to the invasion of India
Russia thus was not yet a formidable power in the region and had to conquer
Central Asia to be able to exhibit a real threat to British India. Yet she had already
substantial ambitions to destabilize India and undermine the British power there, so as
to be able to dominate the sub-continent through closer relations with the weak and
discontented Princes. In the short term, in the mid 1850s Russia was compelled to
advance southward for yet another reason, since she was engaged in war with Great
Britain in Europe, so it was natural that she would seek to undermine the British in
India. As we have seen, the external threat to British India historically had two
phases; in the first Britain had but one enemy, France; while a second and
overlapping phase brought Russia into the arena, advancing inexorably in the direction
S General Duhamel had succeeded Count Simonich as Minister in Persia. His project
will be discussed later in this chapter.
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of India's most vulnerable north-western frontiers. 32 Even after the end of the war,
Russia intensified her efforts in this direction, especially during the 1860s which
witnessed the stabilization of Russian power in the Syr Dana basin, and the
strengthening of her grip on Bukhara after signing the first Russo-Bukharan agreement
in 1868. It was reported by Buchanan from St. Petersburg that "some aspiring Russian
Generals had entered into communication with some restless or malcontent Indian
Princes and that intrigues were rife and disturbing". 33 Some Russian historians have
affirmed that various Indian princes contacted Russia with the hope of obtaining her
assistance in their struggle against British rule. The strategy of St. Petersburg was
intended to agitate the Indians in order to cause a feeling of insecurity in the country,
which would render it impossible for the British to withdraw troops from India for
service in Europe.35 Russia's expansion in Central Asia, with the large expenses
which it entailed for the Russian exchequer, should not be perceived merely in the
context of securing trade routes and pacifying the nomads, as a British observer noted
in 1885:
Russia's expeditions in Central Asia have always been undertaken not with a
view to an improved frontier, the Russian frontier on the Central Asian side
having never been threatened... but simply in order to place Russia in a
position to threaten and, on fitting opportunity, attack India.36
Provoking this issue would inevitably lead to two main inconveniences for the
British: first, it would increase Britain's economic burden which was already
enormous; and second, Britain would find herself obliged to increase her military
presence in the sub-continent by withdrawing troops from Europe, a step which was
highly desired by Russia. Britain in this period feared most the effect of the influence
of Russia, the external enemy, over India's discontented princes, the internal danger.
The assumption of a mutual effect between the external and internal enemies, led
British strategists to adopt the well-known forward policy which sought to keep these
enemies detached from each other. 37 Soon after the advance along the Syr Dana,
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Blackwoods considered the possibility of Russia attacking India and answered in the
affirmative:
The policy of Russia is a game of centuries. She will not spring too soon; she
has learnt that grand secret of success - to wait. But waiting, with her, is not
inaction; and her approaches towards India are now sufficiently far advanced
to cause us active disquietude. She has begun in earnest to push forward her
tiraileurs against us preparatory to the pitched battle. She will continue to
throw Persia against our first parallel of defence, Afghanistan; and, if unop-
posed, will carry the sap of bribery and coercion through that mountain-
rampart up to the very plains of India. Henceforth we may look for a series of
harassing attacks, increasing in magnitude - wandering Turkomans and civi-
lised Persians being alike pressed into the service, until Russia descends
herself into the arena, and presses the assault with all her forces.38
The difficulties attending the invasion of India were however enormous. They
lay, besides the remoteness of Russia's military strength in Asia, in the character of
the people of Afghanistan and Central Asia, the formidable difficulties of
communications and the scantiness of resources in the region. 39 Britain's hard ex-
perience in Afghanistan during the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1838-1842 had led her
to the assumption that Russia would face similar difficulties when advancing upon
India. Some politicians went so far as to assume that "the undertaking was impossible
because it was attended with [such] great difficulty". 4° In the mid 1860s, when
Russia was advancing against Kokand and apprehension in British opinion was
mounting regarding the security of India, Sir Roderick I. Murchison, the president of
the Royal Geographical Society of London, indicated these apprehensions as devoid of
reason and said that "the alarm taken by [some] of our countrymen... is entirely
groundless".4 ' The Russian press was quick to stress the point in order to support the
Russophile tendency, while Russian officials continued to deny any intention against
India.42
The Russian advance through the steppe had not been regarded as threatening,
but there was no doubt that the move southward in the steppe region and along the
Syr Dana was alarming. The British were fully aware of the fact that the most vulner-
able frontiers of India were those of the north west, facing the Russian advance.
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Despite Russia's improving military position at the expense of Kokand between 1855
and 1864, Britain still suffered from inaccurate evaluations of Russia's power in
Central Asia, depending mostly on information collected from individuals or officers
who visited the Uzbek Khanates. This relative absence of good intelligence led to a
surprising indifference towards the affairs of Central Asia. This was still the situation
as late as 1860. Regarding this lack of information Boulger, a leading member of
the Royal Asiatic Society, wrote that Britain had no information whatever from
English sources, and complained that "this state of ignorance would have been simply
intolerable". Other observers shared this point of view, and admitted that Britain's
knowledge of Central Asia was of comparatively limited character for reasons of
remoteness, inaccessibility, and dangers facing European travellers. 45
 The British
military absence from the Central Asian field was not however to be taken as meaning
that Britain had no political interest in maintaining the independence of the states of
Central Asia. Britain's genuine interest was reflected in Russell's despatch to
Crampton in 1860 directing him to communicate to Prince Gorchakov that
the British Government, having a great interest in the maintenance of the states
of Central Asia in a condition of political independence, might find it neces-
sary to station a British Consul at Astrabad in order to obtain trust-worthy
information as to what is taking place on the eastern coast of the Caspian
Sea.46
The Russian advance against Kokand up to the end of 1864 was discussed without
significant detail. Political correspondence regarding this matter reveals that the Brit-
ish Government had scanty information about the state of affairs in the territories
conquered by Russia or menaced by her armies, and had no clear detailed maps of the
region.47 Britain's main source of information was her embassy in St. Petersburg,
which was endowed by able officers capable of collecting data not only from Russian
press, but from a variety of other sources. 48
 Up to 1867 the Government of India
showed indecision about offering assistance to Bukhara and Kokand, upon their
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request, because its ignorance of the actual state of affairs in that region hindered "any
effective aid either by advice or in any other form".49
Russia's offensive moves in 1864 and thereafter put her on the way to
India.50 After the conquest of the Turkoman country, the culmination of Russian
acquisitions in Central Asia which put her in a position directly to threaten the
frontiers of Afghanistan, Russian policy once more aspired to the realisation of the
great goal of her Indian ambitions. This was now to be achieved by linking her
railway system with Mery and the Afghan frontiers and eventually connecting it up
with other trade centres in Central Asia and with the network of British India. 5 ' This
extension of railway communications (which is more fully discussed below in chapter
VI) was the essential step which was to change the strategic threat to India from
potentiality to reality. Russia's threat to India was less perilous in the first half of the
nineteenth century, so long as Russia lacked means of communication with Orenburg,
and it took three to four months for a regiment to reach Orenburg from Russia's
heartland. Britain was then in an even worse position in that it took only a little less
than a year to send reinforcements from the British Isles to the northern frontiers of
India.52 Russia did not take benefit from her relative geographical advantage up to
the Crimean War, but thereafter she turned her activities to Central Asia. By the time
of the eruption of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, Russia's position in the region had
undergone essential and extensive changes. Her centre for action against India had
moved from remote Orenburg to Tashkand, and in the 1880s even closer, to Askabad,
assisted by the development of modern railway communications that facilitated the
transfer of troops from the Caucasus to the Afghan borders in a remarkably short
time; besides this, Russia had now secured sufficient sources of supply in Bukhara,
Khiva, and the Ferghana valley (Kokand). The former difficulties of communication
were materially diminished as a result of Russia's advance, culminating in her
acquisitions against the Turkomans, and the construction of the railway. Her activities
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and the utterances of her Generals became more frank and the invasion of India was
discussed openly. Even Kaufmann proposed preparations to make the first attempt
against India in 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War and Russian humiliation at the
Congress of Berlin, but before the campaign against the Turkomans the motivation of
which was similar to that of Perovskii's advance against Kokand during the Crimean
War. He assembled 20,000 soldiers in Djam, fifteen miles west of Tashkand, and had
a reserve of 50,000 soldiers in Siberia. 53 Kaufmann wrote describing his preparations
to General Bogdanovich: "by the will of the Emperor, I have assembled an army of
dimensions as yet unseen in Central Asia, and of a quality fit to encounter any troops
in the worldtt.54
The Russophile party in Britain, up to 1878, had remained loyal to the
assumption that Russia had no intention of attacking India. However Kaufmann's
expedition unavoidably exposed the falsehood of such a view. Yet this campaign also
revealed to Russia the immense difficulties to be encountered on the road to India and
pushed her to move forward against the Turkomans in order to remove some of them.
Kaufmann' s activities against India were described by Doctor Yavroskii, a physician
who accompanied Stoletov in his mission to Kabul in 1878:
In May 1878 there was a greater stir in society at Tashkand than at any
previous period. Preparations were being made for an expedition to India. An
order had been issued for the formation of three detachments of Turkestan
troops to set out in a very short time for the southern frontiers... everywhere
expressions of delight could be heard at the impending march. Now we're off
to India to drive the English out of it.55
These designs resulted in exceptional diplomatic and reconnaissance activities in the
countries between Russia's domains and India. Grodekov was dispatched to Herat,
Colonel (later General) Nikolai Grigorevich Stoletov to Kabul, to be met there by Pëtr
Ivanovich Pashino (who had earlier served for two years as interpreter to Abdur-
Rahman Khan, and was dispatched to India to take advantage of his knowledge of
Afghan politics). At the same time Colonel Matveev was despatched to Balkh and
Badakhshan.56
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The controversy over the Indian question had a powerful effect upon Anglo-
Russian relations in the second half of the nineteenth century, and cast its shadow
even over the opinions of the Russian Generals who became split over the issue.
General Grodekov asserted the futility of the enterprise, maintaining that no practical
Russian General believed in the possibility of an invasion of India; and that the mil-
lennium would take place before Russia invaded India, while General Cherniaev af-
finned that the Russian invasion of India was perfectly possible, though not easy.
There was a third politically-conditioned opinion, based on the premise that Russia
could intentionally keep open the Indian question in order to keep her rival at a per-
manent disadvantage. 57 On this view, the absorption within Russia's vast domains of
the Khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva could be seen as the prelude to even
more ambitious projects against India.58 Russia's ambition to unsettle Great Britain
in India was politically motivated even before the conquest of Turkomeniia; it later
turned out to be a real military threat in the 1880's.
Some British politicians and observers considered the question of the Russian
threat to India in the light of the difficulties encountered in operations against Kokand
in the 1850's, though they may have exaggerated the obstacles that stood in the way
of the Russian advance. Many even publicly denounced apprehensions of a Russian
invasion of India, and characterised it as merely a political nightmare, though the idea
continued to permeate the analysis of Indian security. 59 Even before the conquest of
the Khanates, English writers saw the Russian course on the Jaxartes as one of steady
encroachment towards British India, although there were some who regarded the Rus-
sian advance merely as a disagreeable not really threatening event.60
No doubt there were two obstacles that hindered the supposed Russian
invasion: the first was the difficulties of the terrain, and the second was the fierce and
warlike tribes inhabiting it. However Russia had several options to deal with these
hindrances. The first would be overcome by securing the neutrality of Persia and the
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augmentation of Russia's influence in Afghanistan. The second would be surmounted
by mobilizing these tribes against the British and inducing them to loot and plunder
British India. In dealing with the Afghan issue, Skobelev at the eve of the Turkoman's
campaign in 1 880 suggested rapid diplomatic and military action to culminate in the
occupation of Kabul, while the period that followed the occupation should be a
waiting period, during which Russia should maintain contacts with disaffected ele-
ments in India. 61
 British observers considered that the optimum solution to encounter
these Russian designs lay in encouraging the conviction of Her Majesty's subjects in
India, as well as the princes of India, that Britain was and remained:
a first class power, and able to cope successfully with any other power likely
to dispute her supremacy in British India, and that their position is as good, or
better under British rule than it would be under the rule of any other foreign
power.62
In 1881 General Grodekov took pains to convince Charles Marvin during a
lengthy conversation of the impossibility of a Russian invasion of India. Marvin
commented that he was quite satisfied that Russia could not invade India at present
from her position at Askabad, but added that
Russia's position may change. You may by degrees annex Meshed and Herat,
and your position would be better in that case for invading India from those
points.63
This was perhaps true: but of course we know that in the event Russia did not
succeed in expanding its control as far as Meshed or Herat.
One of the factors that pacified English politicians was their disposition to
believe in Russia's repeated assurances about the purposes of her advance, and
justifications of her mission, offering the illusion of civilized Cossack troops chasing
and subduing undomesticated wild tribes, an image which prevailed since the conquest
of the steppe. When these tribes were subjugated and Russia came into contact with
stable nations with a developed agriculture, prosperous trade, and an established
political and social order, the image then underwent certain modifications to fit the
new stage of advance and conquest against the Central Asian Khanates. It became that
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of a Russian army labouring to spread European civilization among semi-savage
people. During the diplomatic offensive aimed at pacifying British official and
public opinion, the Russian press blamed the Government of India as the source of the
idea of a Russian invasion of India, arguing also that the expression of this fear was
evidence that the English rulers of India were as yet unconvinced of the stability of
their power.65
In an interview with Loftus in 1874, Gorchakov affected to be offended by
Britain's apparent lack of confidence in Russia's promises and assurances about the
pacific character of her forward movement in Central Asia. 66 But such lack of
confidence was altogether natural in view of the long succession of broken promises
that marked the Russian career of conquest in Central Asia from the early 1 840s, up
to Gorchakov's circular of November 1864, down to the Turkoman campaign of 1880-
1881 and the conquest of Mery in 1884. Hence Russian assurances that there was no
intention to invade India would not be likely to impede her from carrying on her usual
practice, and break her promises if they came into contradiction with her interests.
Russia in her rivalry with Britain in Asia and Europe, undoubtedly regarded
India as Britain's Achilles heel and relentlessly strove to place herself in a position to
threaten the Indian frontiers. This intention was at the same time accompanied by
efforts for the time being to eliminate Britain's anxiety and mistrust. Prince Gor-
chakov, in a desperate auempt to revive Britain's confidence in his and other Russian
official assurances said that:
the idea of an attack on India is absurd; moreover, it would be impossible for
us to attack India. Why will you not have confidence in our word? In that of
our Emperor?67
But this loss of confidence between the two Empires was a natural result of the
deceptive declarations by the Emperor himself and his Minister of Foreign Affairs
regarding Russia's proceedings in Central Asia from the fall of Tashkand to the fall of
Merv. In 1865 the Emperor had insisted that his dominions were vast enough and his
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intention in Central Asia was "to encourage commerce and civilization". 68 Russia
between 1865 and 1873 conquered large territories from Kokand, tied Bukhara hand
and foot with the treaty of 1868, and subjected Khiva in 1873, while the usual
assurances were offered by officials and by the Emperor himself. 69 The ruthless
Turkoman campaign of 1 880-1881 was accompanied by the same assurances at the
same high level, to the extent that Gorchakov avowed that the Emperor had issued
positive orders that no expedition should be undertaken against the Tekke Turko-
mans.7° These assurances were transparently false, as events showed.
Russian strategies for the invasion of India, 1 854-1881
The idea of invading India was rarely far from the minds of Russian politicians
and Generals. This issue was frequently considered not only by Russia's Generals,
who had put before the Government detailed plans for achieving this task, 7 ' but also
attracted Russian orientalists such as Valikhanov, who admitted that designs on British
India could be entertained with "a force on the Caspian as with an army at Bukhara.
The same distance [in each case] would have to be passed by the invading force
before reaching Afghanistan".72 British travellers also did not exclude the possibility
of an army marching across the steppe and desert of Turkestan to Afghanistan, though
acknowledged that it "would not be easily accomplished". 73 British politicians had
different assumptions, they believed that with the shores of the Caspian as the nearest
Russian bases for an invading army, surrounded by such warlike, predatory and
treacherous races as the tribes of Central Asia, it would be a very perilous one.74
Loftus regarded it as the "most venturesome proceeding to march an army into a
hostile and difficult country". 75 General Dugamel had already submitted to the
Emperor a more comprehensive project in 1854 during the Crimean War for the
conquest of India. When advocating his project he emphasized the idea that the
Crimean War imposed
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upon Russia the duty of showing how she can attack England in her only
vulnerable point, in India, and thus force her to assemble so great a force in
Asia as to weaken her action in Europe. History teaches us that nearly all the
Powers which conquered India found their way to it through Central Asia and
Persia.. 76
While Russia was immersed in the Crimean War, Dugamel produced a detailed
plan including five routes to be followed: three from Orenburg or Orsk to Kabul; one
from Astrakhan on the northern shores of the Caspian by water to Shahnid and then
via Meshed, 1-lerat, and Candahar to Kabul; and the fifth from the Caucasus to Tabriz,
Teheran, Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and thus to Kabul. All his routes met in Kabul,
which made it the head of the arrow against India. He emphasized that an Afghan
alliance stood as a prerequisite for the success of the venture, and envisaged it would
be possible to win the Afghans over by tempting them with the prospect of spoils and
acquisition of territory, "should this be the means also of winning over the Sikhs, so
much the better; but the Afghan alliance is of the greatest importance". 77 From the
British point of view, a careful evaluation of India's internal and external situation led
to the recognition that, if Russia could secure her influence in Afghanistan, she would
face no difficulty in employing an army greater in numerical strength than anything
the Government of India could bring into the field. The whole venture depended on
the possession of Afghanistan. An Anglo-Afghan alliance would therefore render the
Russian invasion a very remote contingency and its success would be doubtful if not
impossible.78
The issue of how to manipulate Asian tribes, who were regarded by Loftus as
an obstacle to a Russian invasion, had already been thoroughly dealt with in General
Khrulev's project for invading India in 1855. Khrulev suggested to the Emperor that
Russia should form native forces to fight the British, while Russia's own forces
should be in reserve. He observed that the entrance of a corps of thirty thousand men
into Afghanistan would excite the national antipathy of the Afghans against the
English, and would shake the power of the English in India. He wrote:
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we should endeavour to raise a native force; our own should form the reserve.
We are bound to instruct the population in our methods of offering opposition
to the oppression of the English, whose force in India consists of only twenty
five thousand European troops.79
The Russian press, notably the Moscow Gazette, a Government controlled
organ, oddly revealed the true intention of St. Petersburg when it admitted just after
the reduction of Bukhara that there was now no barrier which could "arrest the prog-
ress of either power on the other. They are only separated by a tract of country
without any means of defence".8° The French traveller, Ferrier, supposed that the
Russian expansion towards the Oxus and Khiva was intended to reduce the difficulties
of a march against India. 81 The Moscow Gazette maintained that the invasion of
India would become a matter of fact in the event of another war "like that of the
Crimea".82
 Some months later the Moscow Gazette affirmed the same view once
more: "Central Asia is for Russia a strong strategic point against England in the event
of an Eastern War".83 British opinion realized that a strong Russian dominance in
Central Asia might be fatal to Britain in India, but their efforts to halt the Russian
advance were hopelessly inadequate to counter Russian intrigues in the region.
Clarendon explained to Buchanan, the ambassador in St. Petersburg, that:
the only apprehension we had was that the nearer approach of the Russians
and intrigue with native chiefs might bring the Indian mind in a foment and
entail upon us much trouble and expense all of which would be avoided by
clear understanding with the Russian Government.84
While Russian diplomacy was labouring to foster British confidence in her
pacifying assurances after subjecting the Uzbek Khanates and dominating the eastern
coast of the Caspian, General Skobelev submitted to his Government in 1878 a com-
prehensive project for invading India. He recommended that Russia "should throw a
mass of Asiatic cavalry into India as an advanced guard. Their motto would be, blood
and plunder". 85 After the Akhal Tekke campaign in 1881, Skobelev admitted that the
invasion of India would require 150,000 troops, explaining that 60,000 were to enter
India, while 90,000 guarded their communications. 86 He confirmed, in contradiction
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to apparent difficulties and enormous expenditure, that Russia could march an army to
India if she chose,87 though he declared, to Marvin that he would himself abstain
from commanding such an expedition.88
As an integral part of his plan, Skobelev put guidelines for dealing with Afghanistan.
He suggested the occupation of key strategic locations in the countiy, and cooperation
with the Afghan troops and people. In return Russia would suggest the extension of
the frontiers of Afghanistan southward to the Indus, 89 guarantee the independence of
Afghanistan, and tender that country financial aid. In case of rejection of these terms,
however, the Amir of Afghanistan should be deprived of his throne.9°
Meanwhile another strategist, Lebedev by name, sought to save Russia's image
and avoid destruction of resources, offering to achieve Skobelev's objectives but in a
different way:
in our opinion the campaign to the frontiers of India should be carried out ex-
clusively by regular troops. The employment of Turkomans and Kirghiz would
mean laying waste the country over which we should have to move, and stir
up against us the hatred of the people who suffered from their outrages and
plundering.91
In line with the usual practice in Russian policy of concealing her intentions,
and pronouncing exactly contrary to what intended, officials in St. Petersburg offered
the usual assurances that apprehensions of invading India were quite needless:
the idea of a Russian army marching to the Indus could not be realized, or at
any rate could not be carried into execution without frightful sacrifices and
without straining our forces to the utmost.92
Since the projects of the Russian military assumed that the enterprise could be
accomplished without undue strain, we may conclude that the diplomats were
exaggerating the difficulties in invading India for the purpose of misleading British
opinion, both official and public.
A Russian army marching against India would of course be more dangerous if
timed to coincide with a European war. Observers believed that England could repel a
Russian attack, but they warned that "a European war might endanger the whole
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question".93 If war was declared in Asia and Europe simultaneously, the British
would be unable to send troops to reinforce their troops in India, or withdraw troops
from India to operate in Europe. 94 Also an invading army would pose a serious
threat if it coincided with disturbances like those of the 1857 mutiny. England would
be able to put down the mutiny, as it could defeat a Russian army of invasion, "but
what if a mutiny and a Russian invasion came together?" as Seeley put it. 95 The
conquest of Khiva was necessary to secure the nearest point capable of sustaining and
comforting a Russian army crossing the Caspian, while the Oxus would afford a
convenient waterway down to the Afghan boundaries. 96 Russian plans were
perceived in different ways by officers of the Government of India; some, even after
the fall of Khiva, viewed Russia as still being far away and incapable of posing a real
threat to India. This group, as we know, became known as the school of "masterly
inactivity". This school was criticised by Ferrier for ignoring Russia's ability to
advance under the pretext of restoring those native dynasties which had been
conquered by the British:
The very presence of the Russian would create a hostile feeling against their
adversaries among the native population; many chiefs and their dependents
would take arms; the English would then fmd their rear menaced and on their
own territory, and it may be foreseen that, instead of their being able to bring
forward the whole of their forces against the enemy, they would be obliged to
ditch and employ the best and most efficient part of it, that is to say, their
European troops, in putting down the revolts which probably would take place
in almost every direction....97
This political tendency justified "masterly inactivity" through indulgence in the
illusion that it would be impossible for the Russians to overcome the vast deserts and
subdue the recalcitrant tribes of Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Others advocated the opinion that the defence of India should lie in the
countries beyond its frontiers, and advocated confronting Russia as early as possible,
and before she conquered the Uzbek Khanates; thus it became known as the forward
party or the "Scind school". Exponents of the forward strategy opposed Lord
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Lawrence's approach, that it would be enough to annihilate the Russian army in the
passes of the north-west frontier. Although some observers argued saying that, "no
doubt all this represented a very comfortable philosophy, but, in the event of their not
being defeated, what then?",98 they acknowledged that it would be difficult for the
British to avert the Russian advance if they remained behind the IndusY9 Russia's
Central Asian base, remote in the thirties, became nearer each year until it became
coterminous with Afghanistan:
we have at present to deal, not with a Russia creeping along the lower water
of the Jaxartes, and without a harbour on the eastern coast of the Caspian, but
with a Russia firmly established on the Oxus and Kopet Dagh and possessing
steamers on the Central Asian rivers and a line of railway for more than two
hundred miles in the territories of the Turkomans.10°
As the Russian advance proceeded, both schools of thought, the "inactive" and
the "forward", found it increasingly ominous and were increasingly concerned about
the defence of India. if it was true that "the best defence of India was to keep Russia
at a distance", then growing Russian influence in Central Asia was bound to be
disquieting and to enhance the influence of the forward school.101
Russia's attempts to open up channels of communication with certain Indian
Princes did not concern Wood, Secretary of State for India, when he wrote to
Lawrence that he was not much afraid of the Russians, but that he believed that their
growing proximity might disquiet the countries on India's north western frontier and
"give them a notion that there is a power behind them who might protect them if
stirred".'°2 The Russians well understood the game, and were encouraged to develop
their plans against India by exploiting factors within India itself. As a European power
with deep experience in dealing with Asians, the Russian Government regarded the
British Government in India as alien to its subject peoples from the points of view of
religion, culture, and race. Russian politicians took the view that the Government of
India was able to maintain itself because of the support of the army, but that a great
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part of that was not English and was bound to the Government only by their pay; thus
its relation with the British seemed merely that of mercenaries.'03
After the reduction of Bukhara, which brought under Russian influence also
the tiny mountain states of Shugnan and Darwaz, Russia was now separated by only
200 miles from India. The formation of the Government of Turkestan made Russia de
facto the great power in the region with unrivalled influence over the southern
Bekships of Kitab, Shahri-Sabz, and Karategin, which at any convenient moment
could be annexed, with Russia's instigation and encouragement, either to Bukhara or
Kokand whichever was more suitable to Russia' s long-term ambitions.104
After the subjugation of Khiva in 1873, Russia began a delicate campaign
directed to detach Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan, from his British supporters, a
campaign which indicated that, although Russia had often denied that India was her
goal, nothing short of that prize would in the end satisfy her.'° 5 Following the treaty
signed by Kaufmann and Sayed Rahim, the Khan of Khiva, in 1873, British
politicians could no longer overlook that Russian ambitions were designed to upset
India, and were obliged to learn "by what means she seeks to realise her
ambitions".'°6
The Gobs a leading Russian semi-official journal, published in 1877 an article
stating that, while it was obvious that Russia could not challenge Britain in Europe in
case of war, Russia would be able to mobilize a force of no less than 30,000 men on
the north-western borders of India. 107 Once she controlled Afghanistan, either
politically or militarily, and had achieved conquest of Herat and Kandahar provinces,
Russia would become India's immediate neighbour; from this new position she would
be able to change the balance of power between her and Great Britain, not only in
Asia but in Europe as well. 108 Despite the fact that Herat was the centre of a fierce
Turkoman tribe, the Jamshjdis, Russia would not hesitate to make the necessary
sacrifice as long as Herat "lay astride one of the possible Russian routes for the
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invasion of India, and was therefore strategically sensitive". 9 The fall of Herat
would destroy Britain's position in Afghanistan and would have a negative effect on
the internal tranquillity and security of British India. The Gobs remarked that Russo-
Persian cooperation in the 1840s and 1850s had been regarded as injurious to British
interests and that the magnitude of the danger which it would bring about, was
immense.11°
As we have seen, British public opinion regarding the question of the Russian
threat to India ranged between two extremes. The first was a pacific position that
regarded Russia as a better neighbour than the turbulent tribesmen and "hereditary
brigands" beyond the Indian frontiers and made the assumption that it was needless to
evince any signs of alarm at the advance of Russia towards the Indian frontiers, or at
her rapid subjugation of Central Asia." The second can be characterized as an
alarmist one that saw in Cherniaev's advance, along the Syr Dana, against Kokand in
the 1 860s an action highly threatening to the security of India. The advocates of this
doctrine believed that,
if a duel were to be fought between the Russian bear and the British whale...
Central Asia would be the place where the two must join issue.'12
This was the opinion of Charykov, who was the chief negotiator with the Amir
of Bukhara for extending the railway through his domains; like him, the Russian
Generals who executed military policy in Central Asia saw Turkestan as the forward
bulwark from which Russian forces would invade India. 113 After consolidating their
position in Central Asia, the Russians contemplated seriously the execution of these
intentions. The time seemed exceptionally fit; Sher Ali was not cooperative with
Britain, so that Britain could not take any effective action in Central Asia against
Russia. On 24 March 1878, the Tsar gave a private audience to two of his Generals,
Stoletov and Cherniaev, the two men most prominent and most acquainted with
Central Asian affairs. After this meeting, both left for Central Asia. 114 Clearly, if the
British were to abandon the policy of "masterly inactivity" and detente with Russia,
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and instead seek to counter the Russian advance by adopting the "forward policy",
then close relations with Afghanistan would be of vital importance to them. The
British strategy for meeting an enemy advance towards the north-western frontiers of
India was hitherto based upon pulling the enemy nearer to their line of defence, where
Britain had direct railway communication with the sea, which was considered as a
"proper place to meet the forces which any invading power may precipitate upon
her"."5 The Russians however had studied and designed counter-measures against this
strategy, known as the "backwards policy" which was the military corollary of the
political strategy of inactivity. The adherents of the "forward policy", who believed
that the best defence of India should include the countries beyond her frontiers, held
that it was the needs of Indian security that should shape the British policy towards
Afghanistan both in war and peace. Though there were other factors that influenced
the relations between Britain and Kabul, the most important were the policy of Kabul
towards Russia, and the activity exhibited by Russia in Central Asia, which usually
added to apprehension regarding India's northern frontiers, and led the British where
necessary to contemplate war with Afghanistan." 6 In this situation Afghanistan
found itself inclined to pursue a policy of neutrality, which however put her under
double-sided political and military pressure from both Empires. The old Anglo-
Russian agreement of 1844 in which the Central Asian Khanates were regarded as a
neutral zone, encouraged the Afghans to appreciate the advantages of the policy of
neutrality. 117 But this policy also had its negative aspects. Palmerston's achievement
in the 1 840s, which gave a sense of security to British India, was possible because
Russian authority was not yet secure even in the steppe region, and the Central Asian
states were secure from direct Russian military pressure.' 18 It was the Russian
advance itself which increased the threat to Afghanistan and made the policy of
neutrality more difficult to maintain.
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The security of Afghanistan as the military road to India became one of the
most critical considerations of the Indian government. Observers fathomed the
relationship between Russia's Asian and European policies, and gathered that the
Russian troops stationed on the Amu Dana were the outposts which would be the first
to begin the possible contest for the solution of the Eastern Question." 9 Hence a
stable Afghanistan would not be easy prey to Russia, and would guard India from
involvement in Persian or Central Asian affairs. It was also believed that securing
Afghanistan would require far less troops than what must be required for the defence
of India. Russia, as soon as she approached India, would use all her means to create
discontent and destabilize British India to force England, as mentioned earlier, to
transfer troops from Europe to Asia. Thus the Indian question would have an auxiliary
role in solving the Eastern Question: at all events, the moment Russia became
contiguous to Indian possessions, England must immediately send out an increase of
force to the East Indies. Marvin recorded that General Skobelev admitted to him, in a
personal interview, that Russia should seek to settle the Eastern Question by striking a
blow against England in Asia, and asserted that if England should make Russia "wild"
by stopping her in Europe, "Russia would retaliate by trying to invade India" or at
least disturb her frontiers.'2°
Clarendon explained to Gorchakov that a nearer approach to the Hindu Kush
by the Russians would put Indian opinion in a ferment and thus entail for Britain
much trouble and expense, all of which "would be avoided by a clear understanding
with the Russian Government".' 2 ' It was evidently therefore becoming clear that the
security of India's northwestern frontiers did lie in the countries beyond, and thus for
understanding British policy on the northwestern frontier of India, one must look far
beyond the immediate boundaries of the Empire.' 22 In the 1 860s, the British had
evaluated their military position, with reference to an invasion from beyond India's
north-western frontiers, as unsatisfactory.' 23 The source of Britain's anxiety lay of
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course in the hostile advance of a European rival towards India, "or such a
combination of the heterogeneous elements of combustion as exist in and around her
boundaries..., at the instigation or under the auspices of this power".' A hostile
power, it was estimated, would find around a quarter of a million warriors ready to go
for war or plunder. Great Britain, during the 1850s and the 1860s, made more than
twenty abortive expeditions to restrain these tribes from plunging into India on their
own or under the direction of a foreign power.' Russia it was feared, with her
duplicity and experience in dealing with nomadic tribes, would need little effort to
activate these tribes against India.
Among all these projects General Skobelev's project of 1878 was probably the
most comprehensive and practical. It embodied all previous aims and plans, and was
planned after consolidation of Russia's position in Central Asia and the conquest of
the Turkoman tribes. When the project was completed on 26 January 1877, Skobelev
put his project in full detail in a thirty-page letter to one he considered a confidant
and friend for deliberation; it has been found in Prince Cherkaskii's" papers.'
However even he, in a pragmatic tone, forewarned that the adventure against
England in India was a hazardous one, and might end in the annihilation of the
Russian army. But if the Russians succeeded in demolishing the British Empire in
India, this would have far-reaching repercussions in England itself:
competent people in England are aware that a defeat on the borders of India
would entail social revolution in the metropolitan country... the fall of British
might in India, would mean the beginning of the fall of England.'27
Thus Skobelev, even before the Turkoman campaign in 1877, when he was
Governor of Ferghana, was urging that Russia take advantage of the striking position
she had in her favour in Central Asia, to realize the dream of conquering India; he put
b V. A. Cherkaskii was mainly active in the Polish and Bulgarian affairs. He was
actively involved in publishing and writing in the Russkaia Beseda, and supporter of the
abolition of the serfdom before 1861. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, he was
representative of the Russian Red Cross on the front.
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before his Government an ultimatum saying that he would resign if Central Asia was
not used to influence the Eastern Question and as a leverage to modify Britain's
policy in Europe:
I am all the less in a position to apply for leave to quit this region, because I
firmly believe in its aggressive power as an agent for the solution of the
Eastern question. It has been frequently said that from Central Asia Russia can
threaten the British rule in India, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary
for England at this juncture to check the advance of the Russian troops in
Turkestan. if we look around us, we shall find that our position in Turkestan is
indeed most formidable, and that the apprehensions of the English are not
groundless .'
In Skobelev's view, Russia's efforts in Central Asia were best justified in
connection with her plans against India, and with the effect that her success against
British India would have on Europe, otherwise it was a matter of grave doubt whether
the enormous amount of treasure which had been spent for the conquest of Central
Asia would ever bring a commensurate return. 129 Skobelev, as representative of the
"forward policy" mentality among the Generals, argued that, with such a commanding
position in the hand of Russia, the Eastern question would have a wholly different
aspect. With Russia's present experience, with her troops and with the available
resources under her control in the region, he affirmed that:
there is no Asia capable of preventing us from carrying out the broadest
strategical designs which we might conceive... A knowledge of this region, and
of its resources, leads inevitably to the conclusion that our presence in
Turkestan, in pursuance of Russian interest, is justifiable solely on the ground
of an endeavour to solve the Eastern question in our own favour from this
quarter. Otherwise the hide is not worth the tanning, and all the money sunk in
Turkestan is lost.130
In St. Petersburg, in the Ministry of Foreign affairs, politicians as well, did
think that the Central Asian advance worthwhile in light of Skobelev's ideas, and by
threatening India the Eastern Question could be solved in Russia's favour. These
considerations found its repercussion among English politicians. The British Consul-
General at Tabreez, drew the attention of the British Government to Russia's
increasing activities in Central Asia and the Caspian:
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I consider the augmentation of the Caspian navy in the light of a menace to
Central Asia and British India. It can hardly be doubted but that Russia, having
failed for the present in her designs on the western part of the Turkish Empire,
will devote increasing attention to the affairs of Asia generally... It cannot be
doubted that the true interests of Russia lie rather in the East than in the
West.'31
Further, Abbott analyzed Russia's attempts in the region as part of her strategy
towards Afghanistan, pointing out that the routes from Astrabad into Afghanistan were
the most convenient routes leading from Russia to the same point and then to
India. 132 This strategy may be regarded as reaching its apogee in the Skobelev plans
of 1877-1878. In the next chapter we shall consider how it was to be facilitated by the
construction of the Central Asian military railway, and in chapter eight how it was
further advanced by the expansion of Russian power to the frontiers of Afghanistan.
The Penjdeh affair of 1885 brought Russia and Britain to the brink of war over
Central Asia and the defence of Afghanistan. However, it may be observed that
Skobelev's enterprise, however much it may have influenced the policy of the
Government in St. Petersburg, proved to be over-optimistic, and that the Russian
threat to Afghanistan and India had but little effect upon Russia's position of relative
weakness in Europe and in the Eastern Question during these years.
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Chapter Six
THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY RAILROAD
In the first place, it must be borne in mind
that the railway has been in its execution and
is in its immediate object a military railway.
Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, (1889)
Origins of the Transcaspian railway project
From the beginning of Russian expansion in Central Asia, the troops suffered
most from the lack of a reliable and efficient means of communication and transport;
hence the question of a fast and practical connection with European Russia was
raised by General K. P. Kaufmann, the first governor of Turkestan, as early as 1873,
following the conquest of Khiva.' The Russian Generals in Central Asia as well as
Russian officials in St. Petersburg felt that the subjugation and colonization of Turk-
estan without a modem means of transport would be impossible in both military and
commercial aspects. Apart from the imperatives of military communications, the
development of Turkestan as a trade centre would depend entirely on the
development of railways. This concept found its way to the press: for instance in
March 1873 Gobs commented sharply that "to occupy Turkestan and not to have a
railway for communication with the centre of the State is devoid of sense...". 2 The
Transcaspian military railway system was initially constructed under the pressure of
urgent strategic-military purposes, with vigilant consideration of future conquests,
and it did not offer any non-military service until that main purpose was achieved.
But it subsequently facilitated the immigration of Russian colonists, mainly in the
Transcaspian region. The project remained, after construction, under the control of
the Ministry of War until 1899, when it was transferred to the Ministry of
Communications.3
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The Transcaspian railway, which was considered by contemporary observers
as of the highest strategic importance, was surely even more menacing when
regarded in connection with the Caucasian rail road which joined Batumi on the
Black Sea with Baku on the Caspian. It was menacing for it gave unprecedented
speed to the despatch of troops from the Black Sea region to stations in the farthest
Russian outposts in Asia in front of Herat; and also in reverse it would enable the
Transcaspian armies, if needed, to take part in fighting in Europe.4 When the
construction began it did not disturb the political situation or meet undue objection
either in Europe or in British India, despite the fact that it threw off its temporary
character as a narrow gauge railway very early and had evolved into a wide-gauge
permanent line as early as 1881.
Colonel Glukhovskii, after surveying the region in 1873 following the
conquest of Khiva, reported that the "best direction for a railway in Central Asia
would be from Krasnovodsk to the Amu Dana".6
 He explained that the advantage of
this project was that it would, incidentally, facilitate the transport of all the
production of Central Asia and Afghanistan to Russian markets, but that above all it
would have great potentiality for the transport of troops. 7
 On November 29, 1872 a
Special Committee for the Advancement of Russian Trade and Industry studied the
question of connecting Central Asia by railway with Russia and Europe. The com-
mittee suggested three ways for connecting Turkestan with the rest of the Empire:
first, from Krasnovodsk through Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkand; second,
from Orenburg through the steppe, Syr Dana, to Tashkand; third, from Ekaterinburg
to Tashkand.8
 In 1873 the Committee for the Advancement of Russian Trade and
Industry, studied the subject and suggested that, if capital were short, the project
could be limited to "the construction of a railroad between Krasnovodsk and Khiva,
and goods could then be transported across the Caspian by the Krasnovodsk Railway
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and the Amu Dana".9 This proposition was however unsatisfactory as it was too
limited and disregarded potential connections with India.
At the beginning the Russians had hoped that the Amu Dana river would
solve the problem of communication in this region. This idea had its origins in the
reign of Peter the Great, who in 1713 turned his attention towards the east after the
visit in that year to Russia of a Turkoman chieftain named Hadji Nafiz,a who en-
hanced Peter's fervour with his tales of the wealth and gold of the east. He men-
tioned to the Tsar that the Amu Dana, which then (as now) flowed towards the Aral
Sea, had earlier flowed into the Caspian, but as a result of a dam built by the Khi-
vans,' it had changed its course towards the Aral Sea. Peter at that time could not
of course think of building a railway communication, but he seriously thought of
restoring the river to the original channel along which it had once flowed. He enter-
tained the hope that, if the river ran back into the Caspian Sea, then it would bring
the Caspian into direct contact through this waterway with Khiva arid render its
invasion possible.'° According to Hadji Nafiz, it was to forestall this invasion that
the Khivans had diverted the Amu Dana in the first place."
Later, in the nineteenth century, explorations were made of the old bed of the
Amu Dana, partly with a purely scientific aim, and partly to investigate the pos-
sibility of restoring the river once more into its old channel. These expeditions found
8• Khodja Nefes as Russian historians call him, while Western historians refer to him as
Hodja Nefes.
1)• After inspecting the story of Hadji Nafiz, who is a Turkoman chieftain, I have formed
the impression that this sage came to Russia with a premeditated pian designed to pull the
Russians to fight the Khivans on the Turkoman side. The reason behind this intrigue was the
fact that the Turkoman tribes had been hurt economically by the deviation of the Amu
Dana's course toward the Aral Sea. They lost the main source of water for their agriculture.
Besides, the unfriendly relations between the Turkomans and the Khivans, led the Turko-
mans to assume that the latter intentionally diverted the course of the river by building a
dam just to weaken them; though it is much more likely that it was natural causes with
changed the course of the river. As a result of their state of helplessness in front of the
Khivans, their sapient leaders and rivals, the Turkomans decided to get the Russians
involved in this perplexity on their side.
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that a well-defined bed existed near Uzba, debouching into the Caspian near Krasno-
vodsk; but it was believed that if the dams on the Laudan were removed, the water
would flow along the old bed just for some distance, at most as far as Sary Kamysh,
but would not reach the Caspian.' 2
 This was a setback to Russian pians to solve the
problem of transport and communications by way of the Amu Dana waterway, the
more so because building a railroad was held to be impossible from a financial point
of view. Consequently, military strategists then aspired to utilize the river not by res-
toring it to its old bed, but as it was in its present condition, and suggested the
building of a flotilla in the Aral Sea. The strategists were faced by a number of
predicaments connected with navigation in the delta of that river. Hence,
ships were introduced, but shoals and frequently shifting channels required
small vessels of extremely shallow draft. Moreover, the fact that there was no
outlet closer to European Russia than the land-locked Anal Sea limited their
economic and military use.'3
All these hindrances however promoted further serious thoughts about the construc-
tion of a railway to join Samarkand and Tashkand with Orenburg.
In 1873 General Beznosikov, assistant of the military Governor of Semi-
palatinsk oblast, was assigned the duty of investigating the feasibility of constructing
a railway to Tashkand. He submitted a voluminous report describing the route, and a
detailed map, although his report failed to win any official confidence in Russia at
that time. However, it did most significantly attract the attention of De Lesseps, who
was engaged in grandiose projects such as the Suez Canal and others in America.
Kattar, an assistant to De Lesseps, tried to purchase a copy of Beznosikov's project,
though the latter refused on the basis that the project belonged to the Russian
Government. Kauar turned to Kaufmann for permission to have access to study the
project. Kaufmann, out of enthusiasm and to boost interest in the project, granted
him permission to review it. Having it in hand, Kattar copied all the data. Bez-
nosikov felt that he was mistreated and took the case directly to the Minister of
Transport, Count Baborinskii, who was more indignant even than Beznosikov. He
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asked Kaufmann to return the project promptly to the ministry with an official ex-
planation. The minister published an article announcing that it was Beznosikov's
project not De Lesseps', but also emphasized the point that De Lesseps had offered
his services to execute the railway project.'4
Dissatisfied with the Orenburg route, Beznosikov surveyed an alternative line
from Ufa, the capital of Bashkiria, to Samarkand via Troitsk.' 5
 In 1873 the semi-
official Moscow Gazette advocated the construction of a railway:
At the present time when we are firmly consolidated in the valley of the river
Syr Dana, it becomes clear for us that we cannot remain in a passive state.
We must go on as rapidly as possible, and the aim of our forward movement
is the joining of the Central Asian trade with that of India. This is the arm by
which our conquests in Central Asia will be for ever secured to us. The ex-
isting communication of Tashkand with the interior of Russia at present is
altogether unsatisfactory, and to get out of this difficulty we suppose it
indispensable to join Tashkand with Orenburg by a railway.'6
An attempt to reconcile the British towards Russian railways was made by
stressing that the railway from Orenburg to the Indian borders would curtail the
journey time of British goods from India to Europe to thirteen days.' 7 Meanwhile
different parties in St. Petersburg were debating the advantage of the line. Other
strategists favoured the route across the Ust-Urt desert between the eastern shores of
the Caspian Sea and the western coast of the Aral Sea. The Russo-Turkish war
diverted the attention from the railway project until 1879. By the end of the 1870's,
St. Petersburg already had more than forty different projects to choose from.'8
From the early 1860's Russian military opinion had advocated the
construction of a railway connection with Central Asia, even though initially, for
financial reasons, preparations for it were limited to surveys and topographical
investigations. The military point of view was represented by General Bezak's
opinion propagating and urging the construction of the railway in 1873:
to act offensively only from Orenburg, having in the rear 1,000 versts of
steppe, was absolutely impossible and it was indispensable to join the action
of the Orenburg corps with that of the Siberian troops...'9
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General Bezak's remarks indicated that some of the military wished the
direction of the railway to be from north to south, i.e. from Orenburg to Tashkand.
There were several possible routes being canvassed which all followed this basic
requirement. There were also schemes for a west-east route starting from
Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. And there was in addition the
most grandiose scheme of all, that associated with the name of the great
entrepreneur of means of communication in this era, the French engineer Ferdinand
De Lesseps. As a result of their desperate need for his experience and regardless of
the earlier dispute with Kattar, the Russians contacted De Lesseps, whose hands
were empty for the moment, through M. Cotrad who had been one of the engineers
employed in the Suez Canal project, and also Yanitskii, a Russian engineer and one
of the chief contractors of the Suez Canal. 2° Russian contractors had already shown
cautious interest in the project, but the idea of a Central Asiatic railway made no
great head until foreign competitors came in, the most famous of whom was De
Lesseps; his acceptance of the scheme contributed to its credibility, enhanced
competition, and numerous projects were brought forward by Russian competitors.
The most bold among these was that of Bagdanovich, who proposed the construction
of a railway from Saratov on the Volga river to Guriev at the mouth of the Ural
river, then across the Ust-Urt desert to Khiva, Bukhara, and Samarkand, with a
branch to Tashkand and another to Peshawar.2'
F. de Lesseps wrote in 1873 to the Emperor Alexander II, as well as to
Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, setting out the details of his
project, in which he recommended a railway from Calais to Calcutta, a distance of
7,500 miles, the portion from Orenburg to Samarkand to be laid by Russia, and from
Samarkand to Peshawar by England. 22
 From this recommendation it is obvious that
Mr. de Lesseps was not aware of the fact that Samarkand was already conquered by
Russia and England would not be allowed to build that portion because Russia's
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influence in both Bukhara and Khiva was paramount. Railway lines of course had
already been constructed as far as Orenburg from European Russia on one side, and
to Peshawar from India on the other. Thus De Lesseps became enthusiastic to
complete the link between Orenburg and Peshawar. He suggested, when faced by the
problem that his Russian client, might be deterred by financial considerations, that
the cost of the project could be collected from public subscription, and that the subs-
cribers should form the Grand Central Asiatic Railway Society.23
Ignatiev instantly welcomed the idea. De Lesseps, backed by financial
establishments, began the formation of a group to undertake the preliminary topog-
raphical surveys, and to submit its findings to a committee of experts, who would
study the technical feasibilities of the enterprise and of its projected commercial ad-
vantages. Some Russian officials agreed to the project as suggested by de Lesseps,
despite the fact that it was against Russia's commercial interests in Central Asia to
open the region up to foreign penetration, mainly British, which would frustrate
Russian ambitions to turn it into an internal market, because they counted on the
British rejecting it on the basis that it would open the road toward India. Despite
Russia's enthusiasm and acceptance, the scheme had been secretly rejected in a spe-
cial ministerial council held in 1873 to discuss the contents of M. de Lesseps' letter
to the Emperor.24
 To obtain the consent of the British government, De Lesseps
communicated with Lord Granville, who seems to have regarded the proposition
nonchalantly. De Lesseps indicated to him that he intended to send his son and an-
other engineer to India and Afghanistan to make the preliminary studies for the
project. The Indian Government declined to concur with the project, and when the
French engineers, led by De Lesseps' son Victor, reached the frontier of Afghanistan
they were prohibited from proceeding further, ostensibly because of the difficulties
that might arise in Afghanistan, and returned to Europe. 26
 On the British side, the
project was rejected for reasons both of security and of prestige, but above all out of
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consideration of the formidable danger that would spring up from the consolidation
of Russian supremacy as far south in Afghanistan as Kandahar. Lord Curzon later
revealed the British attitude when he alluded to these concerns:
I devoutly hope that not one of the three [Downing Street, the House of
Commons, and the British people] would for a moment entertain an idea so
speculative in its inception, so problematical in its issues, so perilous in the
lateral contingencies to which it might give birth.27
It was obvious that, by agreeing to the project, England would connect her rich In-
dian domains with the limited and Russian dominated market of Central Asia. In line
with the increasing Russian military might and economic control in Central Asia, the
trade of the region with England declined under the prohibitive tariffs imposed on
European, mostly British, goods imported into Central Asia, 28
 while by agreeing to
the railway, "England would find that she had stupidly handed over the keys of her
commercial monopoly [in India] to her only formidable rival".29
Owing to British lack of enthusiasm for it, the scheme lost support and
shortly afterwards de Lesseps turned his ambitions towards the Panama Canal.3°
Subsequently the Central Asian Railroad project was shelved because of the Near
Eastern crisis of 1875-78. But an Imperial decree for the construction of a railway
from Mikhailovskii gulf on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to Kizyl Arvat was
issued in 1880. Under the imperative of the urgency that surrounded the project, all
its material was to be freed from tariffs and custom duties, especially that part of the
rail which was ordered from the De Cauville Company in France. This part was not
primarily for use in the construction of the railway, but to be used as a pattern for
Maltsev's Company, the Russian manufacturer, who would produce more than three-
quarters of the needed rails.3'
Military imperatives and the building of the railway
Despite some interruptions caused by the revolt in Kokand in 1875 and the
Russo-Turkish war of 1877, the Central Asian region witnessed during the 1870s
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increasing Russian activities aimed at subjugating the Turkomans. For military
reasons connected with the new battle-field in the Turkoman country, the Russian
Government was pressed by its Generals to implement the project, primarily for
military purposes, and regardless of any economic considerations, to assist the forces
operating against the Turkomans of Akhal-Tekke and to clear the way to Merv, the
Turkomans' stronghold. Russia had foreseen the enormous advantages that would
result from the annexation of Merv. This rich oasis with its strategic location would
secure Russia's acquisitions in Central Asia, i.e. the Uzbek Khanates and the
Turkoman tribes, from any undesired influence that might be instigated by the
example of Afghanistan on the one hand, and on the other the conquest of this rich
oasis would facilitate the stationing of a large Russian army and give Russia
absolute control over the whole region both politically and commercially.
Russian Government was not interested in developing the mineral and natural
resources of Turkmeniia, since it did not want to attract the attention and jealousy of
other European rivals, and, according to Grulev, was similarly uninterested in
developing the wealth of Turkmeniia in so far as it looked at the region primarily
from a strategic point of view. He wrote:
Turkestanskii Krai (Turkestan Province) is one of the most precious pearls in
the crown of the Russian monarchs. Its importance comes from its location in
Central Asia, and from the fact that it could be used as a base for advance
against India. And this point of view was not confined to theory and
judgment, but without hesitation implemented in practical life.32
If Russia's main purpose in the region had been economic, that would undoubtedly
press her towards establishing communication with the richer parts of her
acquisitions, such as Kokand, which supplied Russian industry with cotton, and
desperately needed better roads. However a railway was built in this region not
because of economic demand, but when strategic necessity dictated it.33
Despite Russia's well known interest in a Central Asian railway, the Trans-
caspian military line actually came as a surprise, for foreign observers and for the
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Russians who were concerned with the scheme, from the point of view of its execu-
tion, destination, and timing. All previous schemes which Russia had received from
foreign and Russian contractors were intended to connect Orenburg with Turkestan,
i.e. from the north to the south, with the purpose of connecting the Empire with its
most populous region in Central Asia, and there had been ambitious encouragement
from the Governors-General of Orenburg and Turkestan to develop a commercial
railway. Nevertheless it was evidently the needs of military strategy that lay
behind the remarkable alteration of the enterprise, and resulted, regardless of all
projects that suggested a railway from Orenburg to Tashkand, in developing the line
from Mikhaiovsk on the Caspian Sea in the west, heading eastward across that arid
desert that had witnessed the disastrous retreat of the Russian army only a few years
ago. The urgency of the renewed military operations in the area could not tolerate
postponement until the construction of a permanent railway, so it was decided to
build a light, narrow-gauge line to supply the advancing army as soon as possible.
Only later did this light railway became the prototype of a permanent rail system.
The Generals were the most fervent supporters for the realization of the
railway for military purposes. General Kaufmann had been advocating a rail road
from Orenburg to Tashkand (north-south) since the mid-1870's, but he met no
success in his endeavours to convince his superiors in St. Petersburg. 35
 The ill-fated
expeditions of Lomakin in 1878 and 1879 against the Turkomans, and their retreat
across the desert, prepared the way for accepting the new project (west-east) and
convinced St. Petersburg of its necessity for achieving the subjugation of the region.
Despite her financial difficulties, Russia was compelled to accept the enterprise:
in Akhal the Russian troops were fiercely resisted, as a result they were
obliged to retreat. One of the main reasons of the failure of the Akhal
campaign in 1879 was the lack of modern means of transport and com-
munication. Thus the Tsarist Government decided to build a railway simul-
taneously during the next expedition against the Turkomans.36
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The recent expeditions, though adequately prepared and equipped against the Turko-
mans had resulted in the annexation of only 45 versts, from Chat to Duz-olum. Thus
three years (1877-79) of reconnoitring and raiding the Akhal-Tekke oasis had
resulted in no tangible outcome, despite the engagement of a large number of soldi-
ers;37 this fact encouraged the idea of reconsidering methods to overcome these
impediments, and to furnish the troops with suitable and efficient means of transport.
The bitter Russian defeat in August 1879 at Geok-Teppe promoted a four-year and
40,000,000-rouble railway plan. 38 As Curzon later observed, it was while
General Lomakin was prosecuting his series of ill-adventured expeditions
against the Akhal Tekkes that mention was first made of a Trans-Caspian
Railway (his successor, General Tergukasov laying stress upon the idea in a
report upon the unsuccessful campaign of that year, and upon the proper
means by which to subjugate the Akhal Oasis); and in 1880, after Skobelev
had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, in order to retrieve the Russian
laurels, that the work was actually taken in hand.39
The defeat of Lomakin at the gates of Geok-Teppe proved to Russia that the
subjugation of the Turkomans was more difficult than had been thought, and this
became the major factor for enhancing and inspiring the railway project and
prepared St. Petersburg for accepting fmancial sacrifices. As a contemporary
observer put it,
the disaster at Geok Teppe shook the power of Russia in Central Asia, and
rendered a campaign of revenge unavoidable. The principal difficulty of the
second expedition consisted in the extreme scarcity east of the Caspian of
transport animals, to convey the stores of the army across the band of desert
lying between the coast and the oasis of Akhal.4°
Previously the only means of military transport in Central Asia had been
camels, and the main difficulty in all Central Asian campaigns had been the huge
loss of those animals during battles. The Trans-Caspian armies had 12,273 of these
animals at their disposal, positioned in different locations, though only half of them
had saddles. Supplying forage, and caring for them was another major logistic
problem, for each group of 6-8 camels required a camel driver. By the end of
Lomakin's campaign in 1879, only 350 animals remained, and the Russians found
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themselves obliged to buy, hire, or frequently confiscate a great number of them
from the local tribes.4 ' Russia had attempted unsuccessfully to reach an agreement
with the Atrek Turkomans, according to which the Turkomans would provide an
adequate supply of camels for Russia's needs, but the tribes showed no enthusiasm
for cooperation, and the Russians thereupon forcibly confiscated their animals.42
Russia therefore found itself in the position of adopting the very practice which had
been her main justification throughout her drive against the Central Asians, i.e.
conducting similar acts of pillage and robbery to those of which it accused the
tribesmen; this necessarily damaged its image as a European country striving to
protect its borders against plunder and claiming the right to "civilize" them. Skobe-
1ev was therefore granted permission to select a suitable means of transportation
which would assist the conquest of the Turkomans.
Immediately after his appointment General Skobelev exhausted every possible
way to secure all necessities for a renewed advance against the Tekke Turkomans.
Before leaving St. Petersburg to assume his new post as Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian army, he invited a Russian merchant, Vasiii Efimovich Miakinkov, in
March 1880 and negotiated with him the possibility of supplying 6,000 camels to be
available for work on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Miakinkov refused the idea
of lending the animals and suggested instead selling the camels to the Government at
a reasonable price of 110 roubles each. Negotiations with Miakinkov were conducted
in complete secrecy, to the extent that Miakinkov himself did not know why this
huge number of animals was needed. Miakinkov pledged to deliver the camels at
Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga river.43
 This offer was not favoured by
Skobelev but he did not refuse it as there was a desperate need for means of trans-
portation. Meanwhile Skobelev was conducting another round of negotiations with
A. E. Gromov, a Russian camel dealer from Tashkand. Gromov proposed the loan of
5,000 camels as a better deal, accompanied by 1,000 camel drivers, to be delivered
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at Krasnovodsk, which was much nearer to the field of operations than Astrakhan.
General Skobelev received offers from several other dealers, and the result was that
the Russian Government had secured the availability of 18,000 - 20,000 camels.
Even so, in spite of all these efforts there were also parallel attempts directed
towards the construction of a light railway from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat.
In January 1880 an Imperial command was issued for the construction of a
railroad from Mikhailovskii gulf to Kizyl Arvat, a distance of nearly 100 versts,
from materials to be supplied by the Maltsev and De Cauville Companies. The need
and urgency for the railway induced the Government on March 29 to free the
material for this project from the routine of import duties.45
The initial railroad project had thus been decided upon, despite Russian
apprehension that it would be vulnerable as it was located very near to the Persian
borders, and that British agents were already teaching the Turkomans how to destroy
it. The construction of the railroad was still opposed by the Governor-General of
Orenburg, Kryzhanovskii, as he assumed that the project would divert attention from
Orenburg provice, and consequently diminish the importance of his administra-
tion.47
 Many others opposed the project for security reasons connected with the
location of the railroad and the possibility of triggering war with England, while
Russia was as yet incapable of securing the traffic on the line by an advance towards
Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan.48
In addition to his immediate efforts to secure an adequate supply of camels,
Skobelev also decided also to operate a light railway starting from his headquarters
in Chikishlar, the southern-most Russian fort on the Caspian Sea, to the Akhal oasis
along the river Atrek. For reasons connected with the fact that the line would be
very near to Persia, and also for difficulties related to navigation in the shallow
waters of Chikishlar, he shifted his attention to Krasnovodsk in the north. In this
stage an American investor, Berry, became interested in the project and offered the
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construction of a line from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat, and pledged to accomplish it
by September 1, 1880 if the contract could be signed by February 18 the same
year.49
 The American offer was rejected because of financial and technical conditions
which the Russians considered unacceptable: Berry proposed to St. Petersburg to
exclude Russian engineers from taking part in the construction of the project, and he
wanted to begin the enterprise from Mikhailovsk 5° rather than Krasnovodsk which
was preferred by the Russian Government, although the nature of the land between
Krasnovodsk and Mikhailovsk discouraged contractors to start from Krasnovodsk.
He proposed that the rails and sleepers would come from used materials to be
shipped from the western States of America, and for the purpose of transportation of
the material across the Caspian, he asked the Russian Government to supply him
with fourteen steam ships.51
 Russia, in the light of an earlier unsuccessful
enterprise, where in European Russia the Americans had built a line for the transport
of grain, rejected Berry's offer. Instead they ordered the rails and other materials
from England, Belgium, and Germany, a deal that led to the skyrocketing of metal
prices in Europe. Two locomotives and 500 wagons were ordered from foreign
companies, while Maltsev signed a contract to build 100 wagons. The main reason
for ordering locomotives and wagons abroad, was explained by the fact that the cost
of these machines in France or any other European country, plus the costs of their
transport to the Caspian, would still be cheaper than building them in Russia. They
would also be more reliable and modern. 52
 It is very clear that the superiority of
West European technology as well as expertise was recognized by the Russians, and
that it contributed largely to the quick and successful inauguration of the railway.
The Russian Government however decided to start the project immediately
with its available resources, and the supervision of the construction was given to
General Annenkov, the controller of the Russian Military Transport. Studying the
project Annenkov decided to use 100 miles of steel rails purchased in 1878 for use
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in military purposes in the Balkans in the event of the collapse of Berlin Congress,
since when they had lain idly in European Russia. 53
 For the construction works the
Government formed in 1880 a railway battalion, which in 1884 became known as
the First Trans-Caspian Railway Battalion. 54
 The Government strove to press
forward with work on the line, for the slightest delay would threaten the army's
supply, weaken its performance, and possibly adversely affect Russia's political
interests in Turkestan and Central Asia in general; above all Russia could not risk
another defeat to be inflicted on her army by the Turkomans.55
While Skobelev was preparing his expedition against the Tekke-Turkomans,
the first rails of the line were laid in October 1880. Annenkov pressed ahead with
laying a narrow-gauge track from Fort Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat.56 The line was
not however to be operated by steam, but by horses and camels throughout its first
two hundred and thirty kilometrs. For this purpose General Petrosevich was
authorized to buy 1,000 Kirghiz horses from Mangishlak.57
Skobelev, who was of course well acquainted with the political dimension of
the issue of the Anglo-Russian rivahy in Asia, and therefore understood the
advantages of a permanent heavy gauge line, decided to pursue the annexation of the
oasis to prepare the way for the building of a permanent railway. Progress at first
was extremely slow owing to the resistance and raids of the Turkomans. In January
1881 Geok Teppe was carried by storm. Directly after this victory, the narrow gauge
line was abandoned and work on the permanent wide-gauge line was resumed,
supported by the use of the existing narrow-gauge line. In December 1881 the broad
gauge line reached Kizyl Arvat and the first locomotive steamed there.58 The local
Russian authorities, urged on not only by military imperatives, but also by pressure
from St. Petersburg to push the work forward, took the line as far as Askabad in
November 1885; Mery
 was reached in 1886. The railroad crossed the desert of Kara
Kum and connected Charjui in 1886. Two years later, in 1888, the rail road reached
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Samarkand. In 1894 a line was finally built from Mikhailovsk to Krasnovodsk. The
annual budget of the line reached 12,240,000 roubles in 1885, a fact that
demonstrates the importance of the line, while the Russian Government by then
relied upon it to secure its presence, and for the success of its contest with England
in the region.59
The Russian Government realized that it would be impossible to counter
British influence without a railway which would give her unrivalled control over
Central Asia. The railway was accomplished in two stages; the first was mainly
military from the beginning of the scheme until it reached Askabad in 1885, while
the second stage witnessed the continuation of dominating strategic ambitions along-
side some economic factors.6° During the second stage the line connected Bukhara
and Samarkand, and reached Merv, and was pushed to Kushk on the Afghan
frontier. Russia willingly accepted the costs of the line which reached 51 million
rubles.61
 The extension of the line to Mery
 and Kushk was worthless from an
economic point of view, but from a strategic point of view the railway terminus
brought Russia within fifty three miles of Herat,
and so placed the dominions of the Amir of Afghanistan within easy reach of
a Russian army. The intention of Russia in this repect may be gathered from
the fact that at the present terminus piles of rails are lying stored idle as if
only waiting till the command to extend the line should be given.62
This branch of the railway, i.e. from Mery
 to Kushk, was not intended for
any other purpose other than connecting the Russian line with the Afghan frontier,
thus enabling the next phase of Russian expansion, the expected move against Herat,
to be prepared. In the long run the line could be extended to connect with the rail
network of British India and provide a Russian outlet to south-east Persia and the
Arabian Sea.63
The Central Asian Railway, despite the advocacy and the support it had
received, was not without opponents. As its advocates and defenders were mostly
Generals - it is doubted that any other voice will be heard in a society where anyone
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who is not an official is no one - its most important opponents were Generals too.
Apart from voices that protested against the development of Turkestan, there were
others who criticized the railroad on the argument that the first sand storm would
bury the line. The most influential figure against the Trans-Caspian railway was
General Cherniaev, the conqueror of Turkestan; he was the organizer of the first
system of communications in the region, on the pattern of Russia's mainland post
roads to connect the newly conquered towns of Aulie-Ata and Chimkend in 1864
and to connect them with Orenburg and Semirechie.M Later, in 1882, as Governor-
General of Central Asia, Cherniaev called for a more northerly approach, i.e. from
Orenburg, to Tashkand and advocated a railway that connected Khiva with Kizyl
Arvat and the Caspian Sea. From Khiva he considered the Amu-Daria river would
be a convenient waterway to connect Bukhara with the system. 65 It appears that the
partisans of this point of view were preoccupied by the development of Turkestan
and Central Asia as a market for Russian merchandise and a source of raw material
for the Russian industry. Their ideas were largely discounted precisely because they
were motivated by economic incentives and seemed to be unaware of the long-term
strategic purposes of the railway.
According to Lord Curzon, General Cherniaev wrote a series of articles to
prove its futility. Irritated by his failure and the jealousy of the success of his
colleagues, Kaufmann and Skobelev, he exploded his annoyance in a letter to Novoe
Vremia in the summer of 1886, in which as Curzon later put it "he threw a parting
douche of very cold water upon General Annenkov's scheme, and declared his own
preference for a line from Saratov on the Volga to Kungrad on the Amu Dana
between Khiva and the Aral Sea". Cherniaev's approach was essentially for a
commercial road and showed little awareness of the strategic purpose of the line
which was extending vigorously southward. This suggests once more the degree of
secrecy that wrapped the real intention of the project. He was not informed that his
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proposed project would consolidate Russia's influence only in Central Asia, and that
a railway from Mikhailovskii gulf or from Kizyl Arvat to Khiva or the Amu, "would
possess little of the political and military importance accruing to a line from Kizyl
Arvat to Herat". Cherniaev's proposal was considered as merely commercial and not
by any means serving Russia's long-term strategy in Afghanistan and IndiaP 7 His
previous stature as a major influence on Central Asian policy had been much
diminished; thus his opposition had no weight.
The Amir of Bukhara, not surprisingly, was among the opponents of
extending the line to his country. N. V. Charykov was commissioned to go to
Bukhara to convince him of the usefulness of the railway, and to assure him of
Russia's commitment not to interfere in Bukhara's internal affairs and that the
railway would facilitate Russia's defence of Bukhara against Kabul. Finally Amir
Muzaffar agreed to Russia's demands and pledged to cede without charge public
land and even Waqf C to be used for the line. He promised assistance in hiring
workmen as well. 68 Charykov's mission was concluded with remarkable success,
and an agreement was signed between the Kush-begi of Bukhara and Charykov on
June 18, 1885 which cleared the road for extending the line without impediments to
Samarkand, Khojand, and Tashkand.69
The construction of the Transcaspian railroad was finished in an extremely
short period, considering the difficult natural circumstances and hostile population.
The main reason behind those achievements was the fact that the workers were
mostly soldiers and the engineers were military officers.7° It is highly significant
that
supervision of the construction was given to General Annenkov and a staff of
military engineers. General Annenkov followed the progress of the const-
ruction by living with his staff in a special two-storeyed carriage containing
C• Waqf are the land or any immovable property registered for religious endowment. The
revenue of these lands usually used to sustain religious establishments, clergymen, religious
schools, orphans, and others.
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all the required technical equipment, which was hauled to the sector under
construction.71
The consequences of the Central Asian Railway
Kizyl Arvat remained the terminus until March 30, 1885, the year that wit-
nessed the dangerous confrontation between Komarov's troops and the Afghan army
at Penjdeh and Kushk, an incident that nearly led to war between Great Britain and
Russia, unmasked the ultimate purpose of the railroad, and revealed its true nature as
a military arm in the rivalry of the European powers in Asia. After the annexation of
Mery
 in March 1884, Britain feared the approach of Russian troops towards the ill-
defended Afghan borders and suggested the delimitation of these boundaries. The
Russian government agreed officially, while her troops were still advancing, until
they clashed with the Afghan army at Penjdeh in March 1885. This incident revived
all the old British suspicions of Russia's double-sided policy, and her intentions for
invading India. The peaceful resolution of the Penjdeh affair was indeed only a
temporary breathing space, for Russia subsequently extended the railway into
Penjdeh and up to Kushk; the first train arrived there in 1898, thus puuing Herat at
the mercy of the Russian army. As a result of the extension of the line to Kushk,
Britain and British India had, as Curzon said, to prepare "themselves for a Russian
occupation of Herat... as the next forward move of Russia in the Central Asian
game".72
 The British government had in 1885 "asked the parliament for war credits;
the viceroy Lord Dufferin, prepared to move twenty-five thousand troops to Quetta;
and the navy was ordered to occupy Port Hamilton in Korea, from which operations
against Viadyvostok could be mounted". 73
 Clearly the British regarded the Russian
advance southwards as menacing, and tending inexorably towards the occupation of
Herat. Therefore the British policy of "masterly inactivity" in the region had to be
revised to match Russia's apprehended aggression. It had previously been suggested
that a railway should be built from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf through
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Asia Minor and the Euphrates valley, and thence onwards through Baluchistan to
India.74 The Euphrates valley railway, as viewed by contemporary observers,
would shorten the distance by about 1 ,000 miles,' and reduce the journey by
several days... The connection of Candahar with the Mediterranean, opposite
Cyprus, by a railway, would be a matter of the highest strategical
importance.75
This project would neutralize the Transcaspian Military railway by giving Britain the
same military advantage in defending India's northern borders. Understandably
Russia sought to impede Britain's plans to build a railway via Asia Minor to the
Persian Gulf and finally to India, which would revive the ports of that gulf, and
would eventually shorten the journey from Europe to India by thirteen days. Russian
policy preferred linking the Indian system with the Russian, to divert European com-
munication with British India to pass through Russian territory without risking a
conflict with Britain. The Russian strategists endeavoured to make Russia the link
between Europe with its five hundred million population and India with its richness.
When Russia eventually would be connected with India by a modern railway line,
her influence would be unlimited and she would have the option to influence,
intrigue, or ultimately invade India militarily.76
As we have seen, the local, military railway from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl
Arvat, turned into a strategic scheme in the heart of Asia although, instead of
connecting the Central Asian trade centres of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkand
with the north, as had been projected in the 1860s and 1870s, those cities became
connected from the south and the west in accordance with strategic necessities. The
physical landscape was encouraging, the only obstacle being the building of some
bridges over the Zeravshan and the Syr Dana, but the Russians were not likely to be
discouraged by a gap of 200 miles from linking together their two bases of opera-
d the journey here is compared with the maritime route via the Suez Canal.
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tions, Turkestan and Orenburg on the one hand and the Transcaspian military okrug
on the other "whose firm grip may one day be required to draw the teeth of England
in Central Asia".77
As was rightly expected, a relatively short extension of this rail road from
Samarkand to Tashkand, a distance of only 200 miles, would enable Russia to bring
Siberian troops to operate together with the Transcaspian armies at the southern-most
point of Russia's Central Asian acquisitions in a remarkably short time in case of
any conflict with England. On the other hand, for the security of her dominions,
Russia relied on the railroad to secure her grip in controlling the subjugated popula-
tion, and prevent the spread of national feeling from neighbouring countries, notably
Afghanistan. Events in Afghanistan, which followed the defeat of the British General
Berrow in 1879, strongly awakened the population of the area and stirred a wave of
national feeling that spread to the upper Amu Dana and threatened to engulf the
Russian-dominated Khanates; at the same time, from the Russian point of view, they
might be exploited by the British as a suitable pretence to justify the despatch of
British troops to Herat by way of retaliation. This would have a negative con-
sequence for Russia not only in Central Asia, but everywhere where Russia had
interests. The Russians considered that the control of Herat by Britain, without a
counter-weight on their side, would revive the dormant aspirations of the tribes of
the Khanates, which had lost their independence as a result of Russian military
might. Very little effort would be needed to bring the chaos which had begun around
Herat to the upper Syr Dana and the Amu Dana regions. In such a case, with the
help of the railway, Russia would be able to deploy the necessary force, maintain
order and prevent any communication with the mutinous population of Herat.78
After the striking success of constructing the railway line, and overcoming
natural impediments, such as drought, the character of the desert sand, and the scar-
city of water, General Annenkov was determined to expand the project. 79
 He urged
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the extension of the railway southward to Herat and even suggested an intersection
with the Indian system at Quetta.8°
Despite the fact that General Annenkov, the railway engineer, in an interview
with Charles Marvin, in February 1882, after the campaign against the Tekkes, had
denied the idea of extending the line beyond Kizyl Arvat, the primary target of the
military railroad, it is noteworthy that he was active in St. Petersburg early in 1885,
to gain support for further extension for the project, and these activities were accom-
panied by reconnaissance efforts led by Alikhanov and Lessar, two Russian
lieutenants celebrated for their daring studies of southern lands, apparently Mer y
 and
Herat. Skobelev affirmed Annenkov's denial and he himself denounced any intention
towards its extension to Askabad. The manoeuvres of Skobelev as well as Annenkov
were in harmony with Russia's traditional policies of expansion, "tending to prepare
for war in times of peace, and to realize her plans at a suitable and fitting time".8'
Such evasion and ambiguity was usually designed to quieten the scepticism of Great
Britain. Grodekov in 1883 observed that General Skobelev was the most ardent sup-
porter of the railway extension from the beginning of its existence, and advocated
the continuation of the railroad to Askabad and the Amu Dana, for the purpose of
joining Samarkand with St. Petersburg. He believed that this would be the cheapest
and most efficient way to perpetuate Russia's control over Turkestan and to attach it
to the rest of the Empire. He proposed the popularization of the enterprise for the
purpose of compensating Russia's enormous expenditure. Skobelev put the
responsibility on the government to secure the development and utilization of the
railroad to raise the greatest possible revenue.82
Yet another Russian official, Serebriakov, had mentioned to Marvin in 1882
Russia's desire to extend the railway to Herat from both sides, i.e. from Sibe to
Herat and from Askabad to the same, emphasizing at the same time that Russia had
no desire to fight England. Marvin commented on Serebriakov's ideas that the very
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existence of such a railway must excite alarm. When it was finished, it would
inevitably contribute to anxieties that Russia would then be in a position to invade
India, rather than merely encouraging trade: Marvin argued that the existence of the
railway network in Turkestan had promoted alarm, not allayed it. Serebriakov was
able to answer Marvin that England would be able to rip the railway to pieces in
case of war and prevent the invasion. 83 Since the last thing the British wanted was
a war with Russia over Central Asia, this was hardly encouraging.
Clear as it was, however, the Russian officials did not admit the military-
strategic character of the railway. They were rather inclined to stress its commercial
objectives, despite the fact that this was not, as we have seen, the primary objective
of Skobelev's enterprise. In June 1885 the Tsar instructed Annenkov to continue the
line to the Afghan peripheries. A second battalion of selected men was sent from
Moscow. It arrived at Kizyl Arvat on July 3, 1885 and resumed the task on July 13.
It cannot be mistaken that an obvious tendency of rivalry in building railways was
sparked by the fear and suspicion that dominated the relations of both Empires in
that region; while the Russians were incessantly advancing forward their railway, the
British were constantly engaged upon the analogous railway of Hurnai and Bolan in
Baluchistan.84 Russian propaganda did not change; it took the usual line to justify
expansion, and repeatedly insisted that there was no intention to proceed further; a
position not accepted even by the friends of Russia:
From Kizyl Arvat to Askabad is 135 miles, and from thence to Sarakhs
an additional 186 miles, beyond which it is only 200 miles of easy country to
Herat ... The railway, however, is needed for nothing but strategical purposes,
and need not be considered at present if Russia is content to remain at Merv.
There she has abundant scope for what she considers her mission of civiliz-
ation.85
Lord Curzon (emphatically not a friend of Russia) was very sensitive to the
role of the military railway in the whole process of Russian expansion, as he
explained after his visit to the Transcaspian railway in September and October 1888:
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General Annenkov's railway has laughed alike at river and at sands, has
passed the impassable, and has linked together and consolidated the earlier
and the later conquest, welding east and west into a single Central Asian
Empire. ...Panic stricken before, Bukhara is impotent now, having signed
away her last expiring chance of freedom when the first rails started from the
Oxus bank.86
Thus the narrow gauge railroad, which was once intended to facilitate the
subjugation of the Tekke Turkomans, turned after that campaign into the precursor
of a much larger scheme of augmentation and acquisition, an imperial policy of
wholesale expansion.
The commercial consequence was that products from Central Asia began to
be imported in greater quantities to European markets, and dealers from countries
other than Russia, such as France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, came to buy carpets
and luxury commodities such as silk and embroideries, attractive to European
consumers. The railway also opened up the local Central Asian market to the impact
of European goods, such as porcelain, lamps, glasses, mirrors, brushes, writing
materials, coffee, and preserves. As well as these useful commodities there appeared
others, unwelcome to local tradition, such as cards, cigars, alcoholic drinks, against
the sale of which the Bukharan government strove unsuccessfully; but later secured a
degree of regulation by agreement with the railway authorities.87
The railway, in addition to the consolidation of the Russian presence, turned
Central Asia to a state of complete dependency on Russia, and expedited the spread
of the Russian settlements and dramatically increased their population (this process
will be considered in the next chapter). Politically speaking, the railway curtailed the
autonomy of the Khanates and limited their authority even in their internal affairs,
and on the international arena the railway beyond doubt improved Russia's power in
Asia. Locally, despite temporary limitations connected with the shipment of goods
across the Caspian, which often took more than three months to reach Turkestan
from European Russia, the railway had already brought about an extraordinary
change in the life of the Khanates. It connected the Khanates directly to Europe in
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all spheres of life after long isolation: of course the primary European influences
were Russian.
We have seen that Russia's efforts were directed, however, not towards the
economic and commercial development of Central Asia, as frequently asserted by
Imperial officials, but towards obtaining military-strategical prominence in that
region, and far beyond its confines as well. The later history of the Transcaspian
Railway confirmed this postulation. Russia extended the line to Samarkand,
Marghilan, and Namangan not for any purpose other than establishing a position
from which to menace Afghanistan and India. A Russian observer in 1909
commented that Russia's expenditures, the size of her armies, and political plans
were not designed to promote her economic gains, but were directed towards
achieving political and strategical gains:
We conquered Turkestan but we did not pay attention to this miraculous land,
which was brought to us by divine Providence, we overlooked it, searching
for further acquisitions in a foggy distance.88
Besides stabilizing Russia's control in the region, the railway put the
economy of Central Asia in total dependency on Russia's economy. It brought to the
region a new industry connected with maintaining locomotives and wagons as well
as the rails themselves. As long as the line was detached from Russia's network, the
refurbishing plant had to be local. Kizyl Arvat was chosen to be the base for
military, commercial, and geographic considerations. But the Russians did not
employ the indigenous population in this industrial enterprise. 89
 Until the
construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, the Central Asian railroad had no rival in
its continental prominence, the main purpose of its initial construction was purely
military, but its later economic importance and cultural consequences should not be
overlooked. After the shift of the economic centres of activity in the age of western
Europe's maritime discoveries, events undoubtedly contributed to the isolation of
Central Asia; this rail road however came to revive and connect the region with
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Europe, and opened the door to further economic development; it gave Russia an
unequivocal hold over Central Asia both militarily and economically.
However Russia fell short of convincing Great Britain to connect her Indian
railway network with the Transcaspian railway. This predictable British refusal
deprived Russia of the chance of becoming the centre of communication and trade
between Europe and British India. After the southward extension of the line to
Kushk, Russia found herself obliged by British resistance to postpone plans for
further southward movement. Her long-term goals of establishing her influence in
the Indian sub-continent and her ambitions of having an outlet to warm seas, of
securing the opportunity to interrupt Britain's communication with India, and
spreading her influence in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, all of these had for
the time being to be postponed.
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Chapter Seven
IMMIGRATION AND RUSSIFICATION
Russian settlement in Central Asia: the military phase
The history of Russia's immigration into the Central Asian region is closely
connected with the history of her military and political expansion. The dense
population in western and central Russia could not expand any further at the expense
of her western neighbours or settle in their lands, since those dynamic nations were
already developing their lands, and becoming formidable rivals to the Russians, who
were unable as well as unwilling to ignite war with such powerful neighbours. Rus-
sia had earlier made spectacular gains in this direction, as a speaker in the British
parliament remarked in 1836:
on the north Russia came within thirty miles of the west coast of Norway, a
coast abounding with secure natural harbours, which were never frozen... The
ground within seventy miles of Stockholm was Russian; Warsaw was hers -
she approached with 100 miles of Dresden. She had crossed the Danube, and
possessed Kalisch, which was nearer to Paris than to Moscow.'
But thereafter these opportunities were exhausted in the west, Russian policy
concluded that there was neither free land nor room for military expansion and
annexation there, and so Russia turned to the east. 2
 In the east she found vast
territories without strong rivals, and in some instances the Russians were even wel-
comed as essential working hands. Russian individuals in their search for empty land
were uniquely motivated to looking
forward to attaining the luxuries and enjoyments denied them in their own
country, but which they knew were to be procured elsewhere. The Govern -
ment of Russia encouraged that feeling. All their policy and arrangements
were directed with that view.3
The Russian bureaucratic system served this aspiration and was famous in
this respect, encouraging foreign service and the spirit of adventure in a country
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where there were no careers open to any man but those connected with the State,
and it was characteristic for Russia's foreign service that "the moment a soldier left
the country on foreign service he received four times his ordinary pay".4
Eastward, the Slays reached the Volga basin and settled in Kazan and Astra-
khan as early as the sixteenth century. The next wave reached the Urals by the end
of the century, inaugurating the settlement of Siberia. Wherever the Sla ys settled
they were known as ploughmen and wheat-growers.5 Like no other great migration,
the settlement of Russian civilians in Siberia was followed by the Russian armies,
not preceded by them. Throughout the history of Russia's expansion eastward,
before the 19th century, it would be hard to find in Asia any land that had been
conquered by her armies before it was penetrated either by merchants, or by migrant
peasants.
At the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, this well established
pattern of extension began to change, and civilian settlement began to accompany
military expansion. 6 Russia resumed her expansion in the steppe, where fifteen
fortifications were erected to the south of Orenburg following 1835. These forts were
of mixed nature: on the one hand they were military (Cossack) posts, and on the
other they included a civilian element, mostly the families of the Cossacks. 7 The
Cossack communities (usually called Cossack hosts) were ethnically mixed. They
formed regiments of irregular cavalry in the Russian army, and were defenders as
well as colonizers of the borderlands. The main difference between the regular army
regiment and the Cossack regiment is that the latter regiment included not only the
combat personnel but all their dependents as well. This made them Russia's most
effective arm not only for occupation but also for colonization. Russia's posts, south
of Orenburg, were ostensibly intended to protect the south-eastern peripheries of
Orenburg and to check the Khivan and Kokandian influence among the Kirghiz and
Kazakh population.8 Actually they were not as defensive as they seemed, but mostly
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they were of an offensive character that would aid Russian penetration further into
the steppe, at a time when Russia had no demarcated borders there and her fluid
boundaries incessantly moved forward at the expense of her neighbours. The direct
benefit derived from the existence of these fortifications was basically to familiarize
the nomads with the Russian presence, and to reinforce Russian hegemony and in-
fluence over the nomads through dealing with them and asserting protection over
them.
Attention was directed, of course, to establish new forts to be advantageous
from military as well as commercial considerations. llitsk and Ak Mola were
implanted in the heart of the steppe for these purposes; besides securing political
influence over the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, they dominated the caravan route leading
from Central Asia to Orenburg and Western Siberia. The line of forts which
extended south of Orenburg and Orsk was designed to deter the raids of the Kirghiz
of the Lesser Horde, who at that time had not yet submitted to Russia. General
Perovskii, as early as 1836, tried to erect a forward post at the mouth of the Syr
Dana, capable of maintaining a population of nearly 1,000 persons; but efforts in
this direction were delayed because of the intensive preparation for the intended
expedition against Khiva in 1839. The unsuccessful expedition against Khiva
pushed Russia towards the construction of more fortifications in the steppe, in order
to safeguard the rear of her forces in case of similar campaign, and in the meantime
to be used in future expeditions as advanced military stores for ammunition and
supply. For this purpose Fort Embinskoe was erected in 1839 at the junction of the
Aty-Iakshi and Emba rivers and was enhanced by Fort Ak-B ulakskoe to the south-
west of Embinskoe at a distance of about 165 km. These were the most important
forts built in the steppe before 1845.10 British observers considered these forts as
important works which would enable Russia to command routes of communications
with Central Asia and serve as a "connecting link between the old frontier of the
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Empire and the long coveted line of the Jaxartes"." This policy was ended by the
formation of the Turkestan Governorship, and as a direct result of the Russo-
Bukharan treaty of 1868, which turned Bukhara to a satellite state. Hence these
fortifications lost their military significance and began to develop in a civil direction
as agricultural colonies, commercial centres or simply trading posts. 12 As a result of
continuous advance these forts in time lost their military importance, and naturally
were opened to receive more settlers. Merchants and civilian settlers of these fort-
ifications, after the conquest of large Central Asian cities, moved to settle in the
vicinity of those cities.'3
Despite all Russia's claims about protecting the Kirghiz population, and about
the submission of the Kazakh and the Kirghiz tribes to its authority, historical
evidence shows that the Kirghiz were not satisfied with Russia's colonial policy and
resisted it by attacking her settlements, caravans, and trade routes as late as 1870. To
control their attacks, the Russians, after the subjugation of the whole of the Syr
Dana basin and the reduction of Bukhara to a vassal state by the Russo-Bukharan
treaty of 1868, went on to build in 1869 a fort at Aktiubinsk, just to the south of
Orenburg. This fort, according to the Military Encyclopedia of 1911, was built to
deter the Kirghiz raids in the vicinity of Orenburg and to ensure stability in the
region.'4 The construction of the fort in that late year, and as deep inside the
steppe, undeniably demonstrates the state of unrest which still prevailed deep behind
the Russian lines.
The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War caused a far-reaching political and
economic shock to Russian society. It further worsened the economic situation of the
population as a whole, where most of the burden fell on the Russian peasantry. The
abolition of serfdom in 1861 particularly was meant in part to remedy that situation.
Nonetheless it did not solve the peasants' problems nor it did bring any recovery to
their deteriorating conditions. 15 The government, in order to ease the pressure of
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the reformists and intelligentsia towards reform, found it expedient to facilitate
peasant migration towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia, which were regarded as
new provinces suitable for institutionalized immigration.' 6
 The central government
in St. Petersburg also sought to realize a two-fold target: to create a socio-political
underpinning that would support and promote the Russian administration in the
conquered regions, and to solve the dilemma of landless peasants who were the
target and instrument of radical movements, which daily were gaining momentum.
The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 gave a renewed and massive impetus to the
process of Russian colonization in Central Asia. During the 1 860s, a number of
these settlements sprang up in the newly-conquered territories, either in the vicinity
of Central Asian cities, or in the neighbourhood of advanced military fortifica-
tions.17
Russia's settlements grew up during her advance into Central Asia in the
shape of two lines corresponding with her military fronts. The first line stretched
through the Kirghiz and Kazakh steppe along the Orenburg military line, while the
other extended through the region of Semireche, Chemkend, and Aulie-Ata down to
Peshpek along the West Siberian line. The number of Russians in Semireche in 1873
was already believed to be 25,000 military and civilians, among whom were 17,000
Cossacks, and 1,600 villagers; the remainder were soldiers.' 8
 Immigration from the
north-east i.e. towards Semireche, began earlier and was fostered by a suitable
climate and fertile soil. From the towns of Semipalatinsk, Sirgiopol, and Kopal, a
line of colonies and outposts stretched to Fort Vernoe; this was usually known as the
West Siberian line. Fort Vernoe was one of the military-agricultural colonies of
Semireche, which the Russian authorities distributed among their veteran soldiers
because of its favourable climate and fertile soil. As early as the end of the Crimean
War, between four and five thousand colonists were already settled in Vernoe alone,
their number rapidly increased as a result of the location of this colony at the
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crossroads between Kokand, Kuidja, and Kashgar to Semipalatinsk.'9
The colonization of Semireche had begun by gradual expansion southward by
the west Siberian Cossacks. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Cossacks of
the Altai line, a division of the Siberian Cossacks, began erecting new settlements.
Sergiopol was established in 1831, Kopal in 1847, Vernoe in 1854, Almatinskaia,
Lepinskaia, and Karabulak in 1855. In 1867 the Russian colonies in the region of
Semireche numbered fourteen settlements with a population of 14,413. The number
of settlers in Vernoe (Alma Ma) reached 12,000 by 1871. For the purpose of
enhancing the colonization of the region of Semireche, the 9th and 10th Cossack
regiments were compulsorily detached from the Siberian Cossack army and sent
there. Later in the mid 1 860s, after a considerable increase in the population of
Semireche, an independent Semirechian Cossack army was formed. Even so Kauf-
mann, despite his well known enthusiasm towards encouraging immigration, was dis-
appointed with the outcome of Cossack colonization of the region and put an end to
forced settlement of the Siberian Cossacks in 1873-1874. The number of immigrants
nevertheless increased continuously as a result of the influx of civilian immigrants
from Russia's mainland. These settlers were the main reason behind a number of
revolts by the natives.20
Already by the end of the 1860s the division of towns in Central Asia into
old and new quarters, i.e. Asiatic and Russian, was a familiar sight to all visitors
from Europe, and speaks of itself of considerable Russian presence. Schuyler
described it as follows:
The old town, the new town, and the Tartar suburb, though rapidly fusing
together, give the place a somewhat straggling air; still it has in every way
the appearance of a flourishing Russian or rather perhaps Siberian town pre-
senting a complete contrast to all places south of the mountains.2'
In addition to organized and state-sponsored immigration, another spon-
taneous stream of immigrants flowed towards Kazakhistan and Central Asia. 22
 The
Tsarist Government, for the purpose of supplying these immigrants with the land
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they needed, confiscated under several justifications the land of the natives. The
confiscation of land had already become an official policy under the Imperial
directive of 1853, which legitimized the practices and procedures of the local
administration in this respect. When in 1858 the Kazakh population protested against
the seizure of their land in the lower Syr Dana, Katinin, the Governor-General of
Orenburg, asserted that no more land would be confiscated from the Kazakh
population for settlement. However this declaration did not affect the districts of
Aulie-Ata and Chemkend, which were exempted for strategic considerations.23 The
Imperial directive of 21 October 1868 dispossessed the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz
from their land, by declaring that the land remained the property of the Imperial
Government, which had the sole authority to allow them to exploit and to roam in
it. This directive, in the following years became the cornerstone for a more
aggressive development of the Russian colonies. The province of Syr Dana witnes-
sed, during the administration of General Grodekov, the construction of fifty-one
settlements, with a population of 18,259 by the end of the 1880's.26
In his second term as Governor-General of Orenburg (1851-1857), Perovskii
reversed all the plans which he had advocated during his first term (1833-1842). He
preferred to advance against Kokand along the Syr Dana river instead of attacking
Khiva, his original target, across arid desert. The most striking administrative order
he gave was directed against the concentration of the Kirghiz in permanent
settlements. He believed that they were nomads and must remain nomads, and was
so opposed to their settlement that he destroyed their winter homes. 27
 The new
policy tended to open the door wide for replacing them with Russian peasants.
The building of new fortified bastions was resumed under General Obruchev,
commander of the Independent Orenburg corps, from 1845 onwards. The new fortifi-
cations were intended to be raised on the Kazakh's grazing pasture to the north of
the Aral Sea, but the Russians discovered that the climate of the area was
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unfavourable for permanent settlement; thus settlements were constructed only on the
banks of the Irghiz and Turgai rivers. Fort Uraisk was erected on the right bank of
the frghiz, and Fort Orenburgskoe on the right bank of the Turgai. 28
 Choosing an
advanced location on the Syr Dana for the construction of a fort was assigned in
1846 to Captain Schultz, who recommended the occupation of Raim at the mouth of
the Syr Dana, or the establishment of a Russian settlement in the same territory. The
following year Russia occupied the site. 29 Not far from Uraisk and Orenburgskoe,
in 1847, yet another fortified settlement known as Kara-Butak was raised on a tribut-
ary of the Irghiz river and used as a connecting point between the Orenburg line of
forts and Kos-Aral on the Aral Sea.3°
In 1834 one of the most important tasks assigned to De Maizon during his
mission to Bukhara had been to gather information about the Syr Dana basin and its
inhabitants. The Orenburg authorities were keen to discover where the migrant
Kirghiz in the Syr Dana region traded, whether the Khivans oppressed them, and
whether they would agree to roam nearer to Russia's domains. De Maizon was also
asked to report in detail about the suitability of the land beyond the Syr Dana for
the cultivation of grain and cotton. These assignments demonstrated Russia's inten-
tion to colonize the region permanently and her intrigues to that end in trying to at-
tract the Kirghiz by driving a wedge between them and the Khivans. Obviously
Russia was interested in getting agricultural and commercial information for the
realization of her plans; thus De Maizon was asked to pay attention to the sources of
water, the possibilities of digging canals and the prospect of irrigation from tribut-
aries of the Syr Dana. 31 However, even by 1 860s, and after controlling the Syr
Dana basin and Semireche, Russia had not developed any irrigation project, despite
the fact that most of her immigrants were peasants. Only after 1885 did the Russian
authorities began building irrigation systems and restoring the old ones.32
In 1848 Obruchev erected the first Russian settlement at the mouth of the Syr
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Dana sixty versts33 from the Aral Sea, not far from the annexed Kokandian post
Raim. This settlement, known as Raimskoe, became the base of Russia's activities
towards exploring the Aral Sea. In 1849 this fortification was opened to civilians.
The civilian population was small in number but of great significance for Russia's
economic purposes and likely to increase. Obruchev in 1849 allowed, on the basis of
permanent residency, sixty five families to live in Fort Karabutak, Raimskoe, and
Orenburgskoe. Obruchev was interested too in building a strong flotilla in the
Aral Sea for use against Khiva and exploring the Amu Dana. He believed that
Raimskoe would serve as a base for his advance toward the upper Syr Dana, but his
ambitions were checked by the strong Kokandian fort Ak Masjid and its garrison,
which was headed at that time by the renowned leader Yakub Bek. This fort hind-
ered all Russian efforts towards exploring the Syr Dana. After the failure of repeated
attempts to occupy Ak Masjid, the fort fell to Russia in 1853, after a long and
ruthless siege, thus at length clearing the waterway for its vessels. The bastion was
renamed Fort Perovskii and because of its critical location, Russia turned it into the
centre of her activities in the region. She supplied the fortress with ammunition and
a large amount of supplies enough to sustain its residents for at least eighteen
months, who besides military personnel included a considerable number of Cossack
families. 35 As a direct result of the annexation of Ak Masjid, the previously highly
valued Raimskoe fortification lost its significance. Fort Perovskii became the centre
of communication between other Russian forts in the region.36
By 1860 separate settlements emerged in the vicinity of Fort Perovskii, be-
cause the military authorities did not admit settlers within the fort because of milit-
ary considerations. The settlers of these new colonies were mostly a mixture of
Bukharan and Russian merchants. However civilian elements began to settle in
Kazalinsk on the mouth of Syr Dana; the Bukhanan merchants were the first to ap-
pear there and were then followed by their Russian competitors, who migrated to
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this strategic point on the trade route between Bukhara and Orenburg with their
families. To meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population in Kazalinsk, the
Russian authorities built in 1862 six more grain mills. 37
 Even so these Russian
colonies can be characterized primarily as military settlements so long as the Russian
civilians who settled in these colonies were assigned in one way or another to
supporting military functions.38
Russian settlement in Central Asia: the civilian phase
The second stage began in the mid sixties when the Russian authorities split
the region between Orenburg and Tashkand administratively into two districts,
Turgai district and the district of Syr Dana; 39
 the latter became a part of the newly
formed Turkestan Province after the fall of Tashkand. Russia in this division was
still guided by military as well as economic considerations.
Two factors affected the construction of the new settlements in the region;
the first was the conquest of the Khivan Khanate in 1873, which led to essential
changes in the caravan routes between Central Asia and Russia; and the second was
the construction of the Trans-Caspian railroad at the beginning of the 1 880s. 4° The
impact of the railroad, in addition to its military character, can be seen in its utility
in connecting the scattered settlements which began to rise along its route shortly
after the subjugation of the Turkomans in 1881. The second stage of Russia's colon-
ization of Central Asia was marked by a very important achievement, the opening of
a regular mail link between Orenburg and Tashkand. This long line began with the
connection of Orenburg with Kazalinsk in 1862 as the first stage, and by 1865 it
connected Orenburg with Tashkand. This route, Orenburg-Tashkand, reduced the
journey between the two destinations to twenty four days instead of two months,
while carriers delivering urgent mail could shorten that period of time to just 12-15
days, and in some highly important cases to nine days only. Because of Kazakh and
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Kirghiz attacks most of the stations on this route had to be capable of defending
themselves.4 ' In 1864 Russia opened a further mail connection between Vernoe and
Chemkend.
In 1875 the Russian Government forced the Ural Cossacks to settle in the
Amu Dana region, for rejecting new regulations regarding their conditions of
service. They were forced to settle not far from Tashicand, establishing a colony
known as Nikolskoe. These Cossacks there met with the scarcity of water, the main
obstacle that had long hindered the colonization of the region. The new settlers came
with their own way of cultivation, which proved to be unfitted to their new environ-
ment. Moreover they dealt aggressively with the indigenous population and usurped
their land and animals. 42 Previously the Russian Government had been reluctant to
colonize the region, fearing possible riots by the indigenous peoples in face of a
heavy Russian civilian presence, and the only colony in this region had consisted of
100 households which was developed at the insistence and custodianship of General
Kaufmann.43 As a precautionary procedure the administration sought to shift the
settlers' flow to the south towards the valley of Kugartsk. Meanwhile the admin-
istration, due to financial difficulties, discontinued its programme of supplying new
settlers with farm animals and other privi1eges. Considerable proportion of the
settlers were Ukrainian peasants driven by famine and the lack of land in their home
country. Official servicemen and retired military personnel made up an important
part of the settlers. The administration of Turkestan Province furnished them with
the required land, but as some of them were not interested in agriculture, and leased
their allotments to landless peasants, Kirghiz or Russian peasants, and they sought
their fortune in cities.45
Many new settlers established themselves in urban centres to be in close
proximity to the administration, and were also attracted by the opportunities which
local industry and trade activities could offer. Thus they created the characteristic
196
Immigration and Russ ficarion
division of Central Asian cities into two parts: indigenous or Asian, and Russian or
European quarters. The Russian part of Tashkand was established in 1865 as a quart-
er for housing the Russian military as well as civilian officials, although it grew
rapidly as a result of increasing number of settlers. The largest Russian community
in Central Asia constituted 20% of the population of Tashkand, and this fact was
mainly behind the granting of limited autonomy to the city. The Russian
administration in Central Asia ruled over the whole urban population, in theory
equally, but actually it cared primarily for the development and welfare of the
Russian portion, and most of its expenditure was devoted to the Russian quarters.
Furthermore, the Russian Government encouraged settlement in strategic locations
not only by Russians, but also by inorodtsy47 immigrants from other peoples, for
the purpose of creating a counter-weight to the indigenous population on the one
hand, and to promote the production of much needed raw materials for her industry
by way of securing availability of a suitable labour force on the other. The ad-
ministration was particularly interested in settling the Mennonite Germans,a who had
come to Russia in the 18th century. In 1879-1880 nearly five hundred Mennonite
families arrived in Turkestan. However their settlement was not voluntary, as their
creed was opposed to violence, they had refused military service in the Volga
region. Hence they were forced to settle in the vicinity of Tashkand, where they
built five colonies.48 Apparently the climate was unsuited to their enterprise, so
they appealed to the Bukharan Amir Muzaffar for protection and land. But, being
himself in a state of vassalage, the Amir could not satisfy their aspirations. Then
Kaufmann took the initiative and got permission from St. Petersburg for them to
a The Mennonites were named after Menno Simon (1469-1561) and are a Christian
denomination located in many counthes of the world, with heavy concentration in the United
States and Canada. They are an offshoot of the sixteenth-century Anabaptists, a radical
reform movement in Europe. Their thought is based on separation between religion and the
world. Under severe persecution in the 16th century, they adopted a strategy of withdrawal
from society. It is believed that they went to Russia not to stay, but on their way to
America.
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settle in Khiva, where under Kaufmann's pressure the Khan allotted them land in the
vicinity of Ak Metched, 13 km from Khiva the capital.49
The resolution in 1866 of the Central Board of Western Siberia, in an attempt
to confront corruption and promote productive farming, announced that the ad-
vantages of settlement in the steppe region and Turkestan would be granted only to
those working families which had strong moral qualities, were materially efficient
and able to guarantee their trustworthiness. The Russian authorities in Semireche
adopted a similar position, while officials in central Russia were instructed to give
permission to certain categories of people and direct them towards those regions
where they could receive free public land.5°
Kaufrnann believed that these Russian settlements in Central Asia would have
a considerable impact on the region, when they had developed and established direct
communications and programmes of mutual assistance towards each other. He
advised that the existing settlements in the region should be rearranged in such a
way that they became a network of settled colonies capable of dominating the
economy and providing assistance to each other. 51
 He was deeply interested in
creating an alien social presence in Central Asia as a whole, and chiefly in the main
cities of Central Asia: Samarkand, Tashkand, and others. Thus he encouraged and
offered generous assistance to German, Polish, and Tatar as well as Russian
colonization and settlement in the region. He showed concern for them, built houses
for them, and granted them a subsidy of 1,200 rubles for adjustment to their new
life.52
 Kaufmann's policy of assisting settlement was accompanied by another pol-
itical course, directed against native institutions and establishments. He deprived
these foundations of any official financial support and, for example, imposed heavy
restrictions on the collection of the religious endowment which constituted the only
source of survival to these establishments, whether educational, judicial or cultural.
Lykoshin argued that the legal system was far from being just, and intentionally
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preserved many elements of the old order. 53 The system of "enlightenment of the
Aliens", which was established by I1'minskii, the engineer of Kaufmann's educa-
tional policy, was completely different from both the Russian and the Muslim school
systems. Il'minskii endeavoured through this system to Russify and Christianize the
education system by offering opportunities to graduates from Russian schools, by
propagating Orthodoxy, and by eradicating the original alphabet of the indigenous
national languages and replacing it with the Cyrilhic. 54 In this regard Kaufmann re-
ported:
in the first year of my administration, I have moved all the Mullahs, who had
been sent by the Chief-Mufti of Ufa; I have abolished all previous con-
nections between our government and the local Muslim establishments; and I
have cancelled the right of these organizations to own the endowment of land
(Waqj).55
Moreover he prevented all Muslim missionary activity in the region, under
the pretext of avoiding what the British had experienced in India during the
1850s.56
In 1874, at the instance of Kaufmann, the Russian administration built five
colonies in the district of Aulie-Ata, on a very important post road connecting
Vernoe, Tokmak, and Peshpek in the east, with Chemkent Turkestan, and the entire
Syr Dana basin in the west. These settlements were not regulated by any legislation
or administrative order. In the same manner Russian settlements continued to spring
up in the region also under General Cherniaev (1882-1884), the successor of
Kaufmann.57
Thus we can see, since its first steps in Turkestan, that Russian policy was
dedicated to maintaining and perpetuating Russia's presence in the region on the one
hand and stabilizing her command on the other. The local populations still resented
and would not accede to the appearance and presence of the Russian peasants in
their lands. For this purpose the government sought to encourage, in the first
instance, the resettlement of the Cossacks. 58 Their sustenance would have been im-
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possible without generous subsidy and allotments of land, besides other privileges
granted by the Russian administration to the new-corners. These privileges included
the granting to each family, upon arrival 27 acres of land free of taxation besides the
needed farm animals, and long term credits.59 As a result, even in remote areas
where one seldom met any dwellers, the Russian peasants had penetrated and formed
considerable colonies. Schuyler, after his trip to Central Asia in the late 1 870s men-
tioned that:
after leaving Ak-Su river we seldom met any sarts', but on the contrary
numbers of genuine Russian peasants, for here begin the Russian colonies.60
In 1873, Tokmak one of the towns of the district of Semireche had a Russian pop-
ulation of 800.61 On the eastern flank of the immigration highway, where the
Trans-hi region witnessed the arrival of settlers as early as 1853, the number of
Cossack and civilian colonists arriving from western Siberia, and from Russia's
mainland reached considerable proportions in 1871. Kalpakovskii, the military
governor of Semireche, according to Suleimenov, became the first initiator of legal-
ized colonization. He issued in 1868 "Temporary rules for peasants' settlement in
Semireche". Kolpakovskii's rules granted for the immigrants, besides land, the
privileges of exemption of that land from taxation for the first 15 years, long term
credits, and other encouraging grants. 62 Later in 1883, because of the shortage of
more available land, the Government suspended these privileges; Semireche was
completely closed for further settlement in 1891.63
The Cossack presence and the continuous flood of immigrants became a
grave challenge to the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, who were discontented as a result of
losing their rich land to the new-comers, who were moreover unfamiliar with the
local irrigation techniques, and frequently ruined them. These factors among others
led the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs to attack the Russian colonies. The Russian ad-
b• The sarts in local languages means the urban dwellers, but as used here by Schuyler it
means indigenous, which is common in European historical literature.
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ministration however did not hesitate to attribute these hostilities and unrest, in the
early stages, to Khivan or Kokandian intrigues aimed at spreading disarray among
the nomads. This allegation as we have seen was one of the main pretexts utilized
by the Russian politicians to justify their aggression against the Khanates. The
programme of civilian resettlement in Central Asia continued and reached a massive
scale in 1871, when the Russian authorities deported immense numbers of Uralians,
Tatars and Bashkirs, to the Syr Dana region, an operation that gave the impression
of an exiled population in Central Asia. The Uralians were not immigrants but
brought here as deportees for their refusal to submit to the law of general military
service. The Uralians, even after resettlement in Turkestan, refused to submit to local
authorities, and rejected government demands to register upon arrival in the town of
Kazalinsk.65
 They consisted mostly of Tatars and Basbkirs and proved, after their
forced resettlement, that they were capable of flourishing; despite the severe climatic
conditions, and the harsh character of the land they had been assigned to, some
established great influence on the economic life of the region. It surpassed that of
the Russian immigrants, who preferred to seek settlement in more convenient
regions. These Uralians developed and monopolized the fishing industiy on the
banks of the Syr Dana and the eastern shores of the Aral Sea, 66 yet another
example of the pervasive role which the official policy of Russian settlement exerted
in the economic development of Central Asia.
Education policy and the attempt at Russ jfic ation
The conquest of Central Asia, as we have seen, began as an exercise of
military power, but its perpetuation and continuity depended on victory in other
fields such as economic domination and cultural control. The Russian Government
was confronted with the dilemma which met all other colonial powers in the century,
i.e educating the colonized population. The Russians were confronted by completely
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different traditions and cultures in Asia. However, in this field Russian authorities
were not without experience, because they had dealt with similarly alien nations,
with comparable cultural backgrounds, throughout their advance eastward, in the
Khanate of Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the steppes.
The Russian officers, themselves half Asian and half European, unlike those of other
European countries, mastered methods of drawing closer to the Asians, and de-
licately knew how to split them and win the sympathy of one party against the other.
Russia gradually began imposing her culture on her Muslim subjects; and there was
no doubt that "Russification" was a determined principle and could prove to be most
effective of all through her educational policy. This system has been well described
as:
elements of western-style education, in the Russian spirit, with an Orthodox
Christian background, imparted in the pupil's own language by native teach-
ers.67
This policy may have appeared to serve the short and medium-term interests
of the Russian State; whether it did much to benefit its recipients, the peoples of
Central Asia, is more doubtful. It isolated them from any effects of Western culture
that might reach them other than through Russian mediation, and hindered the
possibility of further development in their own national cultural life. Vambery has
put it as follows:
under Russian sway a transformation, ..., could at the best only be possible
by forcing the Asiatics entirely to give up their national individuality, by
their being swallowed up in the mass of the ruling element, in short, by
Russification.68
For short-term necessities, the Russian authorities sought to create "Russified"
individuals capable of controlling the economic and political aspects of newly
assimilated societies. Thus these individuals, whether activists in the fields of
education or religion, enjoyed privileges usually granted only to Russian officials. In
this direction the Russian authorities took extraordinary pains to eliminate existing
religious establishments and educational institutions. In the field of education, which
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included religious schools, all subsidies to the traditional religious authorities were
severely restricted, to the extent that they were deprived of all grants from the
controlling Russian administration and from the Khanates as well. In the meantime
an attempt was made to foster a network of schools that would spread the Russian
language and culture among the indigenous population.69 Kaufmann, the Governor-
General of Turkestan, decisively opposed any development in the indigenous cultural
life and hindered the traditional educational system.c He forbade all the connections
between the Russian administration and the local institutions that had existed during
the time of his predecessors. 7° He endeavoured to destroy the existing order,
according to Terentiev, and resisted any suggestion of reorganizing the indigenous
schools, insisting that they should manage their affairs without any support from the
Russian administration, or fade away.71 But, as we have already seen, he also
severed them from their traditional sources of support.
Instead he fostered a new type of school designed to create "Russified"
individuals, superficially attached to their heritage, upon whom Russia could rely to
control and govern. The indigenous children were admitted to schools, not for the
purpose of enlightenment but for assimilation, Russification, and nurturing love for
Russia and respect for "the unlimited authority of the white Tsar". 72 Curtis in this
regard wrote that,
the Russian government does not prohibit native children from attending the
schools that are furnished for the inhabitants of the Russian towns, and
admits them free of tuition, and particular pains are taken to impress them
with the greatness and the goodness and the far-reaching authority of the
Czar. In other words, they are russified as thoroughly as possible.73
Kaufmann rigorously maintained his policy of negligence of Muslim spiritual
c The system of madrasah and Maktab prevailed in Central Asia, but not in the Kazakh
steppe where schools did not exist before the coming of Russia. In these madrasahs and
maktabs the pupils learned mostly theological education besides mathematics, astronomy,
and history. But in the sense of the Western educational system, schools in Central Asia did
not exist.
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leadership and Muslim institutions.74 Lykoshin described the native schools under
Russian administration in Tashkand:
primary schools for children located in narrow, low and dark huts, so that
one would admire the endurance of those children, and their patience in such
inconvenient condition.75
These conditions and intentions were resisted by all Central Asians, including the
Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, who refrained form sending their children to such schools,
until they were desolated and finally closed. However, conditions of schools in
Russian quarters and colonies were different. Among measures that would encourage
immigration and settlement of Russians, besides free land and other privileges
alluded to earlier, Kaufmann opened a school in every Russian settlement. He built a
school in Kazalinsk, even though it had been desolated earlier because of its
unfriendly climate, and another in Perovskii, for the purpose of attracting the
settlement of Russians in the region.76 Even though these schools were opened to
Kirghiz children, no native student attended them during their first seven years.77
The key reason behind the sad fate of these schools was the great apprehension in
the minds of the parents of these children regarding the type of education they
would receive there, which was unrelated to their traditions, religion, or history.
These fears created a passive resistance on the part of the natives who abstained
from sending their children to these schools. In 1867 only twenty five pupils
attended the Russian schools in Tashkand, the largest city in Central Asia, and less
than thirteen in Khodzhend, while the schools in Kazalinsk and Perovskii were
already closed. To remedy this situation, Kaufmann formed a special committee
authorized to deal with the difficulties that met the Russian system of education. The
committee included three military officers: Brodovskii, Terentiev, 78
 and Kun.
Among the recommendations of the committee there were two prominent points. The
first was the construction of mixed Russo-Central Asian schools, which would be a
strong rival to the indigenous schools; and the second was the introduction of the
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Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet to replace the Arabic. These recommendations became
the basis for a full-scale course of Russification and assimilation, although it may be
debated whether the Russian educational policy in the whole of Turkestan was as
successful as the committee had hoped. There were 61 mixed schools, attended by
less than three thousand native pupils (as a result of the dominating apprehension
already noted, that the youngsters would be assimilated and Russified). 79
 The Rus-
sian administration in Turkestan sought to convince St. Petersburg of the necessity
of establishing native secondary schools, in order to prepare teachers for the
provincial schools. But the Ministry of Public Education feared that these schools
would be too busy with propagating Islam and anti-Russian feelings, and declined to
grant them any assistance.8°
Among other procedures to boost her cultural influence in Central Asia,
Russia built a public library in Tashkand which included 10,000 volumes in Russian
language, some in other foreign languages, but none in the local languages! In the
same direction, towards achieving cultural predominance, Russia issued a number of
official publications besides three Russian daily newspapers: Turkestan, Turkestan
Courier, and Turkestan Agriculture, but all in the Russian language. The only
newspaper in the local language was Turkestan Native Gazette. 8 ' All these
newspapers, including the native one, had at the top of their priorities the task of
defending Russian policy in the region, advocating the civilizing role of Russia, and
keeping the public constantly alert to the supposed danger of alleged British designs
and British aggression.
A full examination of the progress of Russification in Central asia would
require a separate study of its own, but the evidence from the observations of
contemporary Russian authorities does suggest that it was more successful in
promoting resistance than assimilation or loyalty.
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Chapter Eight
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKOMANS
I always have the assumption that the Central Asian foe is not
insignificant as some assumed. Judging the situation from the
reports which I have received about the Tekke Turkomans, I
believe that they might be exceptionally militant people. Alex-
ander II speaking to General Skobelev before the Turkoman
campaign, January 12, 1880.
The enemy is brave, and skilful in single combat; he fires
effectively.., but he operates in individual extended order, or
in detached bodies, very little obedient to the will of their
chief. Skobelev's Official Report, December 24, 1880.
Kaufmann and the Yomuds
The conquest of the Khivan Khanate in 1873 created a new situation in
Central Asia; Russia now sought to spread its authority over adjacent territories
whether they clearly belonged to, or were merely claimed by, the Khivans, such as
the Yomud territory.' The Turkoman countrya for several reasons was considered
by British politicians to be more important than Khiva, the fall of which was
regarded as a "stepping stone to the subjugation of the Turkomans". 2 It was evident
that the Russian Government would want to master the strategic Turkoman country,
which would connect her possessions on the Caspian with K1iiva and Bukhara, and
her dominions in Central Asia with Afghanistan and Persia. The reduction of the
Turkomans' country, besides safeguarding her recent acquisitions, in the region,
would secure for her military predominance in the whole region and prepare the way
for further advance. British politicians understood that to stop robbery and slavery
was no doubt the Russian humanitarian mission, but that it had also massive political
a The Turkoman country, bordering Bukhara, Khiva, Afghanistan, and Persia, occupied
the vast territory between the Caspian and the Oxus. Controlling Turkomaniia and its tribes
constituted the key to the long-term mastery of the Khanates of Central Asia.
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consequences.3 They realized that the collapse of the Turkomans would become a
powerful incentive to a further advance:
by the subjection of the Turkoman tribes Russia acquired that land of war
like population, which can supply at the lowest 40,000 armed cavalry.., with
complete command of the Caspian and of the rail roads leading to and
beyond it, and with an army of 120,000 men... Russia has acquired the basis
for military operations which may seriously menace the independence of
Persia and Afghanistan, and thereby become a standing danger to our Indian
Empire.4
After reinstalling the Khan of Khiva as a Russian puppet in 1873, Kaufmann
began discussing ways of collecting the war indemnity from the Khivans and from
the Turkomans as well. The Khan straightforwardly repudiated responsibility for
collecting the Turkomans' share, and insisted that they had never paid him anything
in the shape of taxes, that they would not now, and that it was beyond his power to
compel them to do so.5 Kaufmann then resolved to collect the war indemnity from
the Turkomans directly himself, and issued a declaration ordering the Yomuds to
pay 300,000 roubles within two weeks.6
Russia in her advance generally considered tolerance in any of her officers as
a sign of weakness; thus Colonel Stoletov, who won the sympathy and obedience of
the Turkomans without oppressing them, was accused of having a "soft" attitude and
replaced by the hard-liner V. I. Markozov as commander of the Krasnovodsk gar-
rison.7 After the subjection of Khiva, Kaufmann instructed both Glukhovskii and
Markozov to survey the western part of Khiva down to lake Sari-Kamysh in the
heart of the Yomud territories. Their survey took on a military as well as an
economic character, and they met no resistance from the Turkomans, who discerned
the absurdity of resistance after the fall of Khiva, so they "not only professed their
entire submission but showed it in deeds".8 In spite of that attitude, Markozov
arrested several Yomud elders and confiscated their camels to carry his equipment
from Krasnovodsk to the region of Sari-Kamysh, where he would meet with Glu-
khovskii who was dispatched to the same point from Khiva. 9 According to Miliutin,
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the War Minister, and Kaufmann, the Governor General of Turkestan, the conquest
of the Turkomans was necessitated by the impossibility of maintaining peace in
Khiva as long as they were independent, but the military survey shows that the real
reason lay in the fact that the south-western part of Central Asia, i.e., the Turkoman
country, had major strategic significance as the eastern flank of the Caucasian anny,
and was regarded as a natural military extension of Bukhara and Khiva.1°
As usual some Russian officers were eager for an easy campaign against the
Turkomans for the purpose of obtaining decorations and promotion, especially the
Order of St. George, the highest decoration in Russia. The Russian Generals also
were motivated by the idea of inflicting punishment on those recalcitrant Turkomans
for, as Terentiev put it, "we never had the chance to teach them a lesson, and to let
them feel the weight of our hands"; besides it was an opportunity for those who had
arrived too late during the Khivan campaign and had no chance to fight, all of whom
were sent in the expedition, at least to "smell the gun-powder".' 1 The Yomuds, the
target of the intended campaign, had sent their chieftains to Kaufmann after the fall
of Khiva, declared their submission and asked for peace. Despite accepting their sub-
mission, Kaufmann considered it necessary to inflict a severe punishment on them
for their previous resistance and to make them feel the Russian power.' 2 With these
views Kaufmann decided to take advantage of the presence of his troops in Khiva, at
a convenient marching distance from the Yomuds, and determined to "change the
order of things regarding the Turkomans, materially and morally, by subduing their
pride and their license".' 3 Kaufmann believed that the Yomuds remained a centre of
resistance to the Russian presence, and were capable of dealing a blow to his army;
nor did he forget that the Khan of Khiva had sought refuge among them in the near
past. So he demanded that the Yomuds pay a war indemnity of 300,000 roubles in
two weeks. The Yomuds acceded but appealed for a longer period to collect such a
large sum. The indemnity would be paid, as the Yomuds' elders said, but the fact
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that they were a nomadic people rendered it difficult to collect such a sum in such a
short time; besides their wealth consisted of flocks not ready cash, and "it was
impossible even to raise it by the sale of their cattle or their corn, or even the jewels
and ornaments of their wives and daughters".' 4 It is clear that there was a pre-
determined plan in Kaufmann's mind behind the demand of payment in cash not in
kind, for ordinarily accepting camels for use by the army would have been worth
more than money. The Russians were looking for a pretext to inflict punishment on
the Yomuds, and they found it in their inability to pay the indemnity within the
stated period.
The massacre of the Yomuds (1873)
Kaufmann therefore detained twelve of the Yomuds' elders, who came asking
for an extension of the period fixed for paying the indemnity, as hostages and sent
back five of them to collect the money. Kaufmann dispatched a force on 18 July
1873, one day before the beginning of the two-week period for the payment of the
indemnity, which was set forth from 19 July to 3 August; it was led by General
Golovachev and was to discover the Yomuds' intention, whether they had resumed
the collection of the money or not.' 5 If he discovered evidence to justify suspicion
of their intentions, Kaufmann furnished him with the following military command:
I order you immediately to move upon the settlements of the Yomuds which
are placed along the Ghazavat canal and its branches, and to give over the
settlements of the Yomuds and their families to complete destruction, and
their herds and property to confiscation.'6
Another order was issued to a detachment from the Orenburg army, despatched for
the same purpose, "to proceed to the work of slaughter". 17 An eye-witness heard
Golovachev delivering the command to his subordinates:
I have received an order from the commander-in-chief.., this expedition does
not spare either sex or age, kill all of them.'8
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Even Russian historians expressed surprise at the decision to send troops against the
Yomuds since they did not refuse payment, but merely asked for a longer period.b
Golovachev lost no time and spared none, his Cossacks eagerly assumed their
appointed task, slaughtering indiscriminately and burning every thing. Upon receiv-
ing the news, Kaufmann approved the procedure, though he advised Golovachev to
spare the grain and not to burn it:' 9 grain of course being a strategically valuable
commodity. The destruction, ruin, and butchery wreaked on the Yomuds was great;
they were not prepared to resist, thinking that submission would spare them and
their properties. After the massacre, Kaufmann increased the amount of the indemni-
ty to 310,000 roubles, though he agreed to receive half of it in camels. 2° As Schu-
yler observed:
The Turkoman women had to strip themselves of all their ornaments and
bring them into the Russian camp for sale... Every necklace and bracelet thus
given up will leave a long legacy of hatred.c
b Kaufmann became abashed and frequently found himself on the defensive trying to
justify the motives that provoked him to issue such a command. The whole of Russia was
embarrassed when Skyler, an American writer, accused Russia of barbarism after having
read Schuyler's Turkestan. That was a severe blow to the Russian image in the United States
of America. Russian writers accused him of falsehood, although they couldn't accuse
Schuyler, the American Consul General at St. Petersburg, who put a translation of the order
in his book, for he visited Central Asia by invitation of the Imperial Government, and he
had the text from a Russian official; they denied such a command and defended their
allegations by stating that MacGahan had visited the region but did not refer to such a
directive. Terentiev gave a good image of the confusion and defamation that prevailed, in his
Istoriia Zavoevaniia, II, 267-8.
It should be remembered that these are the words of Schuyler, the United States Consul
in St. Petersburg, who was invited by the Imperial Government to visit Central Asia and had
an opinion far from hostile to Russia. In a very humane language he stated that these orna-
ments were exhibited later at St. Petersburg and in 1875 at Paris. Schuyler recorded the
following story, which he heard from an eye-witness who took part in the massacre,
Abramov by name. He said the army advanced on 7 September 1873 against the Turkomans
killing virtually everyone on their way "cutting everybody down, whether a small child or an
old man... A mother, who had been riding on a horse with three children was lying dead.
The eldest child was dead also, the youngest had a sabre cut through his ann, and while
crying was wiping off the blood. The other child, a little older, who was trying to wake up
the dead mother...". Schuyler, II, 359-60.
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Following the conquest of Khiva and the suppression of the Yomuds, Russia
in November 1873 formed a new military district, the Transcaspian Military District,
on the eastern coast of the Caspian including all the territory between the Caspian
and Khiva, under the control of the Caucasian military administration. Colonel
Lomakin, who had been promoted to General after the fall of Khiva, was appointed
Governor-General of this district.2 ' The new formation was justified by the need for
safeguarding a strong position on the eastern coast of the Caspian for securing the
passage of the Caucasian regiments, which would be needed for an operation against
the Akhal Tekke Turkomans who continued to oppose the Russian presence in their
territory and oases.22
In 1876 Lomakin was authorized to begin reconnoitring the region between
Chikishlar and the Kopet Dagh range, under the pretext of conducting scientific
research on the old bed of the Amu Daria.d He was instructed to dig wells in water-
less areas, and was commanded to occupy Kizyl Arvat which fell to him on 7 May
1877 though heavy fighting erupted on 12 May and the Russians were obliged to re-
treat.e
 Although unsuccessful, this episode shows that the annexation of the Turko-
man country, which became of urgent priority in Russian policy after the fall of
Khiva, was wanted to open the road in front of Russia directly to Afghanistan across
a wide front extending from the Caspian to the Pamirs.23
d• The Russians spared no effort to create a suitable route for transport and communica-
tions to facilitate their advance. They regarded the Oxus (Amu Dana) as a proper water way,
if diverted to its old course, which would connect Russia's central zone through the Volga
river, the Caspian sea and the Oxus to the borders of India. This idea existed in Russian
thought since the expedition of Bekovich-Cherkasskii in 1717, when Peter the Great inquired
about the possibility of diverting the river to be used by an avenging army against the
Khivans. The idea held its importance as strongly as ever until the end of 1880 when
General Glukhovskii with ten engineers tried to determine the possibility of diverting the
Oxus back towards the Caspian during the campaign against the Turkomans.
Terentiev admitted the withdrawal of the troops after that battle, though he attributed it
to lack of forage. He also blamed Lomakin and accused him of mismanagement and
misconduct of the campaign, which obliged him to withdraw from Kizyl Arvat. Vide Terent-
iev, lstoriia zavoevaniia, III, 3-4.
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During the critical period that followed the fall of Khiva in 1873 up to
Skobelev's campaign of 1880-1881, Britain did not offer the Turkomans any
practical assistance, even though the security of the Turkomans in that period was
crucial for the security of Afghanistan and India as well. At the same time as the
international situation in Europe became more tense, new developments in Kokand
compelled Russia in 1875 to take decisive measures against the insurgents there. The
following years were dominated by the annexation of Kokand and the resolution of
the rivalry between Turkestan and the Caucasus armies for the honour of conquering
the Turkomans?A Meanwhile Russia's main effort of expansionism in the following
years, 1877-1878, was directed against Turkey and towards the Balkans. British
inactivity in this period was partly due to preoccupation with other imperial and
above all European questions, and partly to the image of barbarism which they
attached to these tribes, and their "inhuman" practices. Thus British sentiment was
far from being in favour of the Turkomans, which led to a false evaluation of the
significance of Merv, their stronghold, until it was too late to deter Russia from con-
quering the Tekkes, and the two headed eagle flew above the ramparts of Geok
Teppe and Akhal Tekke. 25
 Even so, the issue of Mery was treated seriously by the
British following the conclusion of the Russo-Khivan treaty of 1873. Granville
instructed Loftus on 7 January 1874 to express Britain's views regarding Russia's
policy in Central Asia, which were said to be arousing the apprehensions of the
Amir of Afghanistan regarding Russia's evident intention to capture Merv. The
Amir's fears were triggered by the recognition that Russia's action against the
Turkomans would bring them to the vicinity of Herat, and so bring the Governments
of Russia and Afghanistan into conflict. 26 The British action did not exceed dip-
lomatic remonstration in St. Petersburg.
These representations evidently had some effect upon Russian policy regard-
ing Mery and the Turkomans. Miliutin wrote to the Viceroy of the Caucasus,
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warning him that England was monitoring every Russian step in that direction,
especially toward Merv, and conveyed to him the Emperor's recommendation that
the Caucasian and Turkestan administrations should evade open belligerence or any
activity that could be regarded as hostile, in order to avoid Britain's protests.27
Thus Russian activities against the Turkomans were disguised as reconnaissance
activities, despite the large number of troops that took part. Russia timed her action
against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans in 1880 to coincide with the fall of the Beacon-
sfield Ministry and the coming of Gladstone to office, when British public opinion
was concerned mostly with domestic affairs. 28
 Meanwhile, Lomakin continued his
activities in reconnoitring the region between Chikishlar, Krasnovodsk, and the
strategic Kizyl Arvat. 29
 Because of British hostility to Russia at the Congress of
Berlin in 1878, Russian interest was revived in making a military demonstration to
be conducted on the northern borders of Afghanistan, i.e., on the road to India. The
Russian Government, as Terentiev put it, faced with Britain's stand in the Near East,
found it natural to use Russia's new position in Central Asia against the interest of
British India, to create enough trouble in Asia to occupy Britain's attention and
deflect her from interference in the affairs of other countries, and notably from
assisting Turkey. He observed that Britain maintained a strong fleet near the shores
of Greece that prevented that potential Russian ally from declaring war against Turk-
ey, and "maintained another sea-borne force in the Dardanelles that prevented us
from occupying Constantinople". 30 The Caucasian army was therefore put on alert
and ordered to advance against Mery where it should meet the Turkestan army
advancing from Khiva. It was only the achievement of a compromise with Great
Britain in Berlin which led to the abandonment of that operation. 31 Instead Lomak-
in occupied Chat and was directed to connect it with Chikishlar by a chain of forts!
. Chat is an isolated small town, though the Russians mobilized 18 regiments, 2 sotnias,
and 8 guns against it. Lomakin advanced further against Khodja Kala, meeting no resistance;
(continued...)
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By 1877 Chikishlar on the eastern coast of the Caspian had become the
centre of operations against the Turkomans. Lomakin's ventures were however
largely unsuccessful, and on one occasion he narrowly escaped by burying his gun in
the desert.32
 To inject Lomakin's efforts with better means of success, the Russian
government authorised him to form a brigade of militia (miijtsiia) from the Yom-
uds, Tekkians, and Khivans, to buy 400 horses, to hire the necessary camels from
Khiva and Mangishlak and to dig wells between Chikishlar and Chat. Lomakin was
assisted by another General from the Caucasian staff, General Lazarev, 33 who
crossed the Caspian with four battalions in the spring of 1879. The Tekkians replied
by attacking Krasnovodsk on 7 April and captured 200 camels from those brought
for the intended expedition. The Russian army lost four soldiers killed and twelve
wounded when force was sent unsuccessfully to recover the camels.34 Despite
Lomakin's cruelty, all his efforts to subdue the Turkomans ended with failure and
increasing hostility. In his last campaign against them he refused to give them
quarter and "shot their wives and little ones as though they had been rats". 35 The
failure of his campaign against the Turkomans was felt throughout Russia, and the
Russian army was so disgraced that fast repair of the situation became imperative.36
The period was marked by decline of Russia's prestige, and Chikishlar as well as
Krasnovodsk became the object of frequent attacks by the Tekkians. Lomakm was
accused of being irresolute and incompetent for the obligation he assumed; by pro-
claiming that he was authorized by Grand Duke Mikhailhl to rule over the Turko-
t'(•• 
.continued)
he resolved to advance against Bendisen, where he met the Tekkians and was obliged to
retreat to Khodja Kala, and on 8 September 1878 retreated to Chat.
g For methods of choosing candidates, their past, character, salary, clothing, training,
and later employment at Mery see Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, pp. 127-129.
h Grand Duke Mikhail was a brother of Alexander II and the commander of the
Daghistan and the Caucasian armies.
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mans of the Attiek and Gorgan, he also antagonised the Persians without achieving
any practical success.37
The appointment of Skobelev and the conquest of Akhal Tekke (1880-1)
Following the defeats of General Lomakin, the Tsar found his most fitting
servant for the task of retrieving the lost Russian prestige to be General Skobelev.
He had taken part in the expedition against Khiva in 1873 as the commander of
Kinderly corps, an advanced wing of the Turkestan army. He also took an active
part in the Yomud massacre that followed the fall of Khiva, and won further reputa-
tion in 1875-6 during the campaign against Kokand. In January 1876 he displayed
exceptional brutality against the inhabitants of Andijan. 38
 Skobelev's campaign led
to the end of the existence of Kokand as an independent state: on 19 February 1876
Kokand was annexed to the Empire and replaced on the map by the title of Ferghana
valley. This was the General selected by the Tsar to settle accounts with the Turko-
mans.
In the mid 1870s when Russian activities were hindered and the time was
unfit for action against the Turkomans, Prince Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister,
affirmed to the British Government that orders were positively issued on behalf of
the Tsar that no expedition should be undertaken against the Tekke Turkomans, and
that they had been given in such conclusive terms that no Russian official in Central
Asia would dare to take the liberty of departing from them. 39
 Gorchakov also gave
assurances that Russia would not extend her borders at the expense of the Turko-
mans even if she should be compelled to act against them as a reprisal for their
depredations.4° He confirmed to Loftus in January 1874 that Russia "had no inten-
tion of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans", and in a dispatch to
Baron Brunnow he confirmed that the Emperor had himself given similar assurance
directly to Loftus. 41
 Gorchakov told Doria:
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the intention of the Emperor of Russia is not to extend the frontiers of Russia
beyond their present limits in Central Asia either on the side of Bukhara or
on that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek.42
Britain accepted Russia's latest assurance, despite the frequent violation of previous
and similar ones.
Notwithstanding these diplomatic niceties, in St. Petersburg the question of
subjugating the Turkomans was discussed in late 1878 by a special committee
including the War Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, (who took charge of
pacifying Britain and furnishing her with assurances) and the Commander of the
General Staff. They resolved that no peace would be possible as long as the Turko-
mans were not under the sway of Russia.' Gorchakov's participation in these discus-
sions is an instructive comment upon the diplomatic assurances just referred to, and
upon the contention sometimes advanced that the Russian Foreign Office had no
responsibility for the policy of expansion in Central Asia. These powerful figures
recognised that the relatively small expeditions in the period between 1869-1879 had
been expensive, unproductive and negative, and that their results had been mainly
humiliating.43
 Considering all the circumstances the committee recommended: first,
the assembly in the spring of 1879 of an army capable of subjugating the Akhal
Tekke; second, after securing its lines of communication, and subduing the country,
the army should proceed to occupy the line to Uzba and to erect a fortress in Igda.
Earlier on 23 Janualy 1878 these recommendations had been sanctioned by Alex-
ander H. Lazarev collected fifteen thousand camels for the intended campaign,
and mobilized 18,000 men, the largest Russian army ever seen in Central Asia,
supplied with every necessary. 45 He advanced to the heart of the Tekke oasis until
'. St. Petersburg was convinced that her influence would be secured in the region
extending from the Caspian to Samarkand and Tashkand only after the fall of the Turkoman
country. Vide Grodekov, II, 64-70. Regardless, the Russian officials continued their usual
political practice of declaring one intention and planning for another. Vide Jstoriia Narodov
Uzbekistana, II, 249.
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he reached Geok Teppe, but once again his campaign against the Tekkes proved to
be fruitless, and he was compelled to retreat after considerable 1oss. This further
military humiliation in 1879 could not be attributed to the need for a stronger or
better armed military force, for the army was numerous enough. The Generals attrib-
uted its failure to the want of an adequate plan and better means of supply and
communication, rather than to the valour of the Turkomans. General Grodekov
described the repeated expeditions since 1877 as raids rather than operations of an
advancing army,47 and called for a better planned offensive.
In January 1879, after the death of Lazarev, General Tergukasov put forward
a plan for the conquest of the Akhal Tekke oasis. Tergukasov underlined mostly the
problem of deficient communications between positions already conquered by
Russia, such as Chikishlar, Chat, and Duz-olum. He also emphasized the necessity
for establishing permanent services such as hospitals, stores, telegraphs, and postal
services, for controlling the conquered territories and facilitating the movement of
the troops.48 This interesting recommendation clearly displayed the Russian tenden-
cy to promote the colonization of the region by civilian measures for military
purposes. Tergukasov cautioned St. Petersburg that this was the only method that
would help Russia to subdue the Turkomans. 49 His plan demonstrated the defective
condition of the troops and the urgent need to provide them with a supporting
civilian infrastructure in this hostile land. It came as a reminder of the similar
procedures enforced by Kaufmann in the 1 860s following the conquest of Turkestan,
when he encouraged the settlement of the Mennonites and others in the conquered
territories.50 Some opponents of Tergukasov considered that his plan addressed
mainly the conquest of strategic points while neglecting the rest of the country. But
as we have seen he did address wider questions, and he suggested encouraging the
families of lower-rank servicemen to undertake permanent residency and coloniza-
tion. Tergukasov's plan heavily relied on the Caspian fleet, and stressed the neces-
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sity for a railway between Krasnovodsk and Kizyl-Arvat for the success of any
operation against the Turkomans. Tergukasov, in suggesting this railway, wanted to
liberate the Russian army from dependence on the Persians and other Central Asians
for camel supply? 1
 The railway was considered also by General Skobelev as being
the key factor. This seems to have been an important element in the Russian
response to growing fears about the development of British influence in Persia, and
the prevailing assumption among Russian politicians that Britain was about to
occupy Mery
 and possibly even Herat.52
 Russia's increasing fears in this period
were reflected in an alarming report by F. L. Geiden, commander of the General
staff, and L. N. Sobolev, commander of the Asian division of the General staff, in
which they argued:
current events in Central Asia have enormous political significance. The
British were trying by every possible means to dominate the whole of
Afghanistan, and a slightly bolder policy would lead them to Herat and
northern Afghanistan; they want to subdue Persia to their influence, Mer y
 as
well, and the Tekkians may be regarded as part of Persia.53
Alexander II observed that, if the British should establish themselves in Herat, by
putting it under the control of a Persian garrison led by English officers, the prospect
for Russia would be dismal. So the Emperor decided to assign to the command a
General known for his swift and decisive actions, and the choice fell on General
Skobelev. The observation of Grand Duke Mikhail, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, that
Skobelev's appointment was acceptable if, but only if, a strong forward policy was
intended, is instructive. Throughout her advance in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
The commander of the Caucasus General staff wanted to appoint one of his Generals,
who had distinguished themselves in the last Russo-Turkish war; the Tsar chose Skobelev
for the projected task against the Tekkians for more than one reason. He had served in
Central Asia, was well acquainted with the state of affairs in the region, and had dis-
tinguished himself in the last war with Turkey. Skobelev was informed of his appointment in
10 January 1880. The Viceroy of the Caucasus wrote to the Tsar saying that if the conquest
of the Akhal was intended to be rapid, then the appointment of Skobelev was agreeable, but
if the conquest was to be gradual then the duty should be assigned to another General. Vide
Terentiev, Istoriia, III, 33-4.
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Russia had two options in front of her: either to subdue by a conciliatory process,
time-consuming but successful, such as she had resorted to during the 1820s and the
1 830s to subdue the Kirghiz; or to apply decisive force in rapid and overwhelming
military campaigns, which would be costly. Russia preferred the option of the quick
and decisive conquest in the case of the Turkomans, for her action there brought her
into close proximity with her avowed rival, England, and to pre-empt British
influence needed to be brief and resolute.54
The Russian press, especially those organs closely connected with the
Government, began as early as the beginning of 1879 to advocate the conquest of
Mery
 as an advanced post from which Russia could easily affect developments in
western Afghanistan and menace India. 55
 Russian public opinion was thus being
conditioned to accept the advantage of an advance. The politicians were disposed to
reflect upon the "inactivity" which had dominated earlier British actions, and to
recall that previous English remonstrations had been followed by no action. It was a
mauer of course that the advance of the Russians on Mery
 would give rise to
endless dissatisfaction and to menacing demands for explanation on the part of the
English Cabinet. But it was impossible to act so as to satisfy everybody especially
the English, who were never satisfied with anything. They ought moreover to have
accustomed themselves to this, remembering that the same thing occurred in the
Khivan and Kokand expeditions which did not prevent them from occupying that
region and subjugating to Russian rule a population of 3,000,000 and a rich coun-
try.56
After the decision was taken to appoint General Skobelev, following the
retirement and death of General Tergukasov,57
 for the task of conquering the
Turkomans and restoring Russia's disgraced dignity after the failure of Lomakin's
and Tergukasov's efforts, he had an audience with the Emperor on 12 January 1880
during which Alexander H told his General that he always maintained the opinion
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that the Central Asian foe was not as contemptible as some portrayed him, but that
"judging by what I have had reported to me, those Tekkians must be an excep-
tionally belligerent people" •58 The Emperor made no secret of his extreme concern
for the success of the forthcoming expedition. His anxiety and apprehension can be
deduced from the range of advice and directives he gave to Skobelev, the most
impressive among which was his emphasis on conducting the attack decisively: "no
retreat from the plan once adopted, no dangerous backward step that might be taken
as evidence of our weakness in the eyes of Europe and Asia, that might encourage
our foe, or inflict on Russia high expenses that might exceed the cost of the ex-
pedition itself'.59
 Following that interview, Skobelev joined a team from the Gener-
al Staff headed by F. L. Geiden, commander of the General staff, to discuss in detail
the intended operation against the Akhal Tekke, and to determine how expensive and
how effective the rail road would be in achieving the target. The conclusion was
positive and recommendations were given in favour of constructing a railway
between Krasnovodsk and Kizyl-Arvat. Skobelev then asked for 5,0006,000k in..
fantry assisted by ten sotnias of cavalry, and 32 guns from the Caucasian anny to be
transported to Transcaspia.' From its own sources, the British Government received
k The number of the Russian troops cannot be ascertained at this point because of the
secretive inclination that marked Russia's military proceedings. Contradicting numbers have
reached us through eye-witnesses of the campaign and historians contemporary with the
period. Marvin recorded the number 12,000 in his book Merv..., pp. 386-9; Krausse, a well
informed historian, indicated that the Russian army was 18,000 men, vide his Russia..., p.
87; In Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR, v. I, Pt. 2, P. 96, the number which has been given indicated
an army of 11,000 men armed with 107 guns. Yet other sources, among them contemporary
British observers, fixed the number of the Caucasian army assigned to operate against the
Turkomans as 25,000 men, vide FO 65/1071, No. 26, Major-General Roberts to Lyall,
October 27, 1879; also FOCP 4040, Captain Mimer and Captain Marshall, November 28,
1879.
Grodekov, Voina, I, 176-181; Terentiev, Istoriia, III, 34; and Khalfin, Prisoedinenie, p.
350. These three historians gave the number of the troops of the main body not including
the north and south columns which were listed in full detail by Marvin in his work Men',
391. He accurately gave the following account:
(continued...)
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reliable information that the Russian Government had laid out immense sums of
money upon the Akhal-Tekke expedition, and that no less than 10,000 men were
engaged in it; but reliable and consistent estimates were then, and still are, difficult
to establish.60 The Viceroy of the Caucasus was charged with supplying Skobelev
with sufficient troops and armament. The Turkomans, or "wild Sons of the desert" as
they were called by Loftus, were poorly armed, badly disciplined, unprovided with
leaders of any rank other than their chieftains, and had no artillery.6'
Skobelev observed that the construction of the railway would require a
separate expedition, strong protection, and help from both the Turkestan and Oren-
burg military districts. To inflame his soldiers against the Tekkians, Skobelev went
out of his way to remind his subordinates and soldiers of the disasters of 1878-9 and
warned that the honour of Russia demanded revenge for "the fallen comrades".62
Skobelev, as characterized by Russian historians, belonged to those warlike figures
who aspired for fame and glory, inclined towards slaughter rather than negotiation,
and was a fierce supporter of inflicting complete military defeat on the Tekkians; his
rhetoric was characterised by extensive chauvinism.63
Some Generals from the Orenburg administration, considering financial fact-
ors, suggested that the expedition against the Turkomans should start from an
entirely different starting point. General Meyer, assistant to General Kryzhanovskii,
1(• 
.continued)
I. North Column: led by Colonel Kozelkov consisted of:
8 companies of infantry.
2 somias of cavalry.
10 guns and two rockets.
II. South Column: led by Colonel Kuropatkin included:
8 companies of infantry.
2 sotnias of cavalry.
10 guns and two rockets.
III. Main Body: led by Skobelev and included:
18 and half companies of infantry.
7 squadrons of cavalry.
32 guns.
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the Governor-General of Orenburg, proposed that the expedition against the Turko-
mans should start from Bukhara and Khiva and proceed against Merv, the fall of
which would considerably weaken the Turkomans' resistance. Yet another General,
Brokh by name, suggested attacking the country from two sides: from the Attrek
through Duz-olum, and from Krasnovodsk through Kizyl-arvat. Both advancing
armies should meet in Bami to promote joint action against the main body of the
Turkomans. Skobelev was aware of all of these suggestions and himself, in view
of the heavy expenses of the campaign and the lack of necessary material, contemp-
lated yet another plan, of starting his campaign from Chikishlar. For this purpose,
even before arriving at his destination and while he was still in the Caucasus on his
way to cross the Caspian to Central Asia, he urgently enquired about the quantity of
military supplies already stored in Duz-olum, and ordered General Muraviev to
telegraph him at Petrovsk in the Caucasus. Also he encountered the chronic dilemma
that had faced all his predecessors, the means of transportation. Thus while he was
on his way from the Caucasus to Transcaspia he inquired about the availability of
camels in the Attrek valley, to carry his troops from Chikishlar, Chat, and Duz-olum
through the desert and the Kopet-Dagh range to Bami and beyond. 65
 He was
obsessed by the idea that the earlier failures had been more than mere military
defeats, but had shattered Russian prestige in the region. Consequently he felt that he
was obliged to adopt a strategy of no retreat. The Russians feared more than any
thing else that another Turkoman victory over their army, perhaps with the help of
Afghanistan, would have far-reaching repercussions in Khiva and Bukhara, and
throughout the whole of Central Asia.66
The Turkoman tribes, despite their acknowledged valour, were weakened by
the fact that they were divided among themselves and as hostile to each other as
they were towards the Russians. They had little knowledge of modern weaponry, of
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military science and discipline. In his official report of the siege of Geok Teppe,
speaking of the Turkomans, Skobelev said:
the enemy is brave, and skilful in single combat; he fires effectively.., but he
operates in individual extended order, or in detached bodies, very little obedi-
ent to the will of his chief. 67
These deficiencies were of course much exploited by the Russian Generals, who
manipulated one tribe against another. Though Skobelev had little confidence in the
Turkomans' cooperation, which he believed with some justice to proceed either out
of fear or for money, he did employ Turkoman road-guides, who collaborated with
the Russians for these reasons. Not wholly unexpectedly, these guides deliberately
deluded the Russian troops, and on occasion in order to exhaust the advancing army
chose longer or more difficult roads.68 To guarantee their obedience he arrested
their elders: in May 1880 he invited the elders to his camp under the pretence of
distributing decorations and entertainment, and discussing camel trade. All those who
accepted the invitation and attended the Russian camp were detained. 69 Although
this deception delivered the Turkoman leadership into Russia's hand, it was counter-
productive. The arrested chieftains were coerced to write to their relatives and fellow
tribesmen urging them to serve the Russians devotedly, otherwise they, the elders,
would be exiled to Siberia. As a direct result, the Turkoman population became
hostile and mistrusted Russia's credibility and good faith. As a result it became
difficult for the Russians to distinguish between their supporters and opponents.7°
Further, and after exhausting preparations, Skobelev was not sure of the
success of his expedition if it started from Chikishlar: this was due to the problems
of navigation and marine transportation of the equipment from the Caucasus to this
port, because of its shallow water and its vulnerability to Turkoman attacks. Thus his
choice shifted toward Krasnovodsk as his headquarters, partly for its convenient
location as the nearest point to the Caucasus, and partly for its position at the start
of a line of "auls" (villages) and colonies stretching southward along the Kopet Dag
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range to Askabad, which would render it more secure and adequate for supplying an
advancing army rather than the route from Chikishlar. With his headquarters at
Krasnovodsk, Skobelev decided to advance from Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk
simultaneously and therefore directed General Markov to survey the Attrek region.
In his report, Markov stated the impossibility of relying on the Attrek river as a
means of transportation for this expedition. 71 Meanwhile Skobelev surveyed the
region between Chikishlar and Bendesen up to Bami and Nukhur, m aiming at
splitting the Turkomans into two parts, one to the north of Bami and the other to the
south. In June 1880 he resolved to occupy Bami and to build a railway from there to
Krasnovodsk.72 To weaken the resistance of the Turkomans, the Russian diplomatic
mission in Teheran asked the Persian authorities to stop supplying the Tekkians with
food.73
Finding the Turkomans characteristically difficult to subdue, and after the
failure of his endeavours during the early months of 1880, Skobelev tried to intimi-
date them, by offering them unacceptable conditions for "peace". Either they would
voluntarily subject themselves to Russia by accepting, or if not the preparations
were in full swing at both chosen starting points, Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk. On
23 May 1880 Skobelev invited the Tekkes to join the millions of Muslims who
enjoyed "the mercy of the white Tsar", and offered them the following conditions for
peace: first, to build a road along the Sumbar river to Archman or Bakharden;
second, to supply the Russian army with 1,000 mares; third, to liberate all slaves;
fourth, to pay one million roubles indemnity; fifth, to hand over a number of youths
from the best families to the Russian authorities as hostages, and to be sent to
Russia for training; sixth, to allow Russian troops to occupy Kizyl-Arvat, Archman,
Geok Teppe, Askabad and other strategic points, without resistance; seventh, to
m• Bami was the more strategic point for it was located at the junction of the two supply
routes from Chikishlar and from Krasnovodsk.
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declare that the Akhal-Tekkian land belonged to the Russian sovereign who would
rule it as he pleased; eighth, to hand over to him all historical documents and manu-
scripts; ninth, to secure a safe path for the Russian army to occupy the oases and
furnish the soldiers with camels and food supplies; tenth, to deliver a number of
their chieftains and sardars as hostages to the Russian authorities. 74
 This astounding
catalogue of conditions naturally had no attraction for the Turkomans, who rejected
them and, despite their lack of unity and the need for British or Afghan assistance,
which they could not secure, prepared for combat against a superior and well-armed
modern army.
Having conquered Bami and Kizyl Arvat, Skobelev had secured a convenient
supporting base for his troops. On 17 July 1880 Skobelev advanced and camped six
miles from Geok Teppe and began surveying the area. After intensive reconnaissance
he arrived at the conviction that Geok Teppe could only be taken by siege and so he
asked Grand Duke Mikhail, commander of the Caucasian army, to support him with
12,000 troops and 100 guns; in addition he was to be joined by a contingent from
the Turkestan army, and Colonel Kuropatkin was sent from Samarkand to assist
him.75
By 23 December 1880 the Russian preparations were completed and the siege
of Geok Teppe started. In spite of damaging Turkoman counter-attacks, the superior
arms of the Russians broke their resistance after a three-week siege, and the strong-
hold was stormed on 12 January 1881. The defenders of the fort resisted courageous-
ly despite their enormous losses and the inadequacy of their weapons by comparison
with those of the Russians. 76
 It was rare during Russia's dealings and wars with the
Central Asians for them to attribute any positive character to the tribesmen, but on
this occasion they admitted that the Tekkians had granted a short truce in response
to Skobelev's request to remove bodies and had not broken it. 77 Skobelev admitted
that the conduct of the Tekke fighters throughout the truce were "most honour-
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able".78 Losses were great on both sides,79 and the campaign showed the Russians
that their advance would be very expensive: the siege of Geok Teppe had been very
damaging, and the Russian army in one instance lost several guns. 8° However, the
construction of the railway on the heels of the army marching from Krasnovodsk,
had solved the problems of rapid transport and communications, and facilitated the
conquest of Geok Teppe, which entered history as one of the most brutal massacres
inflicted on Central Asians. 8 ' After the fall of the fortress on January 13, 1881,
Russian troops were ordered to chase the fugitives for ten miles. Skobelev feared
that the Tekkians were withdrawing to prepare for another battle, so he gave his
orders to spare none of them:82
All who had not succeeded in escaping previously - men, women, and chil-
dren - were killed by the pursuers, the number of slain being estimated by
Skobelev at 8,000... and he put the total number of the Tekkes slain during
the siege at 20,000.83
During his visit to Paris in February 1882, Skobelev admitted that he had had
21,000 men killed in one campaign. TM Russian losses in this campaign of course
were nowhere near so severe, but nonetheless considerable: it should be noticed that
the Russians usually minimised the number of their losses, but their loss this time,
even according to their account, was 268 killed and 669 wounded, and if we add
450 killed and wounded in 1879 during Lomakin's siege and other men killed and
wounded in the reconnaissance efforts, the number was clearly substantial despite
efforts to diminish it.85
By the end of March 1881 the last leader of Turkoman resistance, Tikma
Sardar, submitted to Skobelev. Even before this, Colonel Kuropatkin was sent with a
suitable force to occupy Askabad, where the roads from Persia and Khiva meet, and
push forward across the Tedzhen plain towards Merv. In February 9, 1881 Askabad
fell, but to the disappointment of Skobelev, Alexander Ill, successor to the assassin-
ated Alexander II, recalled him to report to St. Petersburg. The new Emperor was
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convinced that what remained to be achieved in Turkomaniia could be attained by
peaceful means, rather than attracting the attention of Europe by another ruthless
campaign.86 St. Petersburg incorporated the Akhal Tekke oasis in the Transcaspian
Military district (Transkaspeiskii Voennyi Otdel) with its seat at Askabad.87
However, despite the fact that Russia appeared desirous to digest her new
acquisitions in peace, and to avoid any untimely confrontation, she energetically
continued paving the way for her future extension. Alikhanov Avarskii, disguised as
a Russian merchant, was dispatched to Merv, accompanied by two Russian officers,
his instructions being to discover the feelings of the inhabitants towards Russia, to
survey the region, and "to pave the way for the future establishment of Muscovite
rule in the oasis".88 The pseudo-merchant surveyed the Kaushid Khan Kala, the
immense rampart which the Mervians had built for the defence of their country.
Colonel Venkoskii was dispatched on a secret mission to Kabul, and Captain Lessar
was instructed to survey the region between Askabad and Herat including the Hen-
rud valley.89 This process reached its culmination in 16 March 1885 when, as
Thornton the British ambassador at St. Petersburg reported, Alikhanov instigated the
Sariks to rise while General Komarov asked for permission to attack Penjdeh.9°
These covert missions and their familiar sequence clearly indicated that the Russian
Government was not eager to halt, but was merely accumulating necessary inform-
ation and awaiting a suitable moment for further advance.
Russian policy moved quickly to pacify the Turkomans, to open the road to
Mery
 and Afghanistan, and to mobilize the Turkomans for her further advance. Later
reports showed that the Turkomans, apparently at Russian instigation, had been
migrating freely, to Penjdeh and Kila Wali in Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities
endeavoured to put a stop to this flow, and considered it might therefore become
". Alexander Vissarionovich Komarov, succeeded General Grodekov as Governor-
General of the Transcaspian District in 1883 and remained in the post until 1889.
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necessary to send a detachment of Afghan troops to Kila Wali for this purpose.9'
The issue of Mery then became the occasion of a number of communications ex-
changed between the British and the Russian Governments. De Giers, head of the
Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry, assured Lord Dufferin that the Russians
would not only not go there, "but happily there is nothing which can require us to
go there":92 another bland assurance due to be falsified by events.
Despite the massacre inflicted on Geok Teppe, the Russian authorities
declared an amnesty and even distributed decorations among Turkoman chieftains;
some earned the title of "officer" and a Turkoman delegation, with Skobelev's
consent, went to St. Petersburg and was received by the Emperor and the War
Minister.93
 Russia began to incorporate the Turkomans under her protection and to
play the role of their defender against Persian oppression. Russia as we have seen
had a system for controlling her lesser neighbours, a combination of two methods,
force and seduction; following their forcible defeat they would themselves be trans-
formed into an effective force for further conquest.94 This system was a characteris-
tic feature of her advance, in the Caucasus as well as in Central Asia, where the
Kirghiz were utilized against the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks, the latter against the
Turkomans, and they in their turn against the Afghans, and the Persians. 95 On 24
May 1881 an Imperial Ukaz was is sued announcing the formation of the Trans-
Caspian district and the annexation of the Tekke Turkomans to the Empire. The
creation of this district inaugurated a new phase in Central Asian affairs. The
attention of observers was no longer fixed on Tashkand, which lost its prominence,
and attention became directed towards the role the Caucasus armies played against
the Turkomans and towards procedures and policy to be followed by the new
administration towards its neighbours. It will be remembered that, when Kryzhanov-
skii resisted and remonstrated against the formation of the Governorship of Turkest-
an, he knew that it would mean a lesser role for Orenburg in the affairs of Central
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Asia. Now Kaufmann and the whole of the Turkestan Governorship lost their sig-
nificance as the decisive authority in the region after the formation of the Trans-
Caspian military district with its seat at Askabad. The new district seized the power
of making decisions, and conducting intrigues against its adjacent neighbours, mainly
Mery
 and the rest of the Turkoman tribes. Askabad became the new centre of action
in the region, and the General in charge, General Grodekov, 96
 and the Colonels
associated with him, Komarov and Moraviov, would be in the centre of attention at
St. Petersburg, while other previously popular Governors-General and Generals, such
as Kryzhanovskii, Kaufmann, Golovachev, Lazarev, Lomakin, and even Skobelev,
must suffer a decline of influence.
The fall of Mery
 (1884)
In line with the guarantees issued by the Russian Government not to annex
Merv, it sought to keep its designs against that city undisclosed until the time was
ripe for annexation. Count Shchovalov, director of the Russian secret police, and
confidential counsellor to the Emperor, had explained in a letter to Kaufmann dated
27 November 1878 the degree of secrecy which wrapped the question of Merv. He
admitted that Russia, in regard to Merv, had two policies: the policy of restraint, and
the forward policy. Behind the camouflage of the policy of restraint, the Russian
diplomats and officials manoeuvred to rid themselves from responsibility for events
in Central Asia in the face of British objections, waiting instead for a haphazard
event which would make the realisation of their hidden intention appear to happen
accidentally. This policy was open to one grave objection, as seen by Russian
observers, that it would leave Russian policy at the mercy of probability and luck.
On the other hand, they saw its advantage in that it "would eliminate any reason that
may lead to confrontation with England".97
 The forward policy was not openly re-
commended as an official course by Russian politicians, for they saw that it would
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bring Russia unpredicted difficulties with her rivals which might harm her interests.
The question of Mery compelled Russia to choose one or the other course. Shchov-
alov in his letter to Kaufmann acknowledged that Russia would in the last resort
adopt the forward policy and attack Mer y if England were to occupy Herat and
Kabul. However he warned that if Russia were to act first against Merv, she would
furnish Britain with the pretext to occupy Afghanistan. Russia's viewpoint on the
question of Mery was kept in deep secrecy up to the end of Akhal Tekke campaign;
"only 15-20 people in the whole of the Empire knew the real state of affairs in this
regard" 98
The Turkomans' elders began to be invited to come to Askabad, the new seat
of the Government, where they were received with honour and courtesy. These
efforts proved to be highly effective and Russia's "moral influence over the Turko-
mans" was enhanced, as the British acknowledged.99 Despite all assurances it was
clear to them that Russia's efforts were directed towards controlling Merv. Officials
in St. Petersburg still denied that any effort was being made in that direction.
Meanwhile the Russian Government at Askabad received a delegation of Mery
Turkomans. In March 1884 De Giers disclosed to E. Thornton, the British ambassa-
dor, that the Emperor had acceded to the request of the representatives of the Mery
Turkomans that he should accept their allegiance.' 00 There then followed intense
diplomatic efforts aimed at clarification of the boundary of Merv, and at demarcation
of the borders of Afghanistan. The British Government secured an answer from the
Russians that the territory of Mery was held to extend eastward to the Oxus and
south to the frontiers of Afghanistan.101
Russia's covert efforts in the region included a policy of waiting upon inter-
tribal rivalries, under the pretext of settling disputes between the Tekke, the Sank,
and the Salor Turkoman tribes; Russian agents also appeared in Penjdeh and Mai-
maneh inside Afghan territory. Upon Thornton's inquiry about the purpose of these
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Russian activities, De Giers assured him that no scheme of annexation was intended
and denied that any agent had been sent to Maimaneh. The Russian Government, in
agreement with its usual apparently conciliatory practice, agreed to the British
proposal to send two commissioners to determine the boundary line between Khoja
Saleh and Tedzhen, but objected to the presence of an Afghan representative, even
as an expert to give necessary advice and information.102 Meanwhile Russia's
activities in the region continued, her relations with the Turkomans tribes were
enhanced, and a wedge was driven, as a result, between the Turkomans and the
Afghans on one side and the Persians on the other.
The British and the Indian Governments were worried about the security of
Herat, and regarded the Russian advance towards Mer y as a menace to the security
of Afghanistan and as a serious infringement of all previous assurances. The British
Cabinet considered measures to correct the deteriorating situation, mostly designed
to keep the Russians out of Herat. Although the Russian Government regarded this
action as directed against its activities, directly and as a threat designed to oblige it
to abandon its policy against the Turkomans, in practice it did not do so.
Since the fall of Khiva the Russian Government had aimed at the control of
Merv, and Russia's activities had begun to alarm the British Government, which
protested against them, arguing that there was no justification for them, and above
all that they compromised the security of the Afghan frontiers.'° 3 In March 1884,
after nearly eleven years interval, the Russian army entered Mer y and established
control over the basins of the Tedzhen and Herirud rivers. The conquest of Mery
was justified by Russian officials as a counter step to Persia's activities in the
region. 104 The Persian move was however evidently a precautionary one designed
to limit the damage and ruin that had been caused by the Turkomans' raids against
Khorasan. Komarov dispatched Alikhanov to meet the Khan of Mery to deliver a
letter. Meanwhile the Russian troops advancing in the direction of Mer y halted at a
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distance of only one hundred miles. 105 The Mery elders realized the futility of
resisting the Russian armies without assistance from either Persia or Afghanistan.
The inhabitants were divided and their resistance was feeble. Komarov advanced and
after breaking the resistance of the anti-Russian party entered Merv.'° 6 The occu-
pation of Mery did not surprise either the British Government or the Indian. Lord
Derby had written in 1877 to Loftus, during the Russian operations against the
Tekke Turkomans, that it was obvious in the light of Russia's earlier practices, that
she would ultimately occupy Merv; but he directed Loftus to remind Gorchakov of
his as well as the Emperor's assurances regarding the extension of Russia's territory
in that direction. 107 All of Britain's previous fears were thus realised, and now the
Russian spears were pointed directly against Herat.
Epilogue: the Penjdeh incident
The fate of Merv, "the Queen of the World", was decided in March 1884. Its
conquest completed the Russian campaign to annex the territories of the Turkoman
peoples of Central Asia, but it did not mark as yet any pause in the Russian career
of expansion in Central Asia as a whole. In the fluid condition of frontiers in the
whole region, upon which we have already commented, the Russians had became
accustomed to conducting their policy as though there were no frontiers of any kind
at all to restrain them; or perhaps, to behaving as though any recognition on their
part of frontiers beyond which they had no claims or interests was a purely tactical
and temporary expedient, to be disregarded as soon as it became possible to do so.
Their annexation of Penjdeh in 1885, as their acquisition of the Pamirs in 1895 (both
of course at the expense of Afghanistan), must remain beyond the scope of the
present study; but we may briefly observe how it exemplified in almost classic
proportions the manners in which they had secured their conquests over the previous
half century.
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The newly conquered Turkomans became an effective instrument at the
disposal of Russian policy; naively they trusted their new masters and without full
realisation of the consequences, helped to realize their plans and to advance their
intrigues. It was the usual practice of the Russian Generals and Colonels to encamp
their regular troops in a certain stronghold and send semi-regular troops from the
newly conquered population, now mobilized as part of the Russian force, forward for
purposes of reconnaissance and to engage in skirmishes; these in due course would
be utilized as a justification for further advance and new claims.'08 On the other
front Alikhanov conquered Serakhs from the Persian troops. The annexation of
Serakhs gave Russia control over the right bank of the river Tedzhen; furnished thus
with unchallenged command over
the junction of the roads to Herat and Meshed, and the best entrance to Khor-
asan from the north, it cannot fail to exercise a very serious influence on the
momentous issue of the Russo-Indian question. if England does not use
Serakhs for defence, Russia will use it for offence.'°9
The fall of Serakhs encouraged the Russian troops to advance south from Mery
along the Murgab river, taking control of the strategic localities between that city
and Kizyl Teppe. Reports reached the Afghans at Penjdeh that a Russian infantry
column supported by field guns was marching on Kizyl Teppe, one mile from Pul-i-
Khitsi.11°
The Russian advance was deliberately provocative, designed to facilitate an
attack on the Afghan post at Ak Teppe. Alikhanov, commander of the advancing
force, looted sheep belonging to Penjdeh inhabitants, and stopped the Saryks from
grazing north of Ak Teppe and Serakhs; he and Komarov used every possible means
to instigate the Saryks to rise. In the mean time Komarov sought the consent of his
superiors at St. Petersburg for an attack on Penjdeh. De Giers in an interview with
Colonel Trench, from the staff of the British embassy in St. Petersburg, promised
that the Russian force would not advance from its present positions:
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that peremptory instructions had been given to the officers in the Trans-
caspian province, not only that all care should be taken to avoid a conflict,
but that no measures of incitement should be made use of.'1'
Despite these assurances General Komarov advanced to Hazrat Imam with a con-
siderable force, reported to be 1,500 men plus the troops under Alikhanov's com-
mand, 400 infantry, 300 cavalry, and unidentified number of Cossacks, which were
stationed at Yarym Teppe. In contradiction of what De Giers had told Thornton, the
orders which St. Petersburg sent to Komarov were of a completely different charact-
er: they clearly urged the local Russian command, in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities, to "seize Penjdeh and to advance with the utmost speed with all available
forces to Herat... before the Anglo-Indian forces can reach that city"." 2 In the
mean time Russia was apparently preparing for full scale war against England. The
War Minister instructed the Caucasus Command at Tiflis to mobilize two army
corps, and all the officers of the Caucasus armies, Turkestan, and the Transcaspian
Provinces were ordered to report promptly to their posts and regiments:
Preparations, moreover, have been made with the Kavkaz and Mercury
Steam-ship Companies for the transport of a considerable body of troops
from Baku to Krasnovodsk."3
On 26 March 1885 General Komarov's forces joined Alikhanov's columns at
Yarim Teppe and Kizyl Teppe and it became clear that the Russians intended to
attack Ak Teppe and Penjdeh."4 The Afghan and British observers suspected that
Russian troops were also moving towards the strategically sensitive Zulfiqar Pass, so
the Afghans began to send reinforcements to that place." 5 On 27 March 1885 the
Russian troops commenced hostilities against Penjdeh, though they were unsuccess-
ful in their attempt to cross the river. In an effort to avoid hostilities, the Afghan
commander made an attempt to meet General Komarov to discuss a settlement, but
received no reply. Three days later Komarov advanced against Pul-i-Khatun and
Penjdeh and took possession of it; this marked the beginning of Russia's policy of
expansion at the expense of Afghanistan." 6 Kabul protested against the aggression
234
The campaign against the Turkomans
and demanded verification of the frontiers by Great Britain. The result, following a
brief but acute crisis between Russia and Great Britain, was a compromise negotiat-
ed between Russian and British officers on the spot, which did indeed transfer to
Russia sovereignty over the Penjdeh territory which had formerly been regarded as
Afghan, and whose inhabitants had owed such allegiance as they acknowledged to
the Amir of Kabul.'17
The Penjdeh affair of 1885 may be regarded as marking the end of the
Russian expansion at the expense of the Turkomans of Central Asia, and the begin-
ning of a policy of aimed against Afghanistan. It was also the first occasion when
the Russians found themselves negotiating frontiers with British officers rather than
with the frightened and corruptible representatives of weak Khanates. Nevertheless
they secured a further territorial advance in return for their undertaking to respect the
new frontier; as indeed they also did in the Pamirs episode 1893-1895, also at the
expense of Afghanistan." 8 However, and in so far as their expansion into Afghan
territory finally brought them up against the opposition of the British, we may in
retrospect regard the decade 1885-1895 as that in which the tide of Russian expan-
sion in Central Asia was arrested. After 1895, they turned their attention to the Far
East, to Manchuria and Korea, where the British were largely powerless to restrain
them and where their progress was finally halted only by defeat in war at the hands
of the Japanese in 1905. It was after that defeat, and in order to begin the recon-
struction of their political position in Europe after the disastrous revolution of 1905,
that the Russians finally acknowledged in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 that
Afghanistan lay outside their sphere of influence, and within the sphere of influence
of British India: the realisation of an old British policy, the policy of the buffer
zone."9 It was only in 1979 that the Russians, the last surviving imperial power of
the 19th century, finally entered Afghanistan, under different international and
regional circumstances, and utilising a totally different pretext. The historian may
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however consider that their underlying aspiration to ascendancy and control of the
region remained fundamentally unchanged, whatever the political character of the
regime in Moscow might be.
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As we have seen throughout this work, the absence of clear natural frontiers
in that vast territory, extending from the Caspian in the west to the Irtysh river in
the east, was of great advantage to the Russians in their period of expansion
eastward and southward into Central Asia. It enabled them systematically to absorb
the steppe region inhabited by nomadic tribes, as they pushed their moving frontier
inexorably towards the Syr Dana river. From the early nineteenth century, Russian
contact with the more settled Khanates of Central Asia beyond the Syr Dana began
to evince an increasingly acquisitive aspect and to assume a more aggressive form,
exploiting the rivalries between the Khanates. Russian envoys were sent to the
Khanates, ostensibly to conduct diplomatic or commercial negotiations, or to secure
the release of hostages; but in secret they were sent also to gather intelligence which
would be of political and strategic advantage to the Russian military advance: to
survey the region and collect topographical data, to discover the availability of
supplies of food and water, and to assess the attitudes of the populations towards
each other, their rulers, and the Russians themselves. The earliest military advance,
that of Perovskii against Khiva in 1839, was a humiliating failure, and Russian
attention was subsequently diverted to the Ottoman Empire by the events leading up
to the Crimean War of 1853. Russia's defeat in 1856 led to a revival of interest in
the Khanates as an area of easy compensation. In the 1860s and the 1870s the
Russian advance was swift and dramatic, extinguishing successively the indepen-
dence of the Khanates of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva, and culminating in the
campaign against the Turkomans and the capture of Merv, the "Queen of the world",
in 1884. In an era of widespread and impressive imperial expansion, this was the
most remarkable (yet perhaps the least remarked) example of European imperial
conquest in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Apart from the neighbouring states of Persia and Afghanistan, the power
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most threatened by the advance of Russia in Central Asia was Great Britain, the
great imperial power of India, with interests extending from the Persian Gulf in the
west, through Persia and Afghanistan, to Tibet and Chinese Turkestan in the east.
Throughout their advance in Central Asia, the Russians were aware that the only
European power capable of limiting their ambitions was Britain, and they made
frequent and assiduous attempts to appease British fears. On the one hand they
appealed to British sympathy for their supposed "civilising mission", on the other
they repeatedly maintained that Russia had no intention of making permanent
conquests and annexations in the region: Gorchakov's notorious circular of Novem-
ber 1864 was merely one example of this mendacious and two-edged policy of
pursuing expansion in practice while denying it in theory. Successive administrative
reorganisations, from the formation of the new General Governorship of Turkestan
(1867) onwards, are adequate evidence of the Russian aim of permanent annexation.
The encouragement given to settlement by Russian civilians in the conquered
territories, and the efforts towards Russification through education and by undermin-
ing the traditional bases of Muslim society, give further proof of Russia's long-term
objectives.
The subjugation of Khiva in the 1 870s, and the capture of Mer y in 1884,
brought the Russians to the frontiers of Afghanistan and demonstrated in increasing-
ly acute form the Russian menace to the security of British india. As we have seen,
Russian projects for the invasion of India dated back to the reign of the Tsar Paul,
and, particularly in periods of Anglo-Russian confrontation over the fate of the
Ottoman Empire, were regarded by the Russian military as a powerful lever to be
applied against the British to secure their compliance in the Eastern Question. The
British response, though increasingly anxious, was remarkably irresolute. The British
and Indian governments did little to halt the Russian avalanche, whether by territori-
al expansion, military assistance, or even financial aid to those states threatened by
Russian ambitions: frequent appeals for assistance from the Khanates were ignored
by the government of India; masterly inactivity persisted long. The policy of the
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"buffer zone" was originally supposed to include at least a part of the Khanates'
territories as well as Afghanistan; but it was pursued at best through half-hearted
political and diplomatic representations, producing a sequence of indecisive under-
standings, which St. Petersburg found no difficulty in successively undermining and
eroding. Only in 1885, as a result of the Penjdeh affair, did British officers meet
their Russian counterparts, to delimit a frontier and set limits to Russia's southward
advance; and even then the result of their work was to surrender a part of the
territory of the Amir of Afghanistan to Russia. The conquest and subjugation of the
Khanates of Central Asia was by then already complete.
It is clear that, throughout this process, the interaction between economic,
political and military considerations and motivations was shifting and complicated.
We have seen how, from the time of De Maizon's mission (1834) onwards, econom-
ic interests were used as a screen behind which political and military ambitions
could be pursued. We have seen how strategic considerations, including the ambi-
tious project for the invasion of India, dominated the thinking and shaped the
policies of Russia's Generals, who were of course the administrators of the region as
well as its conquerors. In this context the history of the Transcaspian railway project
is highly instructive. Those in government who wished to promote the opening-up
and economic development of Turkestan wished to see the railway built southwards
from Orenburg, but this well-intentioned project was frustrated by various obstacles,
mainly financial; whereas those Generals who were intent on improving their
military and strategic position against the Turkomans encountered no opposition to
their project for a railway eastwards from the shores of the Caspian, and no financial
obstacles were allowed to stand in their way. As we have seen, it was the military
railway that was built, its connection with Orenburg being completed only later, in
the 1 890s, following the final termination of the southward advance. Of course the
railway had enormous economic, social, and cultural consequences for the whole
region, promoting its commercial development, facilitating the settlement of Russian
colonists in large numbers, and opening it up to foreign influences: but it is clear
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that it was initially built, and its route determined, out of military considerations. We
need not disagree with those Marxist historians who insist on the importance of
economic factors in Russian imperialism in Central Asia, as indeed we can accept
the view of historians of imperialism in general that economic motivations and
consequences were an important part of the imperial process; but we have seen in
the specific case of Russia's advance against the Khanates of Central Asia that it
was first of all military and strategic imperatives, and then political and administra-
tive considerations, which dictated the methods and direction of the advance.
Unlike other European powers, which went to Asia for economic and
commercial gain, and remained temporarily for political reasons, Russia went into
Central Asia to stay. The intention and the plan permanently to colonise the region
was peculiar to Russia, and the increasing military and civilian presence was
accompanied by vigorous efforts towards Russification. Through investigating her
various practices, military, political and economic, we have seen that Russia's
purpose was no less than the total assimilation of the peoples of Central Asia and
the incorporation of their lands into the great Russian Empire.
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Appendix I
Guide Lines to De Maizon
For his Journey to Bukhara
From The Governor-General of Orenburg
General Perovskii
(October 1833)
(Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve)
Vasiii Alexeevich Perovskii (1795-1857) was twice Military Governor of
Orenburg, from 1833 until 1842, and from 1851 until 1857. In September 26, 1833
Perovskii wrote a letter to Rodofinikin, head of the Asiatic Department in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he discussed urgent political and commercial
concerns. He expressed his desire to receive reliable information about certain
foreign activities, notably British, which were taking place in Central Asia. In the
same letter he stressed his worry about British commercial penetration in Central
Asia. Perovskii also pointed out that not long ago two Englishmen, William
Moorcroft and George Trebek, had visited the Khanate of Bukhara. So he
suggested sending an envoy not directly from the central Government but from the
local authorities of Orenburg, to avoid publicity and other complications. He
emphasized the fact that in such a way, the government certainly would avoid
excessive costs, and the envoy would avoid the speculation and cautiousness of the
Bukharan government and population as well. Perovskii's ideas fully corresponded
with the intention of the Imperial Government, which was by that time attentively
watching Britain's activities in the region, and anxiously aspired to expand its own
commercial relations on the one hand, and exchanging embassies with the states of
Central Asia on the other. For this intricate task Perovskii suggested commissioning
I. V. Vitkeivich, for his knowledge of local languages. Perovskii's project received
the consent of St. Petersburg. The only reservation was that the Emperor did not
see that Vitkeivich was a reliable person for such an important mission. The reason
behind this rejection lay in the fact that Vitkeivich had been involved in anti-
Government political circles during his time in the Gymnasium in 1823. Perovskii
241
Guide lines to De Maizon
was quick to find the suitable and confident alternative figure: he was P. I. De
Maizon. De Maizon was born in the Kingdom of Sardinia, though his name
indicates a French origin. His oriental features gave him the necessary advantage in
carrying out his task; in addition he had mastered the Russian, Arabic, Tatar,
Persian, and Turkish languages. He was entrusted with his mission and received
this list of instructions in October 1833. He commenced his task disguised as a
Tatar Mulla under the pseudo-name of Mirza Au.
The instructions, covered nearly every aspect of life; social, commercial,
political, military, agricultural, geographic, and others. Reviewing it one would
undoubtedly come out with the conviction that Russia's aims lay far beyond
apparent commercial interests, or liberating her prisoners, i.e. in obtaining essential
information which might be necessary for total control of the Khanate. The
instructions reveal in the same time Russian ignorance of such wide range of issues
about neighbouring state. They were originally written and communicated to De
Maizon in Russian. Eventhough, the Emperor took part in discussing this mission,
neither he nor Perovskii signed the communique, in stead it was signed by
anonymous secretary. The translation given here is by the author of this thesis.
Perovskii directed De Maizon to investigate the following points:
1 - The Bukharan attitude towards Russia in general, and their government in
particular. If their disposition is negative, then what is the reason? For that
displeasure do they have any reasons that were unknown to the government?
2 - The characteristics of those personalities who are in power in Bukhara.
3 - Agricultural production. Cannot the production of cotton be increased, and to
what extent? The production of silk as well.
4 - In case of increasing Bukharan exports to our country, would they accept
payment in commodities which until now they do not import from us; or is it
possible to increase the consumption, in Bukhara, of those commodities which the
Bukharans already import from us?
5 - Does not Bukhara receive, from other Asian countries, commodities that do not
reach Russia, but whose use would be beneficial here, and replace goods of the
same sort but from European production? In this respect it is recommended to pay
attention to the dye indigo or what is called "Kubovaia" paint. It remains to be
found out what quantity can be brought into Russia from Bukhara, and at what
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price?
6 - The Bukharans import from Russia a considerable amount of iron and copper.
They then manufacture it themselves and produce different articles and utensils,
despite the fact that these products can be manufactured in Russia more con-
veniently and cheaper, it is helpful to know the reasons.
7 - The Bukharans import a great deal of tea from Chinese Turkestan, and at
reasonable prices, so that we can get the same commodity at the same price, but as
it is transported not in boxes but in sacks, otherwise it not flavoured. Also, is there
any possibility of transporting it in boxes suitable to be carried on horseback, as
the caravans between Kashgar and Kokand do?
8 - How is the trade going between Bukhara and Chinese Turkestan?
9 - How strong are the commercial links between Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand,
Badakhshan, Afghanistan, and Persia?
10- What is the Bukharan's opinion of the English and their East Indian Company.
What did the Englishmen who visited Bukhara do? Were many English goods
brought to Bukhara this year, and how much from Persia? Also how much from
Turkey through Persia, what was the quality of those goods, at what price were
they sold, and were they bought willingly? This subject is so important that the
most penetrating attention should be directed to it and the most detailed data
should be collected.
11- How extensive is the exchange of goods between the Bukharans and the
Kirghiz and is it profitable to the latter?
12- Where do the Kirghiz roaming beyond the Syr-Daria barter for their food and
other products?
13- It is known that the Khivans oppress them [the Kirghiz]; it would not be bad
thing to discover whether they would agree to roam nearer to Russia?
14- What is the influence of Sultan Manumbai Shir-Gazi over these Kirhgiz, and is
he really completely loyal to the Khivan government?
15- Is the land beyond the Syr-Daria suitable for the cultivation of grain and
cotton?
16- Is it true that the Yanydaria river dried up some years ago, and then resumed
its flow?
17- Is there any possibility to have Kyzyldaria to flow again like the Yanydaria?
And would the terrain allow canals from Syr-Daria and from its tributaries?
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18- Is it true that the Amu-Daria has a branch flows to the Caspian sea?
19- The chief of the Khivan caravan, newly arrived her, confirmed the accounts of
the Kirhgiz and declared that the present change in the course of the Amu-Daria
was caused by a flood, which took place last summer in Khiva, damaging fields
and destroying the growing wheat. The most detailed information on this would be
highly useful.
20- Kirhgiz and B ukharans have said that during the period when grain prices were
soaring in Khiva, or grain disappear almost completely during the last winter many
inhabitants left the city, which has resulted in a significant reduction in her
population, and the Khivan government became completely powerless. This matter
deserves to be explained in details.
21- In 1832 Abbas-Mirza drew close to Khiva with his army, then unexpectedly he
stopped, and news about his expedition suddenly dried up. Did he delay the
punishment which he had prepared for the Khivans, or did they reached some kind
of reconciliation?
22- The Russian captives in Khiva have found the only means of escaping
imprisonment to be the very difficult flight across the Kirhgiz steppe to Russia, but
it would be less far to flee to Bukhara, whence they could fairly easily come to
Russia with the caravans. Why they do not use this method? Are there not people
in Bukhara, who would agree to buy prisoners from Khiva, bring them to Bukhara,
and from there smuggle them to Russia? Since the Khivans will sell prisoners only
to their co-religionists, this suggestion would seem acceptable.
23- You should be extremely careful in your dealings with the Russian prisoners in
Bukhara, so as to avoid giving the Bukharan government any cause for
dissatisfaction. Any meetings with them, should as far as possible not be in private,
and you should avoid having any relations with them, the subject of which might
be a source of discontent to the Bukharans. But you can openly ask for their
release and, if all else fails inquire about the desired reward. It goes without saying
that details about the number and condition of the Russian prisoners would be
appreciated by our authorities.
24- It may happen, that the Kush-Begi may send some presents to the military
governor in response to what he received from us; in that case you must explain to
him that, the gift most pleasing to me would be to set free and send home one or
more of the Russian prisoners.
25- In 1825 an Englishman named Moorcroft arrived in Bukhara from India, and
was killed on his way back in Khulm. His and his companions' belongings were
plundered by the local chieftains and sold publicly. Local people would not see any
value in his papers, so these may be preserved, and it is even probable that you can
buy them for modern gifts and promises of future reward. Our government would
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not object to expending some thousands of rubles, in order to obtain all the papers
of that traveller.
Signed: Secretary Ulianov
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PRINCE GORCHAKOV'S CIRCULAR
November 21, 1864
(Boulger, England and Russia in Central Asia)
The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized States which
are brought mt contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed
social organization.
In such cases it always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in
the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a
certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character makes
most undesirable neighbours.
First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put down. To put a stop to
them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect
submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but
are in their turn exposed to the attacks of the more distant tribes.
The state is bound to defend them against these depredations, and to punish
those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically re-
curring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organization makes to
impossible to seize. If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the
lesson is soon forgotten; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity
of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of
reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them. The work
a• Alexander Mikailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883), a Russian diplomat served as
ambassador in London, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna. He took part in the Conference of
Ambassadors at Vienna in 1854 with the main objective to prevent Austria, Prussia and
other Governments from joining the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition against Russia. In
1856 he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1856-1882) to become one of the most
prominent engineers of Russia's aggressive policy in those turbulent years. He was the ini-
tiator of the abrogation Paris Treaty in 1871, which was imposed upon Russia after her
defeat in the Crimean War in 1856. He also played vital role in the rapprochement between
Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, or the well known union of the Three Emperors in
1873, which he masterfully utilized to enhance the position of his country against Turkey,
and succeeded in neutralising Europe in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78, which ended
by the agreement of San Stefano (1878).
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has then always to be done over again from the beginning.
In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are
established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear
upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced
submission. But some beyond this second line, other still more distant tribes, come
in their turn to threaten the same danger, and necessitate the same measures of
repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives -
either to give up this endless labour, and to abandon its frontier to perpetual dis-
turbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civiisation and impossibility, or,
on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the
difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance.
Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar
position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies,
England in India - all have been irresistibly forced, less by ambition that by
imperious necessity, into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to
know where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop.
Such, too, have been the reasons which have led the Imperial Government
to take up at first a position resting on one side on the Syr Dana, on the other on
the lake of Issyk Kul, and to strengthen these two lines by advanced forts, which,
little by little, have crept on into the heart of those distant regions, without, how-
ever, succeeding in establishing on the other side of our frontiers that tranquillity
which is indispensable for their security.
The explanation of this unsettled state of things is to be found, first, in the
fact that between the extreme points of this double line there is an immense
unoccupied space, where all attempts at colonisation or caravan trade are paralysed
by the inroads of the robber tribes; and, in the second place, in the perpetual
fluctuations of the political condition of those countries where Turkestan and
Kokand, sometimes united, sometimes at variance, always at war, either with one
another or with Bukhara, presented no chance of settled relations, or of any regular
transactions whatever.
The Imperial Government thus found itself, in spite of all its efforts, in the
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dilemma we have above alluded to, that is to say, compelled either to permit the
continuance of a state of permanent disorder, paralysing to all security and
progress, or to condemn itself to costly and distant expeditions leading to no
practical result and with the work always to be done anew; or, lastly, to enter upon
the undefined path of conquest and annexation which has given to England the
Empire in India, by attempting the subjugation by armed force, one after another,of
the small independent States whose habits of pillage and turbulence, and whose
perpetual revolts, leave their neighbours neither peace nor repose.
Neither of these alternative courses was in accordance with the objects of
our August Master's policy, which consists not in extending beyond all reasonable
bounds the regions under his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to his rule, in
guaranteeing their security, and in developing their social organization, their
commerce, their well-being, and their civilisation.
Our task was, therefore, to discover a system adapted to the auainment of
this threefold object.
The following principles have, in consequence, been laid down:
1. It has been judged to be indispensable that our two fortified lines, one
extending from China to the lake of Issyk Kul, the other from the sea of Aral along
the Syr Dana, should be united by fortified points, so that all our posts should be
in a position of mutual support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes
might make their inroads and depredations with immunity.
2. It was essential that the line of our advanced forts thus completed should
be situated in a country fertile enough not only to insure their supplies, but also to
facilitate the regular colonisation, which alone can prepare a future of stability and
prosperity for the occupied country by gaining over the neighbouring population to
civiised life.
3. Finally, it was urgent to lay down this line defmitively, so as to escape
the danger of being carried away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive
measures and reprisals into an unlimited extension of territory.
This system was suggested to us by a very simple fact, the result of
experience, namely, that the nomad tribes, which can neither be seized nor
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punished, nor effectually kept in order, are our most inconvenient neighbours;
while on the other hand, agricultural and commercial populations attached to the
soil, and possessing a more advanced social organization, offer us every chance of
gaining neighbours with whom there is a possibility of entering into relations.
Consequently our frontier line ought to swallow up the former and stop
short at the limit of the latter.
These three principles supply a clear, natural, and logical explanation of our
last military operations in Central Asia. In fact, our original frontier line extending
along the Syr Dana to Fort Perovskii on one side, and on the other to the lake
Issyk Ku!, had the drawback of being almost on the verge of the desert. It was
broken by a wide gap between the two extreme points; it did not offer sufficient
resources to our troops, and left unsettled tribes over the border, with which any
settled arrangement became impossible.
In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier, these motives had been
powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish this line between
Lake Issyk Kul and the Syr Dana by fortifying the town of Chemkend, lately
occupied by us. By the adoption of this line we obtain a double result. In the first
place, the country it takes in is fertile, well wooded, and watered by numerous
watercourses; it is partly inhabited by various Kirghiz tribes which have already
accepted our rule; it consequently offers favourable conditions for colonisation and
the supply of provisions to our garrisons. In the second place, it puts us in the
immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural and commercial populations of
Kokand. We find ourselves in the presence of a more solid and compact, less
unsettled, and better organized social state, fixed for us, with geographical
precision, the limit up to which we are bound to advance, and at which we must
halt, because, while on the one hand any further extension of our rule, meeting, as
it would, no longer with unstable communities such as the nomad tribes, but with
more regularly constituted States, would entail considerable exertions, and would
draw us on from annexation to annexation with unforseen complications; on the
other, with such States for our future neighbours, their backward civilisation and
the instability of their political condition do not shut us out from the hope that the
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day may come when regular relations may, to the advantage of both parties, take
the place of the permanent troubles which have up to the present moment paralysed
all progress in those countries.
Such are the interests which inspire the policy of our August Master in
Central Asia.
It is needless for me to lay stress upon the interest which Russia evidently
has not to increase her territory, and, above all, to avoid raising complications on
her frontiers, which can but delay and paralyse her domestic development.
The programme which I have just traced is in accordance with these views.
Very frequently of late years the civilisation of these countries, which are
her neighbours on the continent of Asia, has been assigned to Russia as her special
permission.
No agent has been found more apt for the progress of civiisation than
commercial relations. Their development requires everywhere order and stability,
but in Asia it demands a complete transformation of the habits of the people. The
first thing to be taught to the population of Asia is that they will gain more in
favouring and protecting the caravans trade than in robbing them. These elementary
ideas can only be accepted by the public where one exists; that is to say, where
there is some organized form of society, and a Government to direct and represent
it.
We are accomplishing the first task in carrying our frontier to the limit
where the indispensable conditions are to be found.
The second we shall accomplish in making every effort henceforward to
prove to our neighbouring States, by a system of firmness in the repression of their
misdeeds, combined with moderation and justice in the use of our strength, and
respect for their independence, that Russia is not their enemy, that she entertains
towards them no idea of conquest, and that peaceful and commercial relations with
her are more profitable than disorder, pillage, reprisals, and a permanent state of
war.
The Imperial Cabinet, in assuming this task, takes as its guide the interests
of Russia. But it believes that at the same time it is promoting the interests of
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humanity and civiisation. It has a right to expect that the line of conduct it
pursues, and the principles which guide it, will meet with a just and candid
appreciation.
Signed
(A. M. Gorchakov)
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DECREE
FOR THE FORMATION OF THE OF THE PROVINCE
OF TURKESTAN
(Materialy p0 istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana)
Where as we hold it to be expedient to modify the civil and military
organization of the territories bordering on China and the Central Asian khanates
which formed portions of the Governments of Orenburg and West Siberia, We
ordain by these presents that:
1. A General-Governorship be forthwith established in Turkestan, which shall
consist of the province of Turkestan, the circle of Tashkand, the districts ling
beyond the Syr-Daria, which were occupied by us in the year 1866, and the portion
of the province of Semipalatinsk that lies to the south of the Tarbagatai mountain
range.
2. The boundaries of the Government of Turkestan shall henceforward be:
a - With respect to the Government of West Siberia: the ridge of the
Tarbagatai mountains, and their offshoots as far as the present frontier line which
divides the province of Semipalatinsk from the country inhabited by the Kirghiz of
Siberia, shall form the frontier on that side, as far as the lake of Balkhash, then
extending farther in a curve drawn through the middle of that lake, and equidistant
from its shores, and then in a straight line to the river Chu, thence following the
course of that river till its confluence with the Syr Daria.
b - With respect to the Government of Orenburg: the frontier line shall be
drawn from the middle of the Gulf of Perovskii in the Sea of Aral, over the
Termembes mountain, the place called Terekli, over the Kalmas mountain, the
place Muzbil, the Akkum and Chubar-Tubia mountains, the southern point of the
sandy desert Myn-Kum, and the place Myn-Bulak, to the confluence of the rivers
Sari Su and Chu.
3. The new government shall be divided into two provinces, one the Syr-Daria, the
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other Semirechinsk, and the river Kurogoty will form the boundary line between
them.
4. The chief administrative power over the country thus constituted will be
entrusted to a Governor-General, and the provinces of the Syr-Daria and the
Semirechinsk to Military Governors; as regards the military administration arid the
military establishments, the two provinces shall form the military district of
Turkestan, and the command of the whole of the troops stationed within the district
shall be entrusted to the Governor-General, with the title, "Commander of the
Forces of the District" and the Military Governors shall command the troops in
their own provinces, with the title "Commander of the Forces" in their respective
provinces.
5. On the establishment of the provinces of the Syr Dana and the Semirechinsk,
existing civil authorities therein employed shall remain at the disposition and under
the control of the respective Military Governors until general regulations for the
guidance of the administration of the whole district shall be promulgated.
Dated July 11, 1867
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RUSSO-KHIVAN TREATY
August 12, 1873
(FO 65/8 79, No. 415, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 22, 1873; and in Thukovskii,
Snoshenii Ross ii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednei trekhsotletie)
1. Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan professes himself the humble servant
of the Emperor of all the Russias. He renounces the right of entertaining any direct
and friendly relations with neighbouring sovereigns and khans, and of concluding
with them commercial or other treaties of any kind whatsoever, and shall not,
without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authorities in
Central Asia, undertake and military operations against such neighbouring
countries.
2. The boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amu
Dana from Kukertli down the river as far as the point at which the most westerly
branch of the Amu Dana leaves the main stream, and from that point the frontier
shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral sea. Farther, the
frontier shall extend along the sea coast to Cape Urgu, and from thence along the
edge of the Chink of the Ust-Urt, following the so called ancient bed of the Amu
Dana.
3. The whole of the right bank of the Amu Dana, and the adjoining lands, which
have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the
Khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping
thereon. Those parcels of land which are at present the property of the Khan, and
of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan officers of State, become
likewise the property of the Russian government, free of all claims on the part of
the previous owners. The Khan may indemnify them by grants of land on the left
bank.
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4. In the event of a portion of such right bank being transferred to the possession
of the Amir of Bukhara by the will of His Majesty the Emperor, the Khan of
Khiva shall recognise the latter as the lawful possessor of such portion of his
former dominions, and engages to renounce all intention of re-establishing his
authority therein.
5. Russian steamers, and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the
Government or to private individuals, shall have the free and exclusive right of
navigating the Amu Dana river. Khivan and Bukharan vessels may enjoy the same
right, not otherwise than by special permission from the superior Russian authority
in Central Asia.
6. Russians shall have the right to construct wharves on the left bank wheresoever
the same shall be found necessary and convenient. The Government of the Khan
shall be responsible for the safety and security of such wharves. The approval of
the localities selected for wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authorities in
Central Asia.
7. Independently of such wharves, Russians shall have the right to establish
factories on the left bank of the Amu Dana for the purpose of storing and safe-
keeping their merchandise. 'or the purposes of such factories the Government of
the Khan shall allot, in the localities which shall have been indicated by the
superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, a sufficient quantity of unoccupied
land for wharves, and for the construction of storehouses, of buildings for the ac-
commodation of servants of the factories, and of persons transacting business with
the factories, and of merchants' offices, as well as for the establishment of
domestic farms. Such factories, together with all persons residing thereat and with
all goods placed therein, shall be under the immediate protection of the
Government of the Khan, which shall be responsible for the safety and security of
the same.
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8. All the towns and villages, without exception, within the Khanate of Khiva shall
henceforward be open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans
may freely travel throughout the entire khanate, and shall enjoy the special
protection of the local authorities. The Government of the Khan shall be
responsible for the safety of caravans and stores.
9. Russian merchants trading in the khanate shall be free from the payment of
customs duties zakah and of all kinds of dues on trade, in the same manner as the
merchants of Khiva have long enjoyed immunity from zakah on the route through
Knzalinsk, Orenburg, and at the stations on the Caspian sea.
10. Russian merchants shall have the right of carrying their goods through the
Khivan territory to all neighbouring countries free of customs duties (free transit
trade).
11. Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to establish agents
(caravan bashis) in Khiva and other towns within the khanate, for the purpose of
maintaining communication with the authorities and superintending the regularity
of their trade.
12. Russian subjects shall have the right to hold immovable property in Khiva. A
land-tax shall be leviable on the same by agreement with the superior Russian
authority in Central Asia.
13. commercial engagements between Russians and Khivans shall be fulfilled
inviolably on both sides.
14. The Government of the Khan engages to investigate, without delay, the
complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans, and in case such
complaints and claims shall have proved to be well founded, to give immediate
satisfaction in respect of the same. In the examination of disputes or claims
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between Russian subjects and Khivans, preference shall be given to Russians in
respect to the payment of debts by Khivans.
15. Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to
the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction, even in the event
of such complaints and claims being raised by Russian subjects within the confines
of the khanate.
16. The Government of the Khan shall in no case give refuge to emigrants
(runaways) from Russia having no pennit from Russian authorities, without regard
to the nationality of such individuals. Should any Russian subjects, being criminals,
seek concealment within the boundaries of Khiva, in order to avoid judicial pursuit,
the Government of the Khan engaged to capture such persons, and to surrender
them to the nearest Russian authorities.
17. The proclamation made by Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan on the
12th of July last respecting the liberation of all slaves in the khanates and the
abolition in perpetuity of slavery and of trade in men, shall remain in full force,
and the Government of the Khan engages to employ all the means in its power in
order to watch over the strict and conscientious prosecution of this matter.
18. A fine is inflicted on the Khanate of Khiva to the extent of two million two
hundred thousand roubles, in order to cover the expenses incurred by the Russian
Exchequer in the prosecution of the late war, which was provoked by the Govern-
ment of the Kha¼I257( %A] AA*e Khivan people. Since, owing to the insufficiency
of money in the country, and particularly in the hands of the Government, the
Khivan Government is unable to pay the above sum within a short time, the
Khivan Government shall, in consideration of such difficulty, have the right of
paying the said fine by installments, with the addition of interest thereon at the rate
of five per cent, per annum, on condition that, during the first two years, one
hundred thousand roubles shall be annually paid into the Russian Exchequer, one
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hundred and twenty-five thousand roubles per annum during the two ensuing years,
and, after that, one hundred and seventy-five thousand roubles per annum during
the succeeding two years, and in the year 1881, that is to say, after the expiration
of eight years, the sum of two hundred thousand roubles shall be paid; and, lastly,
a sum of not less than two hundred thousand roubles per annum shall be paid until
the final settlement of the claim. The installments may be paid both in Russian
bank-notes and in the current coin of Khiva, at the pleasure of the Government of
the Khan. The first instalment shall be paid on the 1st of December 1873. On
account of this instalment the Khan shall have the right to levy a tax for the
current year from the population on the right bank, according to the assessment
hitherto in force. This collection shall be terminated by the 1st of December, by
agreement between the Khan's collectors and the local Russian authorities.
Subsequent installments shall be paid in by the 1st of November of each year, until
the entire fine, with interest thereon, shall have been paid off. After the expiration
of nineteen years, that is to say, by the 1st of November 1892, after the payment of
two hundred thousand roubles for the year 1892, the sum of seventy thousand and
fifty-four roubles will still be due by the Government of the Khan, and, by the 1St
of November 1893, the last instalment of seventy-three thousand five hundred and
fifty-seven roubles shall be paid. Should the Government of the Khan desire to
shorten the term of payment, and thus to reduce the amount of accruing interest, it
shall have the right to pay larger annual installments. These conditions have been
fixed and accepted for exact execution and constant guidance on the one part by
General Aide de Camp Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and on the
other part by Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan, Ruler of Khiva, in the
garden of Hendemian.
The original treaty was signed and sealed by General Kaufmann, Governor-General
of Turkestan, and by Sayed Mohammed Rahirn Bahadur the Khan of Khiva.
August 12th 1873, the first day of the month Rajab 1290.
Signed and sealed, General Kaufmann
The Turkish text signed and sealed by Sayed Mohammad Rahim, Khan of Khiva
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RUSSO-BUKHARAN TREATY
September 28, 1873
(Boulger, England and Russia in Central Asia)
1 - The line of frontier between the dominions of His Imperial Majesty the
Emperor of all the Russias and those of His Eminence the Amir of Bukhara
remains unaltered. All the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu Dana
being now annexed to the Russian dominions, the former frontier separating the
possessions of the Amir of Bukhara from the Khanate of Khiva, and stretching on
the west from the locality called Khal-ata towards Gugertli, Togai, on the right
bank of Amu, is abolished. The territory situated between the former Bukharo-
Khivan frontier, the right bank of the Amu Dana from Gugertli to Meshekly,
Togai, and the line passing from Meshekly to the point of junction of the former
Bukharo-Khivan frontier, with the frontier of the Russian Empire, a annexed to the
dominions of the Amir of Bukhara.
2 - The right bank of the Amu Dana being detached from the Khanate of Khiva,
all the caravan routes leading from Bukhara to the north into the Russian
dominions traverse henceforth exclusive lands belonging to Bukharan and Russia.
The Governments of Russia and Bukhara, each within its own limits, shall both
watch over the security of the march of caravans and of the transit trade.
3 - Russian steamers and other Russian Government vessels, as well as vessels
belonging private individuals, shall have the right of free navigation on that portion
of the Amu Dana which belongs to the Amir of Bukhara.
4 - Russians shall have the right to establish wharves (landing-places) and
storehouses for merchandise in such places on the Bukharan banks of the Amu
Dana as may be judged necessary and convenient for that purpose. The
Government of Bukhara shall undertake to watch over the safety and security of
the said wharves and storehouses. The ratification of the selection of localities for
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the establishment wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authorities in Central
Asia.
5 - All the towns and villages of the Khan of Bukhara shall be open to Russian
trade. Russian traders and Russian caravans shall freely pass through all parts of
the khanate and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The
Bukharan Government shall be responsible for the security of Russian caravans
within the. confmes of the Khanate of Bukhara.
6 - All merchandise belonging to Russian traders, whether transported from the
Russia possessions into Bukhara or from Bukhara to Russia, shall, without
exception, be liable to a tax of two and a half per cent. In the same way as a duty
of one-fortieth is charged on merchandise in the Turkestan province. Besides this
zakah no other supplementaiy tax shall be imposed.
7 - Russian traders shall have the right to transport their merchandise through
Bukhara to all neighbouring countries free of duty.
8 - Russian traders shall be allowed to establish caravanserais for the storage of
their merchandise in all Bukharan towns in which they may consider it necessary
to do so. Bukharan traders shall enjoy the same privilege in towns of the Turkestan
province.
9 - Russian traders shall have the right to have commercial agents in all the towns
of Bukhara, whose business it shall be to watch over the regular course of trade
and over the legal imposition of customs dues, and who shall also be authorised to
enter into communication with the local authorities. Bukharan traders shall enjoy
the same privilege in the towns of the Turkestan province.
10 - Engagements of trade between Russians and Bukharans shall be held sacred
and inviolable on both sides. The Bukharan Government shall promise to keep
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watch over the honest fulfilment of all trading engagements, as also over the
conscientious conduct of trading affairs generally.
11 - Russian subjects shall equally with the subjects of Bukhara have the right to
occupy themselves in the Bukharan dominions with the various trades and crafts
which are allowed under the Shari'ah in exactly the same way as Bukharan
subjects are permitted in the Russian dominions to follow those occupations which
are sanctioned by the laws of Russia.
12 - Russian subjects shall have the right to possess immovable property in the
khanate, i.e. to acquire by purchase gardens and cultivable lands Such property
shall be liable to a land-tax on an equality with properties of Bukharan subjects.
The same right shall be enjoyed by Bukharan subject within the limits of the
Russian Empire.
13 - Russian subjects shall enter the Bukharan dominions with permits, issued by
the Russian authorities, for crossing the frontier; they shall have the right of free
passage throughout the entire khanate and they shall enjoy the special protection of
the Bukharan authorities.
14 - The Government of Bukhara shall in no case admit into its country any
emigrants from Russia whatever may be their nationality, who are not provided
with permits from Russian authorities. If criminal, being a Russian subject, seeks
refuge within the confines of Bukhara from the pursuit of the law the same shall be
arrested and delivered over to the nearest Russian authorities.
15 - In order to hold direct and uninterrupted relations with the superior Russian
authorities in Central Asia, the Amir of Bukhara shall select from among those
around him a person of confidence whom he shall establish at Tashkand as his
Envoy Plenipotentiary. Such Envoy shall reside at Tashkand in a house belonging
to the Amir, and at the expense of the latter.
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16 - The Russian Government may in like manner have a permanent representative
in Bukhara shall be near the person of His Eminence the Amir. The Russian
Plenipotentiary in Bukhara, as in the case of the Amir's Plenipotentiary in
Tashkand, shall reside in a house belonging to the Russian Government, and at the
expense of the latter.
17 - In deference to the Emperor of all the Russias, and for the greater glory of His
Imperial Majesty, His Eminence the Amir Sayed Muzaffar has resolved that
henceforth and for ever the shameful trade in men which is so contrary to the laws
of humanity, shall be abolished within the limits of Bukhara. In conformity with
this resolution, Sayed Muzaffar shall immediately send to all his beks the strictest
orders to that effect. Besides the order abolishing the slave trade, commands shall
be sent to all the frontier towns of Bukhara to which slaves are brought for sale
from neighbouring countries, to the effect that in case slaves should be brought to
such places, notwithstanding the orders of the Amir, the same should be taken from
their owners and immediately liberated.
18 - His Eminence Sayed Muzaffar, being sincerely desirous of developing and
strengthening the friendly and neighbourly relations which have subsisted for five
years to the benefit of Bukhara, shall be guided by the seventeen articles
composing the Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Bukhara This treaty shall
be written in duplicate, each copy being written in the two languages, one in the
Russian and the other in the Turkish language. In token of the confirmation of
treaty and of its acceptance as guide to himself and to his successors, the Amir
Sayed Muzaffar has attached his seal.
Sha'ban, 19th, 1290 (A.H.),
September 28th, 1873 (A.D.)
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Abbreviations
AKAK
FO
FOCP
gi. arkhiv
I0
L/P&S
MID
PP
PRO
SAGU
SHC
TsG VIA
Akty Kavkazkoi Arkhiologicheskii Komissii
Foreign Office
Foreign Office Confidential Print
Glavnyi Arkhiv
India Office
Letters, Private and Secret
Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del
Parliamentary Papers
Public Record Office
Sredne-Aziatskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet
Secret Home Correspondence
Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv
Arshin
Bushel
Chetvert
Chinovnik
Desiatin
Gubernia
Pud
Sajen
Uezd
Ukaz
Verst
Volost
Glossary
2.33 feet
36,3687 litre
5.77 bushels
Civil functionary, bureaucrat
2.7 acres
Governorship, govemorate, province
36.11 lbs
7 feet English
disthct
decree, legislative act
0.66 English mile (3,500 feet)
small rural district, usually consisted of group of villages under
local administration.
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Bibliographical essay on contemporary sources
Besides official primary sources preserved in the University Library (Cam -
bridge), the India Office Library (London), and the Public Record Office (London), I
have relied on contemporary Russian and western accounts.
The writings of western officials and travellers who visited the region
contain indispensable first hand descriptions. I have especially utiised those who
were equipped with knowledge of the Russian language, among whom we find
Eugene Schuyler, the American Chargé d'affairs in St. Petersburg, who, after a visit
to the region, contributed Turkestan: Notes on a Journey in Russian Turkestan,
Kokand Bukhara, and Kuidja, (2 volumes, London 1876), which deals, among other
important subjects, with issues such as the Russian immigration to the region and the
Russian administration; Henry Lansdell, who also was invited by the Imperial
Government to visit Central Asia and later published Russian Central Asia including
Kuidja, Bokhara, Khiva, and Merv, (2 volumes, London 1885); and Charles Mar-
vin's eye-witness narrative in his The Eye-witness account of the disastrous Russian
campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans, describing the March across the
burning desert, the storming of Den geel Tepe, and the disastrous retreat to the
Caspian, (London 1880) (and his other works listed in this bibliography): he was an
Englishman who was allowed to accompany the advancing Russian armies, and tells
of his personal meetings and interviews with Skobelev on the eve of his departure to
Central Asia as Commander-in-Chief of the Transcaspian army, which have made
his books indispensable even to Russian and Soviet historians who have referred to
them frequently. The same privilege, i.e. exemption to accompany the Russian
advancing forces, was granted to Januarius A. MacGahan. This made his book
Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva (1874) essential as an eye-witness
account for the historians investigating this campaign. Lord Curzon's Russia in
Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question, (London 1889), also was
based on personal observations during his visit to Central Asia in the autumn of
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1888. His travelling along the Transcaspian railway makes his book an indispensable
reference for any study of that project, its local impact and potential as an effective
arm in Russia's contest with England. Additional value to this book, comes from the
fact that it was read, before publishing, by M. Lessar, previously Russia's political
agent in Bukhara, who in 1889 was Consul-General at Liverpool. The threat to India
and rivalry between the two empires was disscussed in The Central Asian Question
from an Eastern Stand-Point, (London, Edinburgh 1869), an unsigned work whose
contents give evidence that its author was well informed about the relations between
the two Empires, England and Russia, their intentions and strength in Asia. Original-
ly this appear to have had a restricted circulation within the government but was
subsequently published. A lively representation of political activities in St. Peters-
burg, and of Anglo-Russian and Russo-Turkish relations, is in The Diplomatic
Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862 -1879, (2 volumes London 1894). Other
European writers and travellers, besides recording integral and unique accounts of
Central Asian politics and economy, provided us with historical records of the
customs, heritage, character, and tradition of the people of Central Asia. J. P. Ferrier
in Caravan Journey and wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan, and Belooch-
istan; with a historical notices of the Countries lying between Russia and India,
(London 1856), made a lively reconstruction of the countries traversed by him. The
author, besides his description of roads and social life, paid attention to early
Russian efforts in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Among these travellers also we fmd
prominent scholars and writers such as Armenius Vambery, who wrote several books
that deal with the rivalry between Bukhara and Afghanistan, types of governments in
both countries, their commercial and educational institutions, and Russia's strategy
and its commercial superiority in Bukharan markets, e.g. in his Travels in Central
Asia, (London 1864). The politics of both European Empires were dealt with in his
Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question, (London 1874); in Sketches
of Central Asia, (London 1868), Vambery included a brisk description of minute
specifications of social life and local administration; and in Western Culture in
Eastern Lands, (London 1906), he illustrated the dimensions of change in the life
and social structure of the Khanates after massive immigration from European
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Russia, the type of local government imposed by St. Petersburg and the system of
education and methods of coercion followed by the Russian administration. An
invaluable work examining Russian strength in Central Asia is a volume by Singh,
S. H., A History of Kokand, (Lahore 1878). This book is based on original intel-
ligence submitted to the Government of India by Pandit Manphul, an official of the
Punjab authorities. Manphul was dispatched on an intelligence mission to Central
Asia in 1865 accompanied by three assistants. Their original accounts provided the
basis of Singh's book which deals, among other issues, with Russia's military
strength in Turkestan and the threat facing Kokand from that power. The military
presence and influence of both empires in their respective spheres was traced by a
member of the Royal Geographical Society, D. C. Boulger, in England and Russia
in Central Asia, 2 vols. (London 1879). It is needless to say that his Central Asian
Portraits (1880) is an essential biographical reference to a number of Central Asian
dignitaries. Russia's strategy against British India was discussed profoundly in H.
Southerland Edwards' Russian Projects against India from the Czar Peter to
General Skobeleff, (London 1885). The same subject was thoroughly investigated by
G. Malleson, an officer of the army of the Indian Government, in The Russo-Afghan
Question and the Invasion of India, (London 1885). An indispensable volume about
the politics of both empires in Asia, their political and economic rivalry in Asia, and
its direct effect on the Khanates of Central Asia and Afghanistan, is Henry Rawlin-
son's England and Russia in the East (London 1875). Besides these sources there
are other contemporary works and articles in different periodicals listed in this
bibliography which have proved most illuminating.
The nineteenth-century Russian sources have of course been utilized by
previous authors, however, these sources remain far from being fully used. It is
appropriate to say that these sources, especially those written by Russian orientalists,
Generals, and officials who served in Central Asia, among whom we find Khanikov,
Valikhanov, Terentiev, Grodekov, Kaufmann, Skobelev, Grulev, and academicians
such as Bartol'd, and others, contain a very wide a range of useful material, not only
for the political historian, but for other fields of history: economic, social, and
military. Miiutin's Dnevnik, (3 volumes Moscow 1947-1950) stands as the best
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source in regard to correspondence and communication with Generals in Central
Asia. These three volumes contain excellent material which demonstrate St. Peters-
burg's firm control over proceedings in Central Asia, which help to refute the
assumption that the Central Government could not control "ambitious Generals" in
Central Asia. General M. A. Terentiev was one of the highest ranking officials in
Kaufmann's office in Turkestan for a long period that extended form the year of the
formation of the Turkestan province (1867) until the early 1880s. His works, besides
the fact that they are a complete narrative of the Russian conquest, was a first hand
account and differ from other works by their apparent impartiality. The neutrality of
his judgement was the main reason behind the Imperial censor's decision to post-
pone publishing his works for more than a quarter of a century. In Rossiia i Anglia v
bor'be za rynki, (St. Petersburg 1876), Terentiev extensively discussed economic
rivalry between Russia and England in Asia with emphasis on Russia's advantages
in this contest; in Russia and England in Central Asia, (2 vols.) (translated by
Daukes, F. C., Calcutta 1876), the author reviewed the history of the Russo-Central
Asian relations and the position of both Empires in the region; Istoriia zavoevaniia
srednei Azii, (3 volumes St. Petersburg 1906), is among the best historical sources
about the Russian advance in Central Asia. In this work Terentiev discussed events,
military operations, and the attitude of Central Asians, officials and laymen, giving
very interesting details. The same can be said about General Grodekov, who was an
active figure in the military administration of Central Asia, in Kaufmann's office as
well, for most of his career. He recorded in minute detail Skobelev's campaign
against the Turkomans in his Voina v Turkmenii, pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.,
(3 volumes, St Petersburg 1883), besides which he left complete archive named after
him as Arkhiv Grodekova. These most important works of both Terentiev and
Grodekov, are not translated. The Khivan expedition was discussed as well in
Khivinskii pokhod 1873 g., (St. Petersburg 1888), an anonymous study but the details
it contains prove that the author was closely involved in preparing military opera-
tions against Khiva. It contains vital and itemized military details of plans and of
armies which took part in the Khivan campaign. Alikanov Avarskii, a renowned
Russian officer who served in Central Asia, left interesting accounts in his articles
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published in Vestnik Evropy, "Zakaspeiskie vospominaniia 1881-1885", part I in
volume September 1904, and part II in volume October 1904. His original name was
Maqsud Au khan Avari, originally from Daghistan. After joining the Russian army
as an officer, he demonstrated vivid energy and accomplished skillfully tasks
assigned to him in Central Asia. In these articles he speaks of his efforts in recon-
noitering the region to the south of Askabad; his clandestine visit to Merv, and
negotiating with the four Khans of Merv. The auther in astonishing details describes
the efforts spent to survey Serakhs, the basin of the Tedzhen river, and the intrigues
against the Saryk Turkomans. Skobelev's project for the invasion of India, which
later was found in the papers of Prince Cherkaskii, leavs no doubt about the inten-
tion of Russia's Generals and politicians against British India for political, strategic,
and economic purposes. Skobelev in his project "Proekt M. D. Skobeleva o pokhode
v Indiiu", !storicheskii vestnik, vol. XIV, Dec. 1883, elaborated on methods of
conducting the campaign and the consequences of invading India on European
politics. Among interesting works about Trans-Caspian railway we find Dmitriev-
Mamonov's Putevoditel po Turkestanu i sredne-aziatskoi zheleznoi dorogi, (St.
Petersburg 1903): a very informative book about the history of the project and its
later development from military railway to civilian project, the author describes in
detail the regional, political and economic impact of the project, as well as its
management and the historic places traversed by the railway. A valuable study of
later stages of immigration to the east, its social and economic aftermath is Isaev 'S
Pereselenie v russ/corn narodnom khoziaistve, (St. Petersburg 1891). Kostenko, Lev
Feofilovich (1841-91), wrote several articles about his military activities in both
Central Asia and the Caucasus. The author, after graduation from the Academy of
the General Staff, was attached to Turkestan military circles in 1867. He took part in
the Khivan expedition in 1873, and in 1887 was appointed as chief of the Asian
department of the General Staff. He wrote a considerable number of articles dealing
with the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva; among which "Opisanie puteshestviia
Russkoi missii v Bukharu"; and "Gorod Bukhara v 1870", Voennyi sbornik, 76
(1870). The two articles are closely correlated. In the first the author discussed the
customary Russian way of dealing with Central Asians and described life in the
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steppe and the roads crossing this region. The arcticle contains valuable facts about
the education and economy of Samarkand. In the second article Kostenko depicts
social life in the Khanate, as well as Russo-Bukharan and Anglo-Bukharan trade:
also in both articles he discusses the status of Russian fugitives in Bukhara. In a
very informative article "Istoricheskii ocherk rasprostranenie russkago vladychestva v
srednei Azii", Voennyi sbornik, August 1887, the author discussed reasons for, and
stages of Russia's advance in Central Asia. The author also underlined the advantag-
es of Russia's geographic location on the Eurasian landmass. Bukhara, its internal
and foreign affairs, were scrutinized by D. N. Logofet in number of interesting
works; Bukharskoe khansl'.'o pod russkim protektoratom, (2 vols., St. Petersburg
1911), where he as an advocate of the annexation of Bukhara and defends his point
of view from political as well as economic aspects. He has several other works
about this Khanate; Ocherki i raskasy (St. Petersburg 1905); Na granitsakh srednei
Azii, putevye ocherki (St. Petersburg 1909); Strana bespraviia, bukharskoe khanstvo i
ego sovremennoe sostoianie, (St. Petersburg 1909). Bukharskoe khanstvo pod
russkim protektoratom is probably the most important because the author, besides
other matters, discusses in detail the social and political life of the Khanate. Misuse
of authority by the Bukharan government was exceptionally underlined. His points of
view were accepted as guidelines by the Turkestan government when the fate of
Bukhara was under discussion in 1909. P. Nebolsin in several, mostly economic
works, illustrates Russia's increasing interest in Central Asia, and in the meantime
demonstrates the inferiority of Russia's merchandise compared to European goods
dominating Central asian markets. He sought to portray Russia as the most advanta-
geous partner for the Central Asians. The history of Khiva has ample works,
however N. G. Zalesov's, due to the author's participation in political life, are
among those most interesting, 'Pokhod v Khivu Kapitana Nikiforova v 1841g",
Voennyi sbornik, (1861) No. 8; and "Posolstvo v Khivu Podpolkovnika Danilevskogo
v 1842 g.", Voennyi sbornik, 1866, No. 5; reprinted in Russkii Vestnik, 1871, No. 2,
pp. 421-440 and No. 3, pp. 42-82. Zalesov (1826-1896) began his career in Oren-
burg oblast' as an officer and was promoted during his long service (1848-1870) and
became Chief of Staff of Orenburg Corps. The author took part in Ignatiev's mission
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to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858, hence his articles are regarded as first hand accounts.
See Russkaia starina, April-December 1903 about the author's biography.
Yet Bartol'ds works; Sochineniia, (9 volumes in 10, Moscow 1963-1977),
Istoriia izuchenie vostoka v Evropy i Rossii (Leningrad 1925), are not only complete
but among rare works that can be considered impartial. They include besides histori-
cal accounts, reliable studies of other economic, social, cultural, and political
aspects. Bartol'd, a well known academic, worked on the history of these Khanates
under two political patterns, the Tsarist and Bolshevik systems. However his
approaches are reliable and cherished by contemporary historians of the region.
Besides the above mentioned, sources for the history of Central Asia itself
are abundant and various. They include rich and well documented "waqf' chronicles
and records of legislative processes in the Khanates. However, most of these sources
remain unstudied, and untranslated into any European language other than Russian.
Accounts of European diplomats and travellers, including Russian, are among the
most important sources. There is another series of accounts: memoirs which include
highly informative material and fairly used as well, including official archives of the
Khanates, accounts of merchants who narrated to Russian authorities, of course upon
their request, their observations. In addition to that, one can add descriptions and
tales of freed slaves or abducted citizens which contain ample information, despite
the fact they should be handled with vigilance and extra care due to the fact that
narrators may tend to exaggerate. Most of these accounts and manuscripts are
preserved in the Institute for the study of Eastern Manuscripts, Academy of Science
of Uzbeksan SSR, hence their availability to foreign writers is limited to quotations
in Russian works.
However, diplomatic and missionary accounts can be characterised as among
the most accurate and comprehensive. This category of sources includes communi-
ques, military and political, and official reports such as those of De Maizon and
Vitkevich about their missions to Bukhara published recently as Zapiski o Bukhar-
skom Khanstve, (Moscow 1983). These reports are among the first that can be
classified as intelligence reports about internal and external affairs of the Khanates.
These reports included highly valuable accounts about economic, political, social,
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and most interestingly about religious affairs. To the same category belong the
accounts of the orientalist Khanikov, Valikhanov and others, mining engineers
Butenev and Bogoslovskii, and diplomatic reports of Nikiforov, Butenev, Danilev-
skii, Ignatiev and other diplomats who were commissioned officially for negotiations
with the governments of the Khanates. Their accounts are recorded in Zhukovskii's
Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednye trekhsotletie, (Petrograd 1915):
A highly useful study of Russia's political exertions to influence Central Asian
Khanates through official envoys.
The inaccessibility of unpublished original sources, to foreign writers gives
great value to Russian published works based on those sources. Hence the works of
Popov, especially in view of the author's established impartiality, have great value.
His articles "Borba za sredneaziatskii platsdarm" and 'iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei
Azii" derive their importance from the fact that they are based on the archives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, MID), Tsentralno-
voenno istoricheskii arkhiv (TsVIA), Morskoi sbornik (MS), Torgovyi sbornik (TS),
Akty Kavkazskogo arkhiologicheskogo komiteta (AKAK), Moskovskie vedomosti
(MV), Arkhiv Grodekova (AG), Russkii arkhiv (RA), Zapiski russkogo geograf-
icheskogo obshchestva (ZRGO), and others. The same is true regarding M. Rozh-
kova's Ekonomicheskaia politika tsarskogo pravitelstva na srednem vostoke v vtoroi
chetverti XIX veka i russkaia burzhuaziia, (Moscow 1949), Ekonomicheskie sviazi
Rossii so srednei Aziei, (Moscow 1963), and her article "Iz istorii torgovlii Rossii so
srednei Azii v 60-kh godakh XIX veka", Istoricheskie zapiski, No. 67 (1960); and N.
A. Kalfin's Politika Rossii v srednei Azii, and Prisoedinenie srednei Azii K Rossii.
Grulev's Sopernichestvo Rossii I Anglii v srednei Azii, (St. Petersburg 1909), is
based mostly on personal observation during his long service in the region. Other
Russian sources will be commented on in the following bibliographical list.
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